Change UniformResourceIdentifier to be a subclass of List .

[jefft0]

Currently UniformResourceIdentifier is in the class hierarchy under a physical CorpuscularObject. Surely a URI is not an object with a physical location any more than the RationalNumber 2/3 is. This pull request changes it to a subclass of List since it is an abstract list of characters.

[arademaker]

@apease do you agree with that ? I can start help with the evaluation of the PRs if you want.

[apease]

I'm afraid I don't see or understand a rationale for making URI a list. I also can't agree that a URI is the same as a single number. I'm afraid this is probably a debate that doesn't have an objective resolution. There is a good argument I think for the number 2 being abstract - there are two hills in the middle of San Francisco, for example. That fact is timeless and requires no observer to make it true. A URI however is different. It is created with a specific purpose, by an agent at a specific time. That would lead one to believe that it is at least a Physical. Once recorded anywhere there is a Text that is the URI. The tension in intuitions seems to come from the problem when this approach faces a reducto ad absurdum argument. If a URI, or any other identifier isn't timeless, then what about a part of a URI, what about a tiny part that is just the number 2? Do we make a distinction maybe between the character encoding "2" and the timeless concept of twoness? Another example line of argument is that since characters can just be codes and therefore integers, we must decide that 2 is timeless and therefore the letter 'b' is timeless. Yet clearly 'b' didn't exist as a concept before there was human language. But maybe we insist it's just a code and then have to conclude that any code is timeless, so "to be or not to be" or all of Hamlet is timeless. That doesn't seem right either. Ultimately, although a fascinating thought experiment, like the ship of Theseus problem, it seems to resist a simple solution, which is why it's fun to debate, but likely not essential (or maybe possible) to solve. Maybe a better philosopher than I could come up with something more conclusive.

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On 04/16/2017 03:13 AM, Jeff Thompson wrote: Currently UniformResourceIdentifier is in the class hierarchy under a physical CorpuscularObject. Surely a URI is not an object with a physical location any more than the RationalNumber 2/3 is. This pull request changes it to a subclass of List since it is an abstract list of characters. ------------------------------------------------------------------------ You can view, comment on, or merge this pull request online at: #71 Commit Summary * QoSontology: Change subclass UniformResourceIdentifier from ContentBearingObject to List. File Changes * *M* QoSontology.kif <https://github.com/ontologyportal/sumo/pull/71/files#diff-0> (2) Patch Links: * https://github.com/ontologyportal/sumo/pull/71.patch * https://github.com/ontologyportal/sumo/pull/71.diff — You are receiving this because you are subscribed to this thread. Reply to this email directly, view it on GitHub <#71>, or mute the thread <https://github.com/notifications/unsubscribe-auth/ACBvHcOZrH8p5WTD-qMEKxv-4V1BQsZhks5rwenjgaJpZM4M-l40>.

-- ------------------- Adam Pease http://www.ontologyportal.org http://www.adampease.org

[jefft0]

There were no rational numbers before humans invented the concept either. That's why I used it as an example.

To me this is not a philosophical debate. It's a show-stopper preventing me from using SUMO about contradictions in physical locations when there is a large class of things that are absurdly treated as physical.

I'd like other people's input, please. Is the URI for github.com a single physically-located corpuscular object, as SUMO claims?

[apease]

Hi Jeff, Could you give us examples of the contradictions that you do or don't want to occur? Maybe there are different possibilities of how to handle the issue. all the best, Adam

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On 04/16/2017 01:09 PM, Jeff Thompson wrote: There were no rational numbers before humans invented the concept either. That's why I used it as an example. To me this is not a philosophical debate. It's a show-stopper preventing me from using SUMO about contradictions in physical locations when there is a large class of things that are absurdly treated as physical. I'd like other people's input, please. Is the URI for github.com a single physically-located corpuscular object, as SUMO claims? — You are receiving this because you were mentioned. Reply to this email directly, view it on GitHub <#71 (comment)>, or mute the thread <https://github.com/notifications/unsubscribe-auth/ACBvHd3k5c0TxesI_WNmOqSJwMDqoWyvks5rwnV2gaJpZM4M-l40>.

