The Clearinghouse for Agentic Commerce
What · Pillars · Quickstart · Architecture · Integrations · Security · Roadmap · Docs · Spec
curl -fsSL https://www.chio.computer/install.sh | shChio is a Rust kernel that puts every exchange between an AI agent and the resources it reaches for under one governance protocol. Tools, budgets, chain of command, and authority all reduce to a single policy that crosses protocol boundaries, travels with the agent, and is enforced wherever it acts. The security-critical semantics of that protocol are formally verified and implementation-linked, subject to a published assumption boundary.
To act, the agent must present a capability: a signed, expiring grant that says who is acting and what they may do, and that can be narrowed as it is handed off but never widened. The kernel verifies the grant, screens the request and the result, runs the tool, and signs a receipt of what happened that cannot be forged or backdated. It refuses any call it cannot authorize and any result it cannot sign.
MCP tells an agent how to call a tool. Chio proves what it was allowed to do, what it cost, and what happened.
Because the receipt records what a call cost and how it was paid, an agent can hold a balance and be billed for what it spends, like any other economic actor. Each capability carries a spending limit. The kernel meters the real cost of a call, holds the funds before it runs, settles the bill afterward, and writes the price into the receipt beside the authority and the outcome. A service sets its own price, and an agent with a long record of clean receipts pays less for the same work.
The same receipts support a full financial layer. Agents bid for one another's work in open markets, draw credit, and post bonds to take on jobs they cannot yet cover. Underwriters price the risk of an agent or a task and sell insurance against it, and claims pay out against the receipts that recorded what happened. Payments settle on-chain, anchored across EVM, Bitcoin, and Solana. Each of these clears against receipts the kernel signed when the calls ran.
The formal model behind Chio is written up in Programmable Sovereignty: Lean-attestable constitutions over capability-bounded, federated receipts, a machine-checked account of how agents and organizations govern themselves.
Three layers on one proof spine: every capability, decision, and payment resolves to a signed receipt.
Signed, attenuating capabilities go in. Forgery-resistant, independently verifiable receipts come out.
| Primitive | What it does |
|---|---|
| Attenuated capabilities | Ed25519-signed, time-bounded, budgeted tokens. Delegation proves it is a subset of its parent, so authority can only narrow, never widen. Post-quantum hybrid (ML-DSA-65) is supported. |
| Forgery-resistant receipts | Receipt identity is the hash of its own canonical content; the kernel recomputes that hash before signing and refuses on mismatch. allow, deny, cancelled, and incomplete are each signed. |
| A verifiable log | A content-addressed receipt DAG committed in RFC 6962 Merkle checkpoints. Canonical JSON (RFC 8785) makes a receipt signed in Rust verify byte-for-byte in TypeScript, Python, or Go. |
| A Lean-4 modeled core | The pure admission core (verify, resolve, evaluate, sign) is mechanically modeled with a published assumption boundary. |
Policy, identity, and delegated authority are native to the protocol, not bolted on.
| Primitive | What it does |
|---|---|
| Policy that compiles to guards | HushSpec YAML (allow / warn / deny, with inheritance) compiles directly into native guards. No external policy engine. |
| A guard pipeline you can sandbox | Forbidden-path, egress/SSRF, secret and PII/PHI, velocity, data-flow, jailbreak, and semantic SQL/vector checks. Custom guards run as fuel-metered WASM with no host access; cloud guardrails attach behind circuit breakers. |
| Self-certifying identity | A did:chio is the agent's Ed25519 key: no registry, no CA. Agent Passports and BBS+ selective disclosure travel with the agent and verify with no storage dependency. |
| Authority without a central issuer | Federation shares trust evidence while each operator activates locally. Governance charters, capability leases, and threshold multi-party approvals bind who may do what, to which request, for how long. |
| One verifier for provenance | A single fail-closed Sigstore verifier gates guard artifacts, signed model cards, and attestations; revocation is a signed sparse-Merkle oracle. |
Every tool call is a priced, budgeted, metered transaction that settles into a signed receipt.
| Capability | What it does |
|---|---|
| Metering and budgets | Per-call compute, data, and API cost, with durable pre-execution budget holds against a capability's caps, sealed into signed economic receipt metadata. |
| Proof-carrying commerce | One signed receipt binds what was authorized, how it was priced, what it metered, and how it settled, so credit and insurance decisions cite prior signed truth. |
| Markets, credit, and insurance | Discoverable service markets with open bidding and reputation-tiered pricing, credit lines and bonded execution, and liability underwriting and insurance. |
| Settlement and anchoring | On-chain settlement with cross-chain checkpoint anchoring across EVM, Bitcoin, and Solana, backed by the Chio settlement contracts. |
Bond Claude Code to a policy in one line, then verify everything it did.
