Fix wildcard detection (#11), dead repo URLs, and duplicate CI steps

.github/ISSUE_TEMPLATE/config.yml

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 blank_issues_enabled: false
 contact_links:
   - name: Security vulnerability
-    url: https://github.com/VantaInc/grantguard/security/advisories/new
+    url: https://github.com/OpenVanta/GrantGuard/security/advisories/new
     about: Please report security issues privately, not as public issues.

.github/workflows/ci.yml

@@ -21,8 +21,6 @@ jobs:
         python-version: ["3.10", "3.14"]
     steps:
       - uses: actions/checkout@3d3c42e5aac5ba805825da76410c181273ba90b1 # v7.0.1
-      - uses: actions/setup-python@ece7cb06caefa5fff74198d8649806c4678c61a1 # v6.3.0
-      - uses: actions/checkout@9c091bb21b7c1c1d1991bb908d89e4e9dddfe3e0 # v7.0.0
       - uses: actions/setup-python@5fda3b95a4ea91299a34e894583c3862153e4b97 # v7.0.0
         with:
           python-version: ${{ matrix.python-version }}

CHANGELOG.md

@@ -7,6 +7,17 @@ and this project adheres to [Semantic Versioning](https://semver.org/spec/v2.0.0
 
 ## [Unreleased]
 
+### Fixed
+- Detectors now classify colon-syntax prefix wildcards (`Bash(cmd:*)`, the form
+  Claude Code itself writes for "always allow") the same as the equivalent
+  space form (`Bash(cmd *)`), and flag bare tool-wide wildcards such as
+  `Bash(*)` as overbroad instead of safe. ([#11])
+- Dead `VantaInc/grantguard` links now point to `OpenVanta/GrantGuard`: the
+  CONTRIBUTING clone command, this changelog's link references, the issue
+  chooser's security-advisory link, and the web UI's share buttons.
+
+[#11]: https://github.com/OpenVanta/GrantGuard/issues/11
+
 ## [0.1.0] - 2026-07-07
 
 Initial release.
@@ -35,5 +46,5 @@ Initial release.
   `Origin`, resisting DNS-rebinding and CSRF against the write endpoint, and
   caps request body size.
 
-[Unreleased]: https://github.com/VantaInc/grantguard/compare/v0.1.0...HEAD
-[0.1.0]: https://github.com/VantaInc/grantguard/releases/tag/v0.1.0
+[Unreleased]: https://github.com/OpenVanta/GrantGuard/compare/v0.1.0...HEAD
+[0.1.0]: https://github.com/OpenVanta/GrantGuard/releases/tag/v0.1.0

