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ci: decouple chart publish from release-please #14
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ci: decouple chart publish from release-please #14
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Code injection vulnerability via template expansion in shell script.
Direct expansion of
${{ github.event.release.tag_name || inputs.tag }}into a bash assignment allows code injection before the validation regex runs. An attacker with write access could craft a tag like$(malicious-command)to execute arbitrary code.Use an environment variable to prevent template expansion within the shell script.
🔒 Proposed fix to use environment variable
- name: Resolve tag id: tag + env: + TAG: ${{ github.event.release.tag_name || inputs.tag }} run: | - TAG="${{ github.event.release.tag_name || inputs.tag }}" if [[ ! "$TAG" =~ ^([a-z0-9-]+)-v([0-9]+\.[0-9]+\.[0-9]+)$ ]]; then echo "::error::Tag '$TAG' does not match expected format <component>-v<version>"As per static analysis hints, this was flagged as template-injection by zizmor.
🧰 Tools
🪛 zizmor (1.25.2)
[error] 28-28: code injection via template expansion (template-injection): may expand into attacker-controllable code
(template-injection)
[error] 28-28: code injection via template expansion (template-injection): may expand into attacker-controllable code
(template-injection)
🤖 Prompt for AI Agents
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Add
persist-credentials: falseto prevent credential leakage.The checkout action persists credentials by default, which could be accessed by subsequent steps or malicious code in the repository. Since this workflow doesn't need to push commits, credentials should not be persisted.
🔒 Proposed fix to disable credential persistence
- name: Checkout uses: actions/checkout@de0fac2e4500dabe0009e67214ff5f5447ce83dd # v6 with: ref: ${{ steps.tag.outputs.ref }} + persist-credentials: falseAs per static analysis hints, this was flagged as artipacked by zizmor.
📝 Committable suggestion
🧰 Tools
🪛 zizmor (1.25.2)
[warning] 40-43: credential persistence through GitHub Actions artifacts (artipacked): does not set persist-credentials: false
(artipacked)
🤖 Prompt for AI Agents