curl -fsSL https://www.chio.computer/install.sh | shOr from source: git clone https://github.com/backbay-labs/chio.git && cd chio && cargo build --release -p chio-cli
Coding agents reach their file, shell, and git tools over MCP. Wrap that server with Chio so
every call is checked by the kernel and sealed into a signed receipt. The bundled code-agent
preset is a safe starting policy: reads are allowed, writes to .env, .git/, and .ssh/ are
denied, and so is git push --force.
Claude Code registers the wrapped server in one line:
claude mcp add fs -- \
chio --receipt-db ./chio.db mcp serve --preset code-agent --server-id fs -- \
npx -y @modelcontextprotocol/server-filesystem .Hermes wraps the same server through its config. Add this under mcp_servers in
~/.hermes/config.yaml, then run hermes mcp test chio to confirm the edge is live:
mcp_servers:
chio:
command:
- chio
- --receipt-db
- ./chio.db
- mcp
- serve
- --preset
- code-agent
- --server-id
- fs
- --
- npx
- "-y"
- "@modelcontextprotocol/server-filesystem"
- "."
transport: stdioThe --server-id fs must stay fs: the code-agent preset only grants capabilities to the
fs, shell, and git server ids, so any other id fail-closes every call.
Either way, you use the agent exactly as before; every tool call it routes through that server is now checked against policy and sealed into a receipt.
To govern an entire session, including the agent's native tools, install the host plugin.
Claude Code (chio-claude-code-plugin) installs from the marketplace, then bond a session with /chio:bond <policy>:
claude plugin marketplace add backbay-labs/chio-claude-code-plugin
claude plugin install chio@chioHermes (chio-hermes) is not yet published to PyPI; until it ships, follow the source install in the integration guide.
Enable the plugin and select its toolset in ~/.hermes/config.yaml (the toolsets entry is
required, otherwise the chio_* tools never surface):
plugins:
enabled:
- chio
toolsets:
- chiohermes setup does not prompt for entry-point plugins, so set the sidecar URL and capability id
yourself, or write them to ~/.hermes/.env. Mint the capability with hermes chio issue:
export CHIO_SIDECAR_URL=http://127.0.0.1:9090
export CHIO_CAPABILITY_ID=<id from `hermes chio issue --json`>chio --receipt-db ./chio.db receipt list --admin-all --limit 20
chio --receipt-db ./chio.db receipt explain <receipt-id> --admin-allEvery decision (allow, deny, cancelled, incomplete) is a signed, content-addressed receipt you can verify offline.
chio init my-agent && cd my-agent
# allowed by the starter policy
chio check --policy policy.yaml --server hello --tool hello_world --params '{}'
# anything out of scope is denied, fail-closed
chio check --policy policy.yaml --server hello --tool drop_tables --params '{}'chio init scaffolds a project with an editable HushSpec policy.yaml; chio check evaluates
one tool call against it and prints the verdict.
# Mint an Agent Passport from the agent's signed receipt history
chio passport create --subject-public-key <agent-key> --signing-seed-file ./agent.seed --output passport.json
# A relying party evaluates it against their own bar, then admits or rejects the agent
chio passport evaluate --input passport.json --policy verifier-policy.yamlAn Agent Passport bundles the agent's did:chio identity and a signed reputation credential
built from its receipts. A counterparty verifies it with no shared server and, on accept, mints
it a scoped capability with chio trust federated-issue. This is how reputation and admission
cross operator boundaries.
A capability caps what the agent may spend, and the kernel holds funds before each call and denies anything over budget. Add ceilings to your policy (amounts in minor units, e.g. cents):
# policy.yaml, under `rules:`
velocity: { enabled: true, max_spend_per_window: 50000, window_secs: 60 }
human_in_loop: { enabled: true, approve_above: 15000, approve_above_currency: USD }Every metered call records its cost in the receipt. Inspect spend and settlement:
chio --receipt-db ./chio.db receipt list --admin-all --min-cost 1 --cost-currency USD
chio settle status --store ./chio.db # pending, settled, dead-letteredFor a full market with buyers, providers, budgets, and settlement, run
examples/agent-commerce-network.
