Skip to content

protocol/meek: domain-fronted meek outbound (draft)#265

Open
myleshorton wants to merge 7 commits into
mainfrom
fisk/meek-outbound
Open

protocol/meek: domain-fronted meek outbound (draft)#265
myleshorton wants to merge 7 commits into
mainfrom
fisk/meek-outbound

Conversation

@myleshorton
Copy link
Copy Markdown
Contributor

@myleshorton myleshorton commented May 19, 2026

Draft — companion to radiance#488 (fronted/scanner).

Summary

Adds a meek outbound type to lantern-box: a meek-v1 client that tunnels arbitrary TCP through chunked HTTPS POSTs to a meek server endpoint. Domain-fronted via per-dial random pick from a configured Fronts list. Session-keyed by a per-Conn random ID in X-Session-Id. meek originated in Tor's pluggable-transport framework but is architecturally distinct from Tor PTs; in practice the polling-over-HTTPS scheme implemented here is the one Psiphon and Lantern use.

Why

Today our domainfront is a control-plane mechanism only — it routes API calls (config fetch, bandit callbacks) to api.iantem.io through Akamai or CloudFront. User traffic still goes through whichever proxy was assigned. If all proxies are blocked, user traffic dies regardless of how well domainfront is working.

A meek transport closes that gap: bytes flow client → wrapped in HTTPS POST → CDN edge → meek server → unwrapped → routed to internet. When normal proxies are down, fronted traffic continues to flow.

Server-side topology

Important: the meek server is not intended to live on api.iantem.io. Plan is a dedicated domain on a Linode VPS (e.g. Frankfurt) — keeps user data-plane traffic off our API infrastructure. The outbound's URL and InnerHost are config knobs, not hardcoded; the lantern-cloud side / Linode deployment is tracked separately as getlantern/engineering#3526.

Wire format

POST <URL> HTTP/1.1
Host: <inner host>
X-Session-Id: <hex session id>
Content-Type: application/octet-stream
Content-Length: <N>

<N bytes of outbound payload>

---

200 OK
Content-Type: application/octet-stream

<up to MaxBodyBytes of inbound payload (or empty)>

Client polls every PollIntervalMs (default 100 ms) so the server can deliver queued inbound bytes even when the client has nothing to send.

Pieces

  • option/meek.goMeekOutboundOptions carries:

    • URL: meek server endpoint (e.g. https://meek.lantern.io/meek/)
    • Fronts []FrontSpec: candidate (IPAddress, SNI, VerifyHostname) tuples; one is picked at random per dial
    • Polling/buffering knobs: PollIntervalMs, MaxBodyBytes, SessionIDLen, ConnectTimeout, ReadTimeout
    • Header for fixed extra HTTP headers per request
    • SNI semantics: empty SNI sends no extension (Akamai-style); non-empty SNI is sent verbatim (CloudFront-style)
  • protocol/meek/client.goDial(ctx, Config) (*Conn, error) produces a net.Conn. Background poll goroutine:

    • Drains writeBuf into the next POST body (capped at MaxBodyBytes)
    • Reads response body into readBuf so callers' Read unblocks
    • Ticks every PollInterval or immediately when Write signals
    • SetReadDeadline / SetWriteDeadline honored
  • protocol/meek/outbound.go — sing-box adapter. Builds an *http.Client whose DialTLSContext:

    • Picks a random FrontSpec from Fronts
    • Dials FrontSpec.IPAddress:443 via the standard sing-box dialer (respects DialerOptions)
    • Sets ServerName = FrontSpec.SNI (or omits the extension if empty)
    • Verifies cert chain against FrontSpec.VerifyHostname

    DialContext then performs a SOCKS5 CONNECT to destination over the meek tunnel before returning the conn. sing-box treats meek as a terminal outbound and writes the application stream straight into the conn, so the destination has to be conveyed to the server's upstream — a SOCKS5 proxy (microsocks). Without the CONNECT, the upstream would read the app's opening bytes as a malformed SOCKS handshake. This makes the meek server's Upstream a SOCKS5-server contract (documented on ServerConfig.Upstream).

