| name | Security Policy |
|---|---|
| about | How to report security vulnerabilities in Agent Nexus Gateway |
We provide security updates for the latest minor release line. Older versions receive critical fixes only.
| Version | Supported |
|---|---|
| 0.1.x | ✅ |
| < 0.1 | ❌ |
Do NOT open a public GitHub issue for security vulnerabilities.
Please report vulnerabilities privately using one of these channels:
- Preferred: Use GitHub Private Security Advisories
- Email:
security@agent-nexus-gateway.dev(if available)
Include the following in your report:
- Description of the vulnerability and its impact
- Steps to reproduce (proof-of-concept)
- Affected versions
- Suggested mitigation or fix (optional)
We will acknowledge receipt within 48 hours and provide an initial assessment within 5 business days.
- We follow coordinated disclosure.
- We will credit reporters in release notes unless they prefer to remain anonymous.
- We request a 90-day embargo before public disclosure, but this is flexible for good-faith reports.
Agent Nexus Gateway implements:
- Encrypted credential vault (AES-256-GCM at rest, scrypt-derived master key)
- RBAC with wildcard permission matching
- JWT authentication (HS256 today; RS256/EdDSA planned)
- Audit logging of all authorization decisions
- Zero Trust architecture — no implicit trust between services
- Input validation on every HTTP endpoint (Zod schemas)
- Rate limiting (pluggable; adapter-level + global)
- TLS termination at the ingress layer
- Secrets management via env vars / vault — never logged
- Never expose the gateway directly to the internet without authentication. Always go through an authenticated ingress.
- Rotate your
AGENT_NEXUS_VAULT_KEYperiodically. Lost keys mean lost secrets. - Use the principle of least privilege when assigning roles to API keys.
- Enable audit logging and ship logs to a SIEM.
- Pin your Docker image to a specific version, not
latest. - Run as a non-root user in containers (the default Dockerfile does this).
- Use a reverse proxy (nginx, Caddy, Cloudflare) for TLS termination.
| Threat | Mitigation |
|---|---|
| Stolen API key | RBAC scopes limit blast radius; rotate via vault |
| Credential leak at rest | AES-256-GCM encryption with scrypt-derived key |
| Replay attack | JWT exp claim + nonce support (planned) |
| Supply chain compromise | Dependency review CI, lockfile pinning, CodeQL |
| DDoS | Rate limiting, circuit breakers, graceful degradation |
| SSRF | Network sandbox — outbound calls only through NetworkPort |