More: chio mcp serve-http (hosted HTTP edge with OAuth/OIDC) · chio api (zero-code
reverse proxy for any OpenAPI service) · chio federation (cross-kernel treaties and
quorum) · chio trust (revocation and trust-plane state).
Chio is layered around a single trusted core. External ecosystems enter through protocol edges that turn them into governed tool servers. The Runtime Kernel mediates every call and is the only trusted component. A trust plane (identity, credentials, federation, governance) and an economy plane (metering, budgets, settlement) draw on the receipts the kernel signs, and every decision is committed to the Receipt Log.
Only the Runtime Kernel is trusted (the TCB). The agent and tool servers are untrusted and isolated, so a compromised agent or tool server cannot forge authorization or a receipt, and any registry or artifact mismatch fails closed.
| Step | What happens |
|---|---|
| 1 · Present | The agent calls a tool and presents a capability token (Ed25519-signed, time-bounded, scoped) rather than ambient credentials. |
| 2 · Verify | The kernel runs the full capability check: signature and expiry, target within granted scope, delegation attenuates (the child scope is a proven subset of its parent), neither the capability nor any ancestor is revoked, and DPoP when the grant requires it. |
| 3 · Budget | If the grant carries monetary caps, the kernel places a durable pre-execution hold. An over-budget call is denied before anything runs. |
| 4 · Guard (in) | Input guards run in sequence over the parameters (forbidden paths, egress and SSRF, secrets, velocity, data-flow, jailbreak, semantic data checks). Any deny denies the call. |
| 5 · Dispatch | Only the kernel dispatches to the tool server. The agent never holds a handle to it. |
| 6 · Guard (out) | The result passes back through output and post-invocation guards (PII/PHI sanitization, anomaly and data-transfer checks). |
| 7 · Meter and sign | The kernel reconciles the budget hold to actual cost, assembles the receipt (decision, policy hash, guard evidence, economic metadata), recomputes the content hash inside its trust boundary, and signs it. A call it cannot sign is not allowed. |
| 8 · Commit | The receipt is written to the content-addressed log and folded into a Merkle checkpoint, where its evidence is available to the trust and economy planes. |
Every outcome (allow, deny, cancelled, incomplete) produces a signed receipt.
The workspace ships 100+ crates across 11 groups.
| Group | What lives there |
|---|---|
core |
Shared types (capabilities, receipts, canonical JSON, signing), errors, adversarial suite |
kernel |
Capability validation, guard pipeline, receipt signing, runtime and platform variants |
guards |
Native, data-layer, WASM, and external guards, plus HushSpec policy and the guard registry |
protocol |
The 27 protocol and provider edges (MCP, A2A, ACP-Client, AG-UI, OpenAPI, provider dialects, Tower, Envoy) |
economy |
Metering, budgets, pricing, markets, credit, settlement, anchoring, web3 bindings |
trust |
did:chio, credentials and passports, federation, governance, reputation, attestation, TEE, model cards |
observability |
SIEM export, lineage, log redaction, metrics, OTel receipt export |
platform |
Control plane, stores, signed manifests, config, workflow, HTTP and session primitives |
products |
The chio CLI, API Protect, Chio-Wall, MERCURY, Proof Room |
sdk |
Guard-authoring SDK, FFI bindings, receipt evaluation helpers |
tooling |
Conformance suite, spec codegen and validation, LSP, test support |
The crates most users touch are the chio CLI (chio-cli), chio-api-protect (a zero-code
reverse proxy that protects HTTP APIs with Chio receipts), and the libraries chio-kernel,
chio-policy, and chio-guards. The full crate map and component detail live in
AGENTS.md and docs/architecture/.
One kernel. Every major agent-interop protocol, eight provider tool-call dialects, eight language SDKs, and 60+ framework, runtime, and infrastructure integrations. Chio wraps existing ecosystems instead of replacing them: MCP, A2A, ACP-Client, AG-UI, OpenAPI, and provider tool formats become governed Chio tool servers, while the kernel keeps dispatch and receipt authority for the surfaces it mediates.
