SWRDKV-5447: ocdm-widevine defect fix.#25
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Pull request overview
This PR hardens the MediaKeySession decryption/notification paths in the Widevine OCDM integration, primarily addressing memory-safety risks from client-controlled inputs.
Changes:
- Clamp the IV
memcpylength to the IV buffer size to prevent stack overflow inMediaKeySession::Decrypt. - Add
m_piCallbackinitialization and null-guards before invoking callback methods. - Add SVP in-band header size validation and a token-size guard to prevent out-of-bounds copies when handling secure buffers.
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| memset(iv,0,16); | ||
| memcpy(iv,(char*)sampleInfo->iv, sampleInfo->ivLength); | ||
| size_t ivCopyLen = (sampleInfo->ivLength > sizeof(iv)) ? sizeof(iv) : sampleInfo->ivLength; | ||
| memcpy(iv,(char*)sampleInfo->iv, ivCopyLen); |
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| if (m_piCallback == nullptr) | ||
| return; | ||
| m_piCallback->OnKeyMessage((const uint8_t*) message.c_str(), message.size(), (char*) destUrl.c_str()); |
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| // The SVP header arrives in-band from the IPC client. Reject a dataSize | ||
| // that exceeds the bytes the client actually delivered, otherwise | ||
| // svp_allocate_secure_buffers() memcpy()s past the end of inData. | ||
| uint32_t svpHeaderLen = static_cast<uint32_t>(static_cast<const uint8_t*>(pEncryptedDataStart) - inData); | ||
| if (svpHeaderLen > inDataLength || actualEncDataLength > inDataLength - svpHeaderLen) { | ||
| fprintf(stderr, "[%s:%d] SVP header dataSize %u exceeds inDataLength %u\n", __FUNCTION__, __LINE__, actualEncDataLength, inDataLength); | ||
| goto ErrorExit; | ||
| } |
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What it does: clamps the IV memcpy length to
sizeof(iv)(16) so an attacker-suppliedsampleInfo->ivLengthcannot overflow the stack buffer.