security(hardening): CSP, secrets untrack, DB loopback, non-root app, OAuth log redaction, image provenance

.github/workflows/docker-push.yml

@@ -41,3 +41,7 @@ jobs:
         target: web
         tags: ${{ steps.meta.outputs.tags }}
         labels: ${{ steps.meta.outputs.labels }}
+        # Attach SLSA build provenance + SBOM so a swapped/backdoored image can be
+        # detected against the attestation at deploy time (chain C-005).
+        provenance: true
+        sbom: true

.gitignore

@@ -1,4 +1,8 @@
 config.json
+
+# Real secrets must never be committed (chain C-004) — only *.sample templates.
+secrets/*.env
+
 __pycache__/
 *.py[cod]
 db.sqlite3

Access/views.py

@@ -337,9 +337,18 @@ def pending_requests(request):
 
 
 @login_required
+@user_any_approver
 def accept_bulk(request, selector):
     """approve one or more access request.
 
+    F-022: gate the bulk-approval endpoint with @user_any_approver (matching the
+    sibling views pending_requests / decline_access) so a logged-in NON-approver
+    cannot reach the approval paths at all. This checks "holds ANY approver
+    permission" via getPossibleApproverPermissions(), so module-specific approvers
+    are unaffected. Per-request authorization (module/group approver perms, primary/
+    secondary checks, self-approval block) is still enforced in the helpers below —
+    this is a defense-in-depth view gate, not a replacement for those checks.
+
     Args:
         request (HTTPRequest): Details of access and access approver.
         selector (str): access type being approved.

Dockerfile

@@ -16,10 +16,15 @@ RUN DEBIAN_FRONTEND=noninteractive \
 # Set env variables used in this Dockerfile (add a unique prefix, such as DEV)
 RUN apt update && apt install -y netcat dnsutils libmariadb-dev
 
-RUN mkdir -p /ebs/logs && touch /ebs/logs/engima.log && chmod 777 /ebs/logs/engima.log
-
 ARG APPUID=1001
-RUN useradd -rm -d /home/app -s /bin/bash -g root -u "$APPUID" app
+# Own group for the app user (not gid 0 / root group) so a container escape
+# does not inherit root-group file access (chains C-001 / C-003).
+RUN groupadd -g "$APPUID" app \
+  && useradd -rm -d /home/app -s /bin/bash -g app -u "$APPUID" app
+
+# Log file owned by the app user, not world-writable (was chmod 777).
+RUN mkdir -p /ebs/logs && touch /ebs/logs/engima.log \
+  && chown -R app:app /ebs/logs && chmod 640 /ebs/logs/engima.log
 WORKDIR /srv/code/dev
 RUN mkdir -p logs
 RUN mkdir -p db

EnigmaAutomation/settings.py

@@ -49,6 +49,30 @@
 CSRF_COOKIE_HTTPONLY = True
 SESSION_COOKIE_HTTPONLY = True
 
+# --- Response security headers (chain C-002 / F-035) ---
+# Sent by django.middleware.security.SecurityMiddleware + clickjacking middleware.
+SECURE_CONTENT_TYPE_NOSNIFF = True
+SECURE_REFERRER_POLICY = "same-origin"
+X_FRAME_OPTIONS = "DENY"
+
+# --- Content-Security-Policy (django-csp / csp.middleware.CSPMiddleware) ---
+# NOTE: 'unsafe-inline' is retained for script/style because the ops UI still
+# ships inline <script> blocks and inline styles (16 templates). Even so this
+# policy blocks injected EXTERNAL scripts, object/embed, <base> hijacking and
+# clickjacking. Follow-up: migrate templates to nonces and drop 'unsafe-inline'.
+# The allowed CDN hosts below reflect the jQuery/FontAwesome assets the UI loads
+# — smoke-test the pages render before flipping CSP_REPORT_ONLY off.
+CSP_DEFAULT_SRC = ("'self'",)
+CSP_SCRIPT_SRC = ("'self'", "'unsafe-inline'", "code.jquery.com", "cdn.jsdelivr.net")
+CSP_STYLE_SRC = ("'self'", "'unsafe-inline'", "fonts.googleapis.com", "use.fontawesome.com", "cdn.jsdelivr.net")
+CSP_FONT_SRC = ("'self'", "data:", "fonts.gstatic.com", "use.fontawesome.com")
+CSP_IMG_SRC = ("'self'", "data:")
+CSP_CONNECT_SRC = ("'self'",)
+CSP_OBJECT_SRC = ("'none'",)
+CSP_BASE_URI = ("'self'",)
+CSP_FRAME_ANCESTORS = ("'none'",)
+CSP_FORM_ACTION = ("'self'",)
+
 # Application definition
 
