NGAV is a defensive endpoint-security product. This document covers how to report vulnerabilities and the safety rules that govern its development and testing.

Please report security issues privately (do not open a public issue). Use the repository's private security advisory mechanism, or email the maintainers directly. Include:

• A clear description and impact.
• Steps to reproduce (in an isolated lab — see below).
• Affected version(s) and OS.

We aim to acknowledge within 5 business days and provide a remediation timeline.

• Give us a reasonable window to ship a fix before any public disclosure.
• We will credit reporters (with consent) in release notes.

NGAV's kernel/response/malware surface is only validated inside disposable, network-isolated, snapshot-based per-OS VMs driven by ngav-test (see docs/dev-env.md and master plan §7). The rules:

1. No real host is ever the test target. Mac/Windows/Linux hosts only host the disposable VMs; they are never touched by kernel/response/malware tests.
2. No live malware on any host or internet-connected machine. Benign-yet-triggering stand-ins (EICAR, synthetic entropy/random-write generators, public PoC EDR-killer binaries) are preferred.
3. Red-team/offensive tools (EDRSilencer, EDRKillShifter, NyxInvoke, maldev-rust) run only inside the isolated lab to validate self-defense; they are never shipped and never leave the lab.
4. Snapshot before every detonation so the VM reverts to a known-good state.

• Dependencies are pinned via Cargo.lock; the workspace pins a minimum rust-version.
• Update bundles are Ed25519-signed and verified before apply (session S14); the public key is pinned in config.
• Code is licensed Apache-2.0 (see LICENSE).

NGAV telemetry carries only metadata (pid, ppid, path/IP subject, category, severity) — never file contents, documents, or credentials. The Phase-1 backend scrubs PII at the edge (session S17/S18). Data handling is generic and geographic-agnostic.