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Security: wastedcode/truecast

SECURITY.md

Security Policy

Supported versions

truecast is pre-1.0. Security fixes land on the latest published minor; please upgrade to the most recent release before reporting.

Version Supported
latest 0.x
older 0.x ❌ (upgrade first)

Reporting a vulnerability

Do not open a public GitHub issue for a security vulnerability.

Report privately via one of:

Please include: affected version, a description of the issue, reproduction steps or a proof-of-concept, and the impact you foresee. We aim to acknowledge within 72 hours and to agree a disclosure timeline with you before any public write-up.

Threat model — what truecast does and does not touch

  • A persona is third-party content you choose to install. Installing a persona materializes a Claude Code subagent whose system prompt comes from that persona's core/. Running it executes those instructions inside your authenticated Claude Code session. Treat an untrusted persona like untrusted code — read what you install, prefer pinned versions (@<tag>) from sources you trust.
  • truecast owns no credentials. It materializes a subagent for your already-authenticated Claude Code; it has no API keys and never reads or writes your auth.
  • Fetching is sandboxed. Git clones run with a hardened environment (no user hooks, no editor/askpass, an explicit protocol allow-list); persona-supplied paths (#subpath, skill/knowledge refs) are forced through src/safety/ — contained to the persona root, rejecting .., absolute paths, and symlink escapes. The core/ materialized into your project is a symlink to the read-only global cache.
  • Every altering operation confirms before it writes, with an explicit --yes to skip — install, update, remove, and doctor --fix all route through one consent gate.
  • Updates can't silently clobber your edits. A per-persona ownership ledger tracks what truecast wrote (by hash); a hand-edited managed file is detected as drift and requires --force.

Out of scope

  • The behavior, output, or safety of the underlying claude CLI and the agent it runs — report those to Anthropic.
  • What a persona's instructions cause your agent to do once you have chosen to install and run it — you own which personas (and which versions/sources) you trust.
  • Anything an orchestrator (e.g. Posse, claudemux) does on top of the truecast API.

Thanks for helping keep truecast and its users safe.

There aren't any published security advisories