ai-assistant: docs/skills: Add skills STRIDE threat model#888
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Pull request overview
Adds a STRIDE threat model document intended to capture security risks and mitigations for an AI “skills” subsystem, focusing on threats like prompt injection, path traversal, and untrusted remote content.
Changes:
- Adds a new threat model document covering STRIDE categories for the skills system.
- Includes a system overview (components, data flow, trust boundaries) and a prioritized mitigation plan.
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| # STRIDE Threat Model: Headlamp AI Skills System | ||
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| ## 1. System Overview |
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| The skills system loads Markdown documents ("skills") and injects them into the AI assistant's system prompt. Skills come from: | ||
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| 1. **Local directories** — files on disk (configured paths or well-known project directories) | ||
| 2. **Auto-discovered project directories** — `.github/skills/`, `.github/instructions/`, `.claude/skills/`, `skills/` scanned automatically when a project is opened | ||
| 3. **Remote Git repositories** — GitHub zip archives downloaded over HTTPS |
STRIDE threat model for the skills subsystem. Covers threats that arise from loading, parsing, and injecting untrusted skill content into the LLM system prompt: - Spoofing / tampering: malicious skill files served from a compromised HTTP source; mitigated by configurable source allowlists and content-length limits. - Path traversal: zip-slip during zip extraction; mitigated by path canonicalisation in `SkillZipExtractor` before writing any file. - Information disclosure: skill content leaking cluster credentials embedded in YAML; mitigated by treating skill content as user-visible text, not secrets. - Denial of service: oversized skill files exhausting memory; mitigated by `MAX_ZIP_EXTRACTED_BYTES` and `MAX_ZIP_FILE_COUNT` hard limits. - Prompt injection: malicious skill content hijacking LLM behaviour; mitigated by size budgets and content filtering in `SkillRouter` before injection. Signed-off-by: René Dudfield <renedudfield@microsoft.com> Co-authored-by: Ashu Ghildiyal <aghildiyal@microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Ashu Ghildiyal <aghildiyal@microsoft.com>
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Adds
docs/skills/skills-stride-threat-model.md— a STRIDE threat model for the skills subsystem, covering skill loading, path traversal, and prompt-injection risks with mitigations.Assisted by Copilot.
Part of the ai-assistant skills documentation series.