CONTRIBUTING.md

@@ -19,8 +19,8 @@ coverage are all very welcome.
 ## Local setup
 
 ```bash
-git clone https://github.com/VantaInc/grantguard.git
-cd grantguard
+git clone https://github.com/OpenVanta/GrantGuard.git
+cd GrantGuard
 uv run grantguard.py audit     # CLI, dry-run
 uv run grantguard.py           # local web UI
 ```
@@ -37,7 +37,7 @@ the code looking consistent:
 - **[tsgo](https://github.com/microsoft/typescript-go)** (`typescript@rc`) — the
   new Go-based TypeScript compiler. We use it in `--checkJs` mode to catch type
   errors in the JS without a compile step.
-- **[oxfmt](https://github.com/nicolo-ribaudo/oxfmt)** — a fast JS/TS formatter
+- **[oxfmt](https://oxc.rs/docs/guide/usage/formatter)** — a fast JS/TS formatter
   built on oxc.
 
 ```bash

grantguard/core/detectors.py

@@ -170,6 +170,8 @@ def masked_text(self) -> str:
     )
 ]
 
+# In Claude Code rules, `cmd:*` and `cmd *` are equivalent prefix wildcards,
+# and the colon form is what "always allow" writes — so patterns accept both.
 DESTRUCTIVE_DETECTORS = [
     PatternDetector(
         category=RiskCategory.DESTRUCTIVE,
@@ -180,8 +182,8 @@ def masked_text(self) -> str:
         r"\brmdir\s+/s",                                     # Windows recursive rmdir
         r"\bdel\s+/[a-z]",                                   # Windows del /q /s
         r"Remove-Item\b.*-Recurse",                          # PowerShell
-        r"git\s+reset\s+\*",
-        r"git\s+rebase\s+\*",
+        r"git\s+reset[\s:]+\*",
+        r"git\s+rebase[\s:]+\*",
         r"\bkill\s+-9\b",
         r"\bpkill\b",
         r"\bxargs\s+kill",
@@ -206,8 +208,9 @@ def masked_text(self) -> str:
         pattern=re.compile(pattern_source),
     )
     for pattern_source in (
-        r"^Bash\((?:sudo\s+)?[\w./\\-]+\s+\*\)$",            # `tool *`
-        r"git\s+(?:clone|add|commit|fetch|merge|pull|checkout|ls-remote|rev-list|ls-tree)\s+\*",
+        r"^(?:\w{1,64}\(\*\)|\*)$",                          # `Tool(*)` / bare `*`
+        r"^Bash\((?:sudo\s+)?[\w./\\-]+[\s:]+\*\)$",         # `tool *` / `tool:*`
+        r"git\s+(?:clone|add|commit|fetch|merge|pull|checkout|ls-remote|rev-list|ls-tree)[\s:]+\*",
         r"(?:npm|pip|pip3|npx|gh|cargo|brew|apt|yum|choco)\b.*\*",
         r"chmod\s+\+x",
     )

grantguard/web/app.js

@@ -52,7 +52,7 @@ const CHEVRON_EL = svgEl(svgIcon(`<path d="M9 6l6 6l-6 6"/>`));
 const X_SVG = `<svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" viewBox="0 0 24 24" width="16" height="16" fill="currentColor" aria-hidden="true"><path d="M18.244 2.25h3.308l-7.227 8.26 8.502 11.24H16.17l-5.214-6.817L4.99 21.75H1.68l7.73-8.835L1.254 2.25H8.08l4.713 6.231zm-1.161 17.52h1.833L7.084 4.126H5.117z"/></svg>`;
 const LINKEDIN_SVG = `<svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" viewBox="0 0 24 24" width="16" height="16" fill="currentColor" aria-hidden="true"><path d="M19 0h-14c-2.761 0-5 2.239-5 5v14c0 2.761 2.239 5 5 5h14c2.762 0 5-2.239 5-5v-14c0-2.761-2.238-5-5-5zm-11 19h-3v-11h3v11zm-1.5-12.268c-.966 0-1.75-.79-1.75-1.764s.784-1.764 1.75-1.764 1.75.79 1.75 1.764-.783 1.764-1.75 1.764zm13.5 12.268h-3v-5.604c0-3.368-4-3.113-4 0v5.604h-3v-11h3v1.765c1.396-2.586 7-2.777 7 2.476v6.759z"/></svg>`;
 
-const REPO_URL = "https://github.com/VantaInc/grantguard";
+const REPO_URL = "https://github.com/OpenVanta/GrantGuard";
 
 // ── Global state ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
 const state = {
@@ -670,7 +670,7 @@ class GgShareModal extends HTMLElement {
           ta,
           h("div", { class: "modal-link" }, [
             "Shares ",
-            h("code", { text: "github.com/VantaInc/grantguard" }),
+            h("code", { text: "github.com/OpenVanta/GrantGuard" }),
           ]),
           h("div", { class: "modal-actions" }, [
             status,

tests/test_detectors.py

@@ -33,6 +33,24 @@ def test_buckets(self):
         for text, expected in cases.items():
             self.assertIs(C(text), expected, text)
 
+    def test_bare_tool_wildcards_are_overbroad(self):
+        for text in ("Bash(*)", "Skill(*)", "*"):
+            self.assertIs(C(text), RiskCategory.OVERBROAD, text)
+
+    def test_colon_and_space_wildcard_syntax_classify_identically(self):
+        pairs = (
+            ("Bash(nc *)", "Bash(nc:*)"),
+            ("Bash(sudo cp *)", "Bash(sudo cp:*)"),
+            ("Bash(git reset *)", "Bash(git reset:*)"),
+            ("Bash(git rebase *)", "Bash(git rebase:*)"),
+            ("Bash(git add *)", "Bash(git add:*)"),
+            ("Bash(git push *)", "Bash(git push:*)"),
+            ("Bash(npm install *)", "Bash(npm install:*)"),
+        )
+        for space_form, colon_form in pairs:
+            self.assertIsNot(C(space_form), RiskCategory.SAFE, space_form)
+            self.assertIs(C(colon_form), C(space_form), colon_form)
+
     def test_placeholder_not_flagged_as_secret(self):
         self.assertIsNot(C('Bash(curl -H "X-Api-Key: __TRACKED_VAR__" https://x.y)'),
                          RiskCategory.SECRET)