  • Registration: constant.TypeMeek = "meek", plus the standard RegisterOutbound wiring in protocol/register.go. Added to supportedProtocols.

Sequence

sequenceDiagram
    participant App as app
    participant SB as sing-box
    participant MK as meek outbound
    participant Front as CDN edge
    participant Srv as meek server (Linode)

    App->>SB: TCP connect to destination
    SB->>MK: DialContext
    MK->>MK: Dial(ctx, Config)
    Note over MK: generate sessionID, start pollLoop
    MK-->>SB: net.Conn ready
    SB-->>App: stream open

    loop application bytes flow
        App->>SB: Write(bytes)
        SB->>MK: Write(bytes)
        Note over MK: buffer, signal pollReady
        MK->>Front: POST /meek/ Host:meek.lantern.io<br/>X-Session-Id: ...<br/>body=bytes
        Front->>Srv: route by inner Host
        Srv-->>Front: response body = upstream bytes
        Front-->>MK: response body
        Note over MK: append to readBuf
        SB-->>App: Read returns
    end

    loop on every PollInterval, even when client has nothing
        MK->>Front: POST (empty body)
        Front-->>MK: queued inbound bytes
    end
Loading

Server side (included in this PR)

  • protocol/meek/server.goServer (an http.Handler) implementing the meek-v1 server: per-session upstream TCP connection, request body → upstream, upstream bytes → response body, idle-session reaper. Optional AuthToken shared secret (X-Meek-Auth, constant-time compared) — when set, unauthenticated requests get 403; without it the server is an open relay into the upstream, so production on a public/fronted hostname must set it.
  • cmd/meek-server — deployable binary wrapping the server (-listen, -upstream, -auth-token, -holdoff, -idle-timeout, …). Warns when -auth-token is unset.
  • cmd/meek-server/smoketest/socks5.sh — end-to-end smoke test against the deployed server (SOCKS5 handshake + HTTP GET through the meek tunnel, asserts the proxy egress IP).

Security hardening (from review)

  • Outbound rejects non-https URLs (would bypass the fronted TLS dialer) and fronts with no cert identity (verify_hostname/sni both empty → no real cert check).
  • Bounded client write backlog (MaxWriteBufBytes, default 1 MiB) with backpressure, so a fast sender on a slow front can't OOM the process.
  • Reserved request headers (Host, Content-Type, X-Session-Id) can't be overridden via the header config.
  • Server read pump uses a sync.Cond instead of a sleep-based busy-wait under backpressure.

Second review pass:

  • Destination routing: DialContext SOCKS5-CONNECTs to destination over the tunnel (see the outbound.go bullet above) — previously the destination was dropped and raw app bytes hit the SOCKS5 upstream.
  • Oversized request bodies: the server returns 413 rather than silently truncating a POST larger than MaxBodyBytes and forwarding a corrupted prefix upstream.
  • Read-pump liveness: the pump only blocks when pending is non-empty, so a single upstream read larger than MaxBodyBytes*4 can't deadlock delivery.
  • Write-cap correctness: Write appends in remaining-capacity chunks, so one large slice can't grow writeBuf past MaxWriteBufBytes.

Tests

Unit tests against an in-process meek echo server plus the new hardening:

  • TestConn_RoundTrip, TestConn_SessionPersistence, TestConn_RequiresHTTPClient/TestConn_RequiresURL — core protocol + config validation.
  • TestConn_SetReadDeadlineUnblocksParkedRead, TestConn_ReservedHeadersNotOverridable — deadline wakeup + reserved-header protection.
  • TestServer_AuthTokenRequired — 403 without/with wrong token, proceeds with the right one.
  • TestNewOutbound_RejectsUnsafeConfig — http scheme + identity-less front rejected.
  • TestServer_SOCKS5ConnectOverTunnel — full client→meek→SOCKS5→destination chain via the same ClientHandshake5 the outbound runs.
  • TestServer_RejectsOversizedBody — 413 on a POST over MaxBodyBytes.
  • TestServer_SmallMaxBodyBytesDelivers — read-pump liveness regression with a tiny cap and a 64 KiB upstream burst.
  • TestConn_LargeWriteRespectsBacklogCap — a 1 MiB Write blocks at the cap instead of buffering wholesale.