| Layer | Surfaces |
|---|---|
| Protocols | MCP · A2A · ACP-Client · AG-UI · OpenAPI→MCP · Envoy/Istio ext_authz · Tower |
| Provider dialects | Anthropic · Bedrock · OpenAI* · Gemini · Groq · Cohere · Mistral · Ollama |
| Agent frameworks | Hermes · LangChain · LangGraph · LlamaIndex · CrewAI · AutoGen · Vercel AI SDK |
| Language SDKs | TypeScript · Python · Go · Rust · C++ · JVM/Kotlin · Swift · .NET |
| Web and runtime | FastAPI · Django · Next.js · Express · Fastify · Elysia · Spring Boot · ASP.NET · Cloudflare Workers · Vercel Edge · Deno |
| Data and orchestration | Temporal · Airflow · Dagster · Prefect · Ray · Flink · Kafka/NATS |
| Infra and mesh | Kubernetes · AWS Lambda · AWS Bedrock Marketplace · VS Code · Zed |
| Agent and chat plugins | Claude Code · Cursor · Codex · OpenCode · OpenClaw (Slack/Discord/Telegram) |
* OpenAI interception is implemented; outbound execution is deferred (trace-only, not authoritative). Anthropic and Bedrock are the release-qualified providers.
Full integration matrix (60+ surfaces)
| Surface | Package | What it does | Status |
|---|---|---|---|
| MCP adapter | chio-mcp-adapter |
Wraps external MCP servers as Chio tool servers | Shipping |
| MCP edge | chio-mcp-edge |
Exposes Chio tools over MCP (stdio JSON-RPC) | Shipping |
| MCP registry server | integrations/mcp-adapter |
Registry-listed MCP server: Streamable HTTP, OAuth 2.1 + PKCE, RFC 9728 metadata, receipt emission | Shipping |
| Hosted / Remote MCP | chio-hosted-mcp, chio-mcp-remote |
Hosted and remote MCP runtime surfaces | Shipping |
| A2A adapter | chio-a2a-adapter |
A2A to Chio: agent-card discovery + SendMessage mediation |
Shipping |
| A2A edge | chio-a2a-edge |
Exposes Chio tools as blocking A2A skills | Shipping |
| ACP-Client edge | chio-acp-edge |
Exposes Chio tools as ACP-Client capabilities with bridge-fidelity assessment | Shipping |
| ACP-Client proxy | chio-acp-proxy |
Enforces Chio access control on ACP-Client agent sessions | Shipping |
| AG-UI proxy | chio-ag-ui-proxy |
Capability-validated interception of agent-to-UI event streams | Shipping |
| OpenAPI | chio-openapi |
OpenAPI 3.x spec parser to Chio tool manifest | Shipping |
| OpenAPI to MCP | chio-openapi-mcp-bridge |
Exposes Chio-governed HTTP APIs as MCP tool surfaces | Shipping |
| Cross-protocol | chio-cross-protocol |
Shared cross-protocol bridge contracts + orchestrator | Shipping |
| Tower middleware | chio-tower |
Rust Tower middleware for capability validation + receipt signing | Shipping |
Envoy ext_authz |
chio-envoy-ext-authz |
Service-mesh gRPC adapter bridging external authz to the kernel | Shipping |
Each adapter follows a lift to kernel-verdict to lower pipeline over a real HTTP transport with hermetic mock-server tests.
| Provider | Package | Status |
|---|---|---|
| Anthropic (Messages tool-use) | chio-anthropic-tools-adapter |
Shipping, release-qualified |
| AWS Bedrock (Converse) | chio-bedrock-converse-adapter |
Shipping, release-qualified |
| OpenAI (Chat + Responses) | chio-openai-adapter |
In-progress: interception only, execution deferred |
| Google Gemini | chio-gemini-tools-adapter |
Built; not yet release-qualified |
| Groq | chio-groq-tools-adapter |
Built; not yet release-qualified |
| Cohere | chio-cohere-tools-adapter |
Built; governance-deferred |
| Mistral | chio-mistral-tools-adapter |
Built; governance-deferred |
| Ollama | chio-ollama-tools-adapter |
Built; not yet release-qualified |
| Framework | Package | Status |
|---|---|---|
| Hermes Agent (NousResearch) | chio-hermes (HERMES.md) |
Shipping (pre-1.0) |
| LangChain | chio-langchain |
Shipping |
| LangGraph | chio-langgraph |
Shipping |
| LlamaIndex | chio-llamaindex |
Shipping |
| CrewAI | chio-crewai |
Shipping |
| AutoGen | chio-autogen |
Shipping |
| Vercel AI SDK (+ middleware) | @chio-protocol/ai-sdk, @chio-protocol/ai-sdk-middleware |
Shipping |
| Agent observability | chio-observability (LangSmith / LangFuse spans) |
Shipping |
| Language | Package(s) | Status |
|---|---|---|
| TypeScript | @chio-protocol/sdk |
