π‘οΈ Sentinel: [HIGH] Fix timing attack vulnerability in token validation#332
π‘οΈ Sentinel: [HIGH] Fix timing attack vulnerability in token validation#332google-labs-jules[bot] wants to merge 1 commit into
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π¨ Severity: HIGH
π‘ Vulnerability: Checking token lengths before calling
timingSafeEqualcreates a short-circuit fast path that leaks the secret's length via timing differences.π― Impact: An attacker could potentially deduce the length of valid authentication tokens and theoretically execute a timing attack.
π§ Fix: Hash both the input token and valid tokens to a fixed length using SHA-256 before comparison with
timingSafeEqual.β Verification: Ran
bun test tests/unit/cli/commands/serve.test.tsand the full test suite.PR created automatically by Jules for task 10992808094530778128 started by @YoungSx