What's NOT in this PR

  • The meek server deployment: provisioning the Linode VPS + the systemd units (meek-server, Caddy TLS terminator, microsocks upstream) is operational, tracked separately. The server code is here.
  • Front-list feed: Fronts comes from radiance/fronted/scanner (radiance#488) but the wiring between them is a follow-up. Today you'd hardcode Fronts in the JSON config.
  • uTLS: the outbound uses stdlib crypto/tls for simplicity. Switching to refraction-networking/utls is a follow-up; the rest of lantern-box already uses it.
  • Per-(ASN, country) bandit aggregation: covered by getlantern/engineering#3525.

Reference

🤖 Generated with Claude Code

Adds a first-class meek-style transport (Tor pluggable-transport v1
wire format): chunked TCP-over-HTTPS, session-keyed by a per-Conn
random ID in X-Session-Id, polling-based half-duplex.

The intended deployment is a separate meek server on a non-API
domain (e.g. running on a Linode VPS), reachable through Akamai or
CloudFront via inner Host. This keeps user data-plane traffic off
api.iantem.io and onto independent infrastructure.

Wire shape per request:
  POST <URL> HTTP/1.1
  Host: <inner host>
  X-Session-Id: <hex session id>
  Content-Type: application/octet-stream
  Content-Length: <N>
  <N bytes of outbound payload>

Response body is up to MaxBodyBytes of inbound payload (or empty).
The client polls every PollIntervalMs (default 100) so the server
can deliver inbound bytes even when the client has nothing to send.

Pieces:
- option/meek.go: MeekOutboundOptions carries URL + Fronts list +
  polling/buffering knobs. FrontSpec is (IPAddress, SNI,
  VerifyHostname) — empty SNI sends no extension (Akamai style),
  non-empty SNI is sent verbatim (CloudFront style).
- protocol/meek/client.go: Conn implementing net.Conn over a polling
  HTTP client. Goroutine-driven: Write buffers locally + signals
  the poll loop; Read blocks on inbound buffer; SetReadDeadline
  honored.
- protocol/meek/outbound.go: sing-box adapter. Builds an
  http.Client whose TLS dialer picks a random front from Fronts
  per dial, sets ServerName from FrontSpec.SNI, verifies cert
  chain against VerifyHostname.
- Registered in constant/proxy.go and protocol/register.go.

Tests cover round-trip echo, session-id persistence across writes,
and config validation. Front-list is fed externally — radiance's
fronted/scanner produces the working pool per-(ASN, location, time)
and supplies it to MeekOutboundOptions.Fronts via config.
Adds the server side of the meek-v1 transport: a plain-HTTP
http.Handler that terminates the meek protocol and forwards each
session's bytes to a configured TCP upstream. Deploys behind a CDN
(Akamai DSA, CloudFront alt-domain) that handles TLS termination.

Protocol matches the client in this same package:
- POST /<path> with X-Session-Id: <hex>
- Request body = bytes for upstream
- Response body = up to MaxBodyBytes from upstream
- Per-session state keyed by X-Session-Id; idle sessions reaped

Design:
- One TCP conn per session, dialed lazily on first POST
- Background readPump per session drains upstream into a pending
  buffer; backpressure when buffer exceeds 4x MaxBodyBytes
- ResponseHoldoff (default 50ms) bounds the read window per POST so
  bytes flow back quickly without spinning on empty reads
- Session reaper runs every SessionIdleTimeout/2

cmd/meek-server is a thin main wrapper exposing -listen, -upstream,
-path, -max-body, -holdoff, -idle-timeout, -debug. Includes a
/healthz endpoint that reports SessionCount for monitoring.