 INSTALLED_APPS = [
@@ -72,12 +96,16 @@
 CID_CONCATENATE_IDS = True
 SESSION_EXPIRE_SECONDS = 7*24*60*60
 SESSION_EXPIRE_AFTER_LAST_ACTIVITY = True
-AXES_ONLY_USER_FAILURES=True
+# False so lockout also factors in source IP (username+IP), not username-only —
+# username-only tracking lets credential-stuffing spread one attempt across many
+# usernames from a single IP without ever tripping the limit (chain C-008 / F-032).
+AXES_ONLY_USER_FAILURES=False
 AXES_FAILURE_LIMIT=5
 AXES_COOLOFF_TIME=2.0
 
 MIDDLEWARE = [
     "django.middleware.security.SecurityMiddleware",
+    "csp.middleware.CSPMiddleware",
     "django.contrib.sessions.middleware.SessionMiddleware",
     "django.middleware.common.CommonMiddleware",
     'django.contrib.sessions.middleware.SessionMiddleware',
@@ -107,7 +135,8 @@
     "social_core.pipeline.social_auth.associate_user",
     "social_core.pipeline.social_auth.load_extra_data",
     "social_core.pipeline.user.user_details",
-    "social_core.pipeline.debug.debug",
+    # NOTE: social_core.pipeline.debug.debug removed (chain C-008) — it logs the
+    # full OAuth response, including access tokens and user PII, at DEBUG level.
 )
 
 SOCIAL_AUTH_DISCONNECT_PIPELINE = (
@@ -268,7 +297,9 @@
 
 AUTOMATED_EXEC_IDENTIFIER = "automated-grant"
 
-current_log_level = 'DEBUG'
+# INFO (not DEBUG) in the app loggers — DEBUG emits request/response bodies and
+# third-party token traffic that can leak secrets to the log sink (chain C-008).
+current_log_level = 'INFO'
 logging_apps = ["django.request", "inventory", "Access", "bootprocess"]
 LOGGING = {
     'version': 1,

docker-compose.yml

@@ -25,8 +25,10 @@ services:
   db:
     container_name: db
     image: mysql/mysql-server:8.0.31
+    # Bind to loopback only — the DB must not be reachable from the network
+    # (chain C-004). Containers reach it via the compose network as `db:3306`.
     ports:
-    - 3306:3306
+    - 127.0.0.1:3306:3306
     env_file:
     - ./secrets/ops_mysql_dev.env
     volumes:
@@ -37,8 +39,9 @@ services:
     container_name: redis
     image: redis:alpine
     command: --port 6379
+    # Loopback only (chain C-004); the celery worker reaches it as `redis:6379`.
     ports:
-    - 6379:6379
+    - 127.0.0.1:6379:6379
     read_only: true
     security_opt:
     - no-new-privileges:true

requirements.txt

@@ -115,6 +115,7 @@ mypy==2.3.0
 mypy-extensions==1.1.0
 vulture==2.16
 django-cid==2.3
+django-csp==3.8
 flake8==7.3.0
 django-session-timeout==0.1.0
 django-axes==5.41.1

secrets/ops_app_celery.env.sample

@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+CELERY_BROKER_URL=redis://redis:6379/0
+CELERY_RESULT_BACKEND=redis://redis:6379/1
+MYSQL_ROOT_PASSWORD=__CHANGE_ME__
+MYSQL_DATABASE=enigma
+MYSQL_ROOT_HOST=%

secrets/ops_app_dev.env.sample

@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+TOKEN=__CHANGE_ME__
+DEBUG=True

secrets/ops_app_test.env.sample

@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+TOKEN=__CHANGE_ME__
+DEBUG=True

secrets/ops_mysql_dev.env → secrets/ops_mysql_dev.env.sample

@@ -1,3 +1,3 @@
-MYSQL_ROOT_PASSWORD=testtest
+MYSQL_ROOT_PASSWORD=__CHANGE_ME__
 MYSQL_DATABASE=enigma
 MYSQL_ROOT_HOST=%