Fix: connect to an OpenClaw gateway over the LAN #57
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| import CryptoKit | ||
| import Foundation | ||
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| /// Ed25519 device identity for the OpenClaw gateway handshake. | ||
| /// | ||
| /// The gateway trusts loopback connections implicitly, so a client running on | ||
| /// the same machine as the gateway connects with a token alone. A connection | ||
| /// from another host — which is every connection from this phone — is granted | ||
| /// no write scope on a token by itself: `chat.send` comes back | ||
| /// "missing scope: operator.write" even though the handshake succeeded. It has | ||
| /// to present a signed device identity, which the gateway then holds as a | ||
| /// pairing request until it is approved once with: | ||
| /// | ||
| /// openclaw devices approve <requestId> | ||
| /// | ||
| /// The key is persisted in the Keychain so the phone presents the same device | ||
| /// on every launch; a fresh key each time would mean a new pairing request each | ||
| /// time, and a list full of stale devices. | ||
| enum OpenClawDeviceIdentity { | ||
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| private static let service = "ai.openclaw.openvision" | ||
| private static let account = "openclaw-device-key" | ||
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| private static let key: Curve25519.Signing.PrivateKey = { | ||
| if let stored = loadKey() { return stored } | ||
| let fresh = Curve25519.Signing.PrivateKey() | ||
| storeKey(fresh) | ||
| return fresh | ||
| }() | ||
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| /// Raw 32-byte public key, base64url — the form the gateway expects. | ||
| static var publicKeyBase64URL: String { base64URL(key.publicKey.rawRepresentation) } | ||
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| /// sha256 of the raw public key, hex. The gateway derives this itself and | ||
| /// compares, so it cannot be chosen freely. | ||
| static var deviceId: String { | ||
| SHA256.hash(data: key.publicKey.rawRepresentation) | ||
| .map { String(format: "%02x", $0) } | ||
| .joined() | ||
| } | ||
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| /// The `device` object for the connect params. `nonce` must be the nonce | ||
| /// from the server's `connect.challenge` event, and the signature covers | ||
| /// the exact field order below — any deviation fails verification. | ||
| static func deviceParams( | ||
| clientId: String, | ||
| clientMode: String, | ||
| role: String, | ||
| scopes: [String], | ||
| token: String, | ||
| nonce: String | ||
| ) -> [String: Any]? { | ||
| let signedAt = Int(Date().timeIntervalSince1970 * 1000) | ||
| let payload = [ | ||
| "v2", deviceId, clientId, clientMode, role, | ||
| scopes.joined(separator: ","), String(signedAt), token, nonce, | ||
| ].joined(separator: "|") | ||
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| guard let data = payload.data(using: .utf8), | ||
| let signature = try? key.signature(for: data) else { return nil } | ||
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| return [ | ||
| "id": deviceId, | ||
| "publicKey": publicKeyBase64URL, | ||
| "signature": base64URL(signature), | ||
| "signedAt": signedAt, | ||
| "nonce": nonce, | ||
| ] | ||
| } | ||
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| // MARK: - Helpers | ||
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| private static func base64URL(_ data: Data) -> String { | ||
| data.base64EncodedString() | ||
| .replacingOccurrences(of: "+", with: "-") | ||
| .replacingOccurrences(of: "/", with: "_") | ||
| .replacingOccurrences(of: "=", with: "") | ||
| } | ||
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| private static func loadKey() -> Curve25519.Signing.PrivateKey? { | ||
| let query: [String: Any] = [ | ||
| kSecClass as String: kSecClassGenericPassword, | ||
| kSecAttrService as String: service, | ||
| kSecAttrAccount as String: account, | ||
| kSecReturnData as String: true, | ||
| kSecMatchLimit as String: kSecMatchLimitOne, | ||
| ] | ||
| var item: CFTypeRef? | ||
| guard SecItemCopyMatching(query as CFDictionary, &item) == errSecSuccess, | ||
| let data = item as? Data else { return nil } | ||
| return try? Curve25519.Signing.PrivateKey(rawRepresentation: data) | ||
| } | ||
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| private static func storeKey(_ key: Curve25519.Signing.PrivateKey) { | ||
| let query: [String: Any] = [ | ||
| kSecClass as String: kSecClassGenericPassword, | ||
| kSecAttrService as String: service, | ||
| kSecAttrAccount as String: account, | ||
| ] | ||
| SecItemDelete(query as CFDictionary) | ||
| var attributes = query | ||
| attributes[kSecValueData as String] = key.rawRepresentation | ||
| attributes[kSecAttrAccessible as String] = kSecAttrAccessibleAfterFirstUnlock | ||
|
There was a problem hiding this comment. 🔒 Security & Privacy | 🟡 Minor | ⚡ Quick win 🧩 Analysis chain🌐 Web query:
💡 Result: Keychain items configured with the kSecAttrAccessibleAfterFirstUnlockThisDeviceOnly attribute are cryptographically bound to the hardware UID of the specific device on which they were created [1][2]. Consequently, these items do not migrate to new devices and are not included in backups intended for restoration on other devices [1][3][2]. Key behavior points regarding device migration and backup: - Non-Migratory: Items with the ThisDeviceOnly suffix are excluded from both iCloud backups and direct device-to-device transfers (such as Quick Start) [2]. - Restoration: If a backup containing these items is restored to a different device, the items will not be present, and the app will receive an errSecItemNotFound (-25300) error when attempting to access them [2]. - Security Intent: This attribute is designed for data that must remain bound to a specific physical device for security reasons. Developers are strongly advised to implement re-authentication or data-recovery flows within their applications to handle scenarios where these items are unexpectedly absent after a migration [2][4]. This attribute remains accessible after the first user unlock following a device restart and persists in memory until the next restart, making it suitable for background application access on the original device [1][5][2]. However, it is not appropriate for data that users expect to persist when upgrading to a new phone [2]. Citations:
🏁 Script executed: #!/bin/bash
set -eu
file="OpenVision/Services/OpenClaw/OpenClawDeviceIdentity.swift"
sed -n '1,125p' "$file"
rg -n "OpenClawDeviceIdentity|deviceId|publicKey|authToken|Keychain|kSecAttrAccessible" OpenVision/Services/OpenClaw "$file"Repository: rayl15/OpenVision Length of output: 7236 Authorization Bypass (CWE-922) Reachability: Internal · Exploitability: Difficult Prevent device identity migration. Use 🤖 Prompt for AI Agents |
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| SecItemAdd(attributes as CFDictionary, nil) | ||
| } | ||
| } | ||
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📐 Maintainability & Code Quality | 🟡 Minor | ⚡ Quick win
Use the U.S. English form.
Change “afterwards” to “afterward”.
🧰 Tools
🪛 LanguageTool
[locale-violation] ~12-~12: In American English, ‘afterward’ is the preferred variant. ‘Afterwards’ is more commonly used in British English and other dialects.
Context: ...er launch succeeded and every reconnect afterwards failed - Added `NSLocalNetworkUsageDesc...
(AFTERWARDS_US)
🤖 Prompt for AI Agents
Source: Linters/SAST tools