Tests cover end-to-end echo (real client + real server + real TCP
echo upstream), 36 KB bidirectional payloads with chunked transfer,
bad-method / missing-session-id rejection, upstream dial failure,
and idle session reap. 10 tests total in protocol/meek, all green.

Deployment: typically runs alongside a sing-box SOCKS5 inbound on
localhost:1080 so the meek tunnel terminates into the existing
proxy backend. CDN-side fronting handles TLS termination plus the
domain-fronting routing (inner Host = the server's CDN hostname).
Captures the verified reference stack (Akamai DSA → Caddy → meek-server
→ microsocks → public internet) and a reproducible test that exercises
the full chain: SOCKS5 handshake + CONNECT + HTTP GET, returning the
origin IP httpbin observed (the Linode's public IP, confirming the
request actually exits via the proxy).

Test currently passes:
  ✅ End-to-end SUCCESS: "origin": "139.162.181.47"
readCond.Wait has no native timeout, so a Read parked there only ever
woke on data arrival, close, or a fresh SetReadDeadline call —
never on the deadline elapsing in real time. Callers setting a
future deadline and waiting for it would hang indefinitely.

Add a time.AfterFunc that broadcasts on readCond at t. Previous
timer is stopped on each SetReadDeadline call (re-arming or
clearing) and on Close. Zero t clears without arming.

Test asserts a SetReadDeadline(now+100ms) followed by a blocking
Read returns errReadDeadline in 50ms–1s.
@myleshorton myleshorton marked this pull request as ready for review May 26, 2026 19:34
Copilot AI review requested due to automatic review settings May 26, 2026 19:34
Copy link
Copy Markdown
Contributor

Copilot AI left a comment

Choose a reason for hiding this comment

The reason will be displayed to describe this comment to others. Learn more.

Pull request overview

Adds a new meek protocol to lantern-box: a Tor-style meek v1 TCP-over-HTTPS transport with a sing-box outbound adapter, plus a reference server/CLI and accompanying unit + smoke tests. This expands domain-fronting from control-plane-only to a potential user data-plane transport.

Changes:

  • Register new outbound type meek (constant.TypeMeek) and expose it via SupportedProtocols().
  • Implement meek client (net.Conn) + sing-box outbound adapter with per-dial random front selection and cert verification hooks.
  • Add a meek server implementation and cmd/meek-server runnable, plus unit tests and an end-to-end smoke test script/docs.

Reviewed changes

Copilot reviewed 11 out of 11 changed files in this pull request and generated 12 comments.

Show a summary per file
File Description
protocol/register.go Wires the new meek outbound into protocol registration and the supported protocol list.
constant/proxy.go Adds TypeMeek constant.
option/meek.go Introduces MeekOutboundOptions and front selection specs in config schema.
protocol/meek/client.go Implements meek client connection (polling HTTPS POST loop) as net.Conn.
protocol/meek/client_test.go Unit tests for meek client behavior (round trip, session persistence, deadlines, config validation).
protocol/meek/outbound.go sing-box outbound adapter + HTTP client transport that dials via randomly selected fronts.
protocol/meek/server.go Implements meek-v1 server-side handler with session management and upstream relay.
protocol/meek/server_test.go End-to-end unit tests for server behavior (echo, reaping, bad requests).
cmd/meek-server/main.go Adds runnable meek server command with healthz endpoint and flags.
cmd/meek-server/smoketest/socks5.sh Adds manual end-to-end smoke test script for a deployed fronted setup.
cmd/meek-server/smoketest/README.md Documents reference deployment and smoke test usage.

💡 Add Copilot custom instructions for smarter, more guided reviews. Learn how to get started.