Shipping |
| Python | chio-sdk (in-process), chio-sdk-python (sidecar), chio-adapter-base |
Shipping |
| Go | chio-go (in-process), chio-go-http (wire + net/http middleware) |
Shipping |
| Rust | workspace crates + chio-tower |
Shipping |
| C++ | chio-cpp, chio-cpp-kernel, chio-drogon (web middleware) |
Shipping |
| JVM / Kotlin | chio-sdk-jvm, chio-spring-boot, chio-streaming-flink, chio-kernel-mobile (Android) |
Shipping |
| Swift / iOS | Chio Swift SDK (ChioKernel.xcframework, App Attest) |
Shipping |
| .NET | Backbay.Chio.Middleware (ASP.NET Core) |
Shipping |
| Mobile (RN / Expo) | @chio-protocol/mobile |
Shipping |
| Language | Package | Status |
|---|---|---|
| Rust (canonical) | chio-guard-sdk (+ macros) |
Shipping |
| Python | chio-guard-py |
Shipping |
| Go | chio-guard-go |
Shipping |
| C++ | chio-guard-cpp |
Shipping |
| TypeScript | chio-guard-ts |
Shipping |
| Runtime | Package | Status |
|---|---|---|
| FastAPI / ASGI / Django | chio-fastapi, chio-asgi, chio-django |
Shipping |
| Next.js / Express / Fastify | @chio-protocol/next, @chio-protocol/express, @chio-protocol/fastify |
Shipping |
| Elysia (Bun) | @chio-protocol/elysia |
Shipping |
| Spring Boot / ASP.NET / Drogon | chio-spring-boot, Backbay.Chio.Middleware, chio-drogon |
Shipping |
| Cloudflare Workers / Vercel Edge / Deno | @chio-protocol/workers, @chio-protocol/edge, @chio-protocol/deno |
Shipping |
| Browser / Passkey | @chio-protocol/browser, @chio-protocol/passkey |
Shipping |
| Scaffolder | create-chio-app |
Shipping |
| Surface | Package | Status |
|---|---|---|
| Temporal / Airflow / Dagster / Prefect / Ray | chio-temporal, chio-airflow, chio-dagster, chio-prefect, chio-ray |
Shipping |
| Apache Flink | chio-streaming-flink |
Shipping |
| Streaming (Kafka, NATS, Pulsar, EventBridge, Pub/Sub, Redis) | chio-streaming |
Shipping |
| Infrastructure-as-Code (Terraform, Pulumi) | chio-iac |
Shipping |
| Kubernetes (controller, CRDs, webhooks) | sdks/k8s |
Shipping |
| AWS Lambda (Rust + Python) | chio-lambda-extension, chio-lambda-python |
Shipping |
| AWS Bedrock Marketplace | chio-bedrock-control-plane (us-east-1) |
Shipping |
| Editors | vscode-chio, zed-chio (LSP-backed) |
Shipping |
| Product | Package | What it is |
|---|---|---|
chio CLI |
chio-cli |
Operator binary: check, mcp serve, trust serve, replay, receipt inspection |
| API Protect | chio-api-protect |
Zero-code reverse proxy: OpenAPI in, default policy, signed receipts out |
| Chio-Wall | chio-wall |
Bounded control-path packages and evidence bundles |
| MERCURY | chio-mercury |
Typed evidence contracts layered on receipt truth |
| Proof Room | chio-proof-room |
Standalone verifier dashboard (Docker quickstart) |
Beyond this repository, the backbay-labs org ships
companion plugins that bond an agent, IDE, or chat platform to a Chio policy. Each is a
separate repo built on the shared @chio/bridge library and the chio CLI, so any host can
mediate every tool call through the kernel and stream signed receipts.
| Plugin | Repo | What it does |
|---|---|---|
| Claude Code | chio-claude-code-plugin | Bonds any Claude Code session; mediates Bash/Write/Edit/Read and every MCP server, metered and receipt-signed |
| Cursor | chio-cursor-plugin | Bonds Composer, the Agent tab, inline AI, and mounted MCP servers via native Cursor hooks |
| Codex | chio-codex-plugin | Bonds the OpenAI Codex CLI plan-then-act loop through the guard pipeline, with attested plans |
| OpenCode | chio-open-code-plugin | Native OpenCode TUI plugin: scaffold, wrap, and ship bonded agents |
| OpenClaw | chio-open-claw-plugin | A hosted Chio edge in Slack, Discord, and Telegram: mention to propose a policy, passkey-countersign, then a bonded agent streams receipts to the thread |
Two demos worth a look: chio-showcase (an "Internet of Agents" demo of four organizations transacting through Chio-mediated agent commerce) and chio-hedge-fund-demo (one sentence in Claude Code becomes a bonded operator placing budget-gated paper trades with verifiable receipts).
