🛡️ Sentinel: [HIGH] Fix timing attack vulnerability in auth token validation#326
🛡️ Sentinel: [HIGH] Fix timing attack vulnerability in auth token validation#326google-labs-jules[bot] wants to merge 2 commits into
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…idation Changed the token validation logic in `src/cli/commands/serve.ts` to hash both the incoming token and the valid tokens before performing a constant-time comparison with `crypto.timingSafeEqual`. This prevents short-circuiting logic that leaks the token length via timing attacks.
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…idation Changed the token validation logic in `src/cli/commands/serve.ts` to hash both the incoming token and the valid tokens before performing a constant-time comparison with `crypto.timingSafeEqual`. This prevents short-circuiting logic that leaks the token length via timing attacks.
🚨 Severity: HIGH
💡 Vulnerability: The Bearer token validation logic short-circuited when checking the lengths of the provided token and the expected token before using
crypto.timingSafeEqual. This leaks the expected token's length through timing differences.🎯 Impact: An attacker can determine the length of valid authentication tokens by observing response times, aiding in brute-force attacks.
🔧 Fix: Changed the validation logic to hash both the provided token and the expected token using SHA-256 before comparing them with
crypto.timingSafeEqual. This ensures a true constant-time comparison.✅ Verification: All existing tests pass and the full test suite was validated. Added a journal entry capturing the vulnerability.
PR created automatically by Jules for task 9359684735099388884 started by @YoungSx