Comment thread protocol/meek/outbound.go Outdated
Comment thread protocol/meek/outbound.go
Comment thread protocol/meek/outbound.go Outdated
Comment thread protocol/meek/client.go
Comment thread protocol/meek/client.go
Comment thread cmd/meek-server/main.go
Comment thread cmd/meek-server/smoketest/socks5.sh
Comment thread option/meek.go Outdated
Comment thread protocol/meek/outbound.go
Comment thread protocol/meek/outbound.go Outdated
outbound.go:
- Reject non-https URL in NewOutbound (http:// would bypass the
  fronted TLS DialTLSContext and the cert pinning, leaking traffic).
- Require each front to set verify_hostname or sni; without either,
  verifyChain runs with an empty DNSName and accepts any trusted cert
  (no real check). Guarded at config time + at dial time.
- Annotate the intentional InsecureSkipVerify with //nolint:gosec and
  a rationale (custom verification via VerifyPeerCertificate).
- Remove unused innerHost field and unused u *url.URL param.

client.go:
- Bound the write backlog (MaxWriteBufBytes, default 1 MiB): Write
  blocks with backpressure instead of buffering without bound, so a
  fast sender on a slow/stalled front can't OOM the process. Wakes on
  drain, close, or write deadline (SetWriteDeadline now arms a timer
  like SetReadDeadline).
- Apply ExtraHeaders before the protocol-critical ones and skip
  reserved headers (Host, Content-Type, X-Session-Id) so config can't
  hijack session keying or framing.

server.go:
- Add optional AuthToken shared secret (X-Meek-Auth, constant-time
  compare). Without it the server is an open relay into Upstream;
  production on a public/fronted hostname MUST set it. Default off
  preserves local tests.
- Replace the readPump sleep-based busy-wait with a sync.Cond
  (drainCond) signaled by takeLocked/close — no more CPU burn / jitter
  under backpressure.

cmd/meek-server: -auth-token flag + an open-relay warning when unset.

option/meek.go: URL example uses meek.dsa.akamai.getiantem.org, not
api.iantem.io.

smoketest/socks5.sh: per-run mktemp -d instead of fixed /tmp paths
(collision/symlink safety).

Tests: auth required (403 without/with wrong token), reserved headers
not overridable, NewOutbound rejects http scheme + identity-less front.
meek originated in Tor's PT framework but is architecturally distinct
from Tor pluggable transports; the polling-over-HTTPS scheme here is
the one Psiphon and Lantern use in practice. Reword the package doc to
say meek-v1 rather than implying a Tor-PT lineage.
Copy link
Copy Markdown
Contributor

Copilot AI left a comment

Choose a reason for hiding this comment

The reason will be displayed to describe this comment to others. Learn more.

Pull request overview

Copilot reviewed 12 out of 12 changed files in this pull request and generated 4 comments.

Comment thread protocol/meek/server.go
Comment thread protocol/meek/client.go Outdated
Comment thread protocol/meek/server.go Outdated
Comment thread protocol/meek/outbound.go Outdated
…orrectness

- outbound: DialContext now performs a SOCKS5 CONNECT to destination over
  the tunnel before returning the conn. sing-box treats meek as a terminal
  outbound and writes the application stream directly; without the CONNECT
  the SOCKS5 upstream (microsocks) reads the app's first bytes as a
  malformed handshake and routing fails.
- server: reject POST bodies larger than MaxBodyBytes with 413 instead of
  silently truncating and forwarding a corrupted prefix upstream.
- server: readPump only blocks when pending is non-empty, so a single
  upstream read larger than the cap (possible when MaxBodyBytes*4 < 32 KiB)
  can't wedge the pump waiting for room that never frees.
- client: Write appends in remaining-capacity chunks with backpressure so
  one large slice can't grow writeBuf past MaxWriteBufBytes.

Tests: SOCKS5-connect-over-tunnel chain, oversized-body 413, small-cap
delivery (deadlock regression), and large-write backlog cap.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Sign up for free to join this conversation on GitHub. Already have an account? Sign in to comment

Labels

None yet

Projects

None yet

Development

Successfully merging this pull request may close these issues.

2 participants