The kernel is the entire trusted base. Around it, five layers of defense, each one fail-closed:
- Trusted core. Only the Runtime Kernel is trusted (the TCB). The agent and tool servers are untrusted and isolated, and the kernel never leaks its address or signing key.
- Fail-closed by construction. Errors deny access, invalid policy is rejected at load, and the kernel will not allow a call it cannot also sign a receipt for.
- Guard pipeline. Native, data-layer, sandboxed WASM, and external guards screen every input and output before it crosses a trust boundary.
- Active defense. Information-flow control, deception (canary capabilities and honey-tools), and reversible quarantine correlate and contain anomalous behavior.
- Signed evidence. Every decision is sealed into a canonical-JSON (RFC 8785), post-quantum-ready receipt, so receipts and attestations verify byte-for-byte across languages.
Chio names 20 threats in spec/SECURITY.md, each with shipped controls, required mitigations, and residual risk, tracked at docs/security/threat-coverage.md. Report vulnerabilities privately per SECURITY.md.
The protocol is in place. What follows is the frontier it opens: an agent economy that is sovereign, provable, and self-governing. We are shipping the whole arc on a monthly cadence, targeting completion by Q1 2027; the windows below are indicative.
- Aug 2026 · The open authority standard. A neutral, published protocol and a public certification program for third-party runtimes: the interoperable trust layer for the whole agent internet, owned by no one.
- Sep 2026 · A machine-checked kernel, end to end. Extend the Lean 4 proof boundary from the decision core to the entire kernel and wire protocol: a trust base that is proven correct, not merely tested.
- Oct 2026 · The global receipt commons. A federated, anti-equivocation transparency log for agent action: a public, searchable commons of proofs with independent monitors, so any claim about any agent can be checked by anyone.
- Nov 2026 · Proof-carrying money. A universal settlement fabric where value itself carries provenance: one receipt standard that clears across every chain and rail, so a payment always knows where it came from and what it was authorized to do.
- Dec 2026 · Zero-knowledge compliance. Prove KYC/AML, jurisdiction, data-residency, and policy adherence about an agent's actions without revealing the underlying data. Regulation anyone can verify; privacy no one has to surrender.
- Jan 2027 · Autonomous risk markets. Live underwriting where an agent's signed history prices its own credit and insurance in real time. Reputation becomes collateral and premiums self-tune, so trust can be bought, sold, and hedged like any other asset.
- Feb 2027 · Swarm immunity. Decoys, information-flow control, and quarantine composed into a fleet-wide immune system that shares threat intelligence across federated operators and adapts to new attacks in real time.
- Mar 2027 · Chiodos: sovereign agent economies. Chartered digital nation-states of agents, each with its own treasury, constitution, and monetary policy, transacting across borders under signed treaties. Economic sovereignty as a first-class protocol primitive.
- Migrate a coding agent from MCP - docs/guides/MIGRATING-FROM-MCP.md
- Add Chio to your agent framework (LangChain, LangGraph, CrewAI, AutoGen) - sdks/python
- Protect a web backend - docs/guides/WEB_BACKEND_QUICKSTART.md
- Author a native Chio tool server - docs/start-here/NATIVE_ADOPTION_GUIDE.md
- Deploy to production (Kubernetes, Lambda, Envoy/Istio) - sdks/k8s
- Write a custom guard (fuel-metered WASM, any language) - sdks/guard
- Run the agent economy (metering, budgets, settlement) - examples/agent-commerce-network
For a guided local walkthrough, start with the progressive tutorial.
The formal verification roadmap was executed through its local acceptance
gates on 2026-07-15 against implementation commit
d292f14df1c493873199f4f9d969ade00472ff28. Retained full-cycle proof-mutation
evidence was refreshed on 2026-07-16 against prerequisite commit
a871396bffd010500f680c035e7b52c1867f38e2. The repository now binds
production Rust decisions to Lean, authenticated Aeneas extraction, Creusot
contracts, Kani harnesses, TLA+/Apalache models, differential tests,
concurrency exploration, and mutation evidence. The generated
proof coverage matrix is the authoritative map from
properties to models, production symbols, assumptions, and gates.
All hygiene items and 22 of the 