Only the latest minor of the current major receives security fixes.
| Version | Supported |
|---|---|
| 2.x.x | ✅ |
| 1.x.x | |
| 0.x.x | ❌ |
Please do not open a public GitHub issue for security findings.
Use one of:
- Private GitHub advisory (preferred): https://github.com/vbcherepanov/a2abridge/security/advisories/new
- Email
vbcherepanov+security@gmail.comwith subject prefix[a2abridge security]. PGP welcome but not required.
You should receive an acknowledgement within 48 hours. We aim to ship a patched release within 7 days for high-severity issues, with a CVE assigned where applicable.
In scope:
- The
a2abridgebinary and every package underinternal/. - The
install.sh/install.ps1installers. - The embedded skill + UserPromptSubmit hook script.
Out of scope:
- Vulnerabilities in upstream dependencies (please report them upstream first; we'll bump after).
- Anything dependent on the user disabling default loopback bind, mTLS, or the PII screen.
Examples we treat as security-class:
- Path traversal or arbitrary write via
a2abridge installoruninstall. - Privilege escalation via the kardianos/service install path.
- Plaintext disclosure of secrets that the PII screen should have caught (false negative).
- mTLS bypass when
A2A_PEER_ALLOWis set. - Inbox / hook injection that can execute attacker-controlled code on the user's machine.
A secret in a peer's outbound message that we failed to redact (PII
screen miss) is a high-severity finding and a regression test will be
added to pii_test.go.