-- ------------------- Adam Pease http://www.ontologyportal.org http://www.adampease.org

[arademaker]

O agree that changes should be driven my inconsistencies or contradictions found by proofs. It is a safe approach to avoid long discussions about opinions.

[gdemelo]

Adam appears to be adopting a sort of Fregean notion of abstract objects that requires them to exist in a non-mental and timeless way. I would instead argue that entities that lack a spatial extent, such as URIs, the letter 'b', stories, songs, etc., are all abstract, even if they have been created at a particular point in time and their existence is mind-dependent. A specific sheet of paper with any of the above printed on them would be physical.

Agree with Adam that URIs are not lists though.

[apease]

It's a very interesting issue and I'm sure that a leading philosopher might have a more authoritative answer, but let's say Homer composes the Odyssey and hasn't yet recited it to someone yet. Something has been created as a result of mental effort. It isn't tangible like a piece of paper, but it clearly has temporal and spatial extent, which is the requirement to be a Physical. Odysseus the character didn't exist before Homer conceived of him as a fictional character. So that's why it's under Physical, similarly for any sequence of Character, like a URL. The number 2 is just as clearly independent of time and space. The notion of "twoness" wasn't created at any place or time and 'is' independent of any cognitive agent. But, as with most things in metaphysics, the real issue is whether inferences with a particular axiomatization yield a conclusion contrary to some obvious reality, or a contradiction with the rest of the theory. So I think to make a claim that any formalization of metaphysics is 'wrong' (as opposed to a more aesthetic judgement like that it's 'awkward' or 'not satisfying' or some other adjectival phrase) one should have to show a logical inference resulting in an error or contradiction. Of course, another typical problem is that a metaphysical theory could be underspecified (like, ahem, most 'ontologies'), and one could assume that a more complete formalization would yield such an error even if a given theory is, for example, a simple taxonomy that affords little automated inference.

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On 09/29/2018 06:31 PM, Gerard de Melo wrote: Adam appears to be adopting a sort of Fregean notion of abstract objects that requires them to exist in a non-mental and timeless way. I would instead argue that entities that lack a spatial extent, such as URIs, the letter 'b', stories, songs, etc., are all abstract, even if they have been created at a particular point in time and their existence is mind-dependent. A specific sheet of paper with any of the above printed on them would be physical. Agree with Adam that URIs are not lists though. — You are receiving this because you were mentioned. Reply to this email directly, view it on GitHub <#71 (comment)>, or mute the thread <https://github.com/notifications/unsubscribe-auth/ACBvHa-VH-QGt93F_q7MCibjzUmUAlK3ks5ugB7ugaJpZM4M-l40>.

-- ------------------- Adam Pease http://www.ontologyportal.org http://www.adampease.org @apease_ontology on Twitter

[gdemelo]

I don't see in what sense fictional characters or URIs have a spatial extent. Hence, for me the inference that they are physical is contrary to some obvious reality :)

[apease]

The physical extent is the brain of the author in my view

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Sent from my iPhone http://www.ontologyportal.org On Sep 29, 2018, at 10:09 PM, Gerard de Melo <notifications@github.com<mailto:notifications@github.com>> wrote: I don't see in what sense fictional characters or URIs have a spatial extent. Hence, for me the inference that they are physical is contrary to some obvious reality :) — You are receiving this because you were mentioned. Reply to this email directly, view it on GitHub<#71 (comment)>, or mute the thread<https://github.com/notifications/unsubscribe-auth/ACBvHWr7ZzWlO_TGzn4LrzUZfP6Njac9ks5ugCfbgaJpZM4M-l40>.

[apease]

here another way to think about it - we could ask "Where and when was the character of Odysseus created?" Assuming for sake of argument that Homer thought it up in Athens in 500BC that's what we would reply. There was a creation at a place and time. Before that time, Odysseus as a character did not exist. The character also was not created in New York. In contrast, it makes no sense to talk about twoness being created at any place or time.