quackd sends intents to a robot. The robot's own daemon (robotd) is the safety authority — it clamps velocities, detects falls, and stops the robot when commands stall. quackd adds a second layer on the client side: verb allowlists, confirm gates, budgets, a heartbeat, and a kill switch (see docs/safety.md). A bug that lets an LLM or an MCP client bypass that layer is a security issue.

Also in scope:

• API keys leaking into transcripts, GIFs, logs, or run directories.
• The MCP server executing verbs a loaded .duck contract does not allow.
• Anything that lets a .duck file (untrusted input — people will share them) execute code, read files, or reach the network.

Please do not open a public issue for vulnerabilities. Email ksjeno@gmail.com with "quackd security" in the subject, or use GitHub's private vulnerability reporting on the repository if enabled. You will get an acknowledgement within 72 hours.

Only the latest released minor version receives fixes.