Only the latest commit on the main branch (the branch that auto-deploys the reference instance - see CONTRIBUTING.md) is supported. There are no maintained release branches or version tags at this time.

Please report security issues privately rather than opening a public issue.

Email: security@noice.net.au

Alternatively, use GitHub's private vulnerability reporting on this repository (Security -> Report a vulnerability).

Please include:

• A description of the issue and its potential impact.
• Steps to reproduce, or a proof of concept if you have one.
• Any affected version/commit.

We will acknowledge reports as soon as practicable and aim to keep you updated as we investigate and fix.

In scope:

• The application code in this repository (apps/, packages/, content/, deployment configuration in Dockerfile, fly.toml and .github/workflows/).
• Authentication/authorisation of the admin surface (passcode gate), rate limiting on the paid-LLM routes, and handling of Progress Agentic RAG credentials.

Out of scope:

• The Progress Agentic RAG platform itself - report platform-level issues to Progress, not here.
• Third-party services this project depends on (esm.sh, JSR, Fly.io, Google Fonts) - report to those providers directly.
• Denial of service against a specific deployed instance you do not own.

This project is designed around a single trusted administrator per deployment. The admin surface (provisioning, corpus management, labels, knowledge graph configuration, agents, branding) is gated behind a single shared passcode (ADMIN_PASSCODE - see .env.example), not per-user accounts or roles. If ADMIN_PASSCODE is unset, the admin surface is disabled entirely (503 admin_disabled) rather than defaulting open.

If you need multi-administrator access control, audit logging of admin actions, or any other access-control model beyond a single shared passcode, that is a known gap rather than a vulnerability report - feel free to raise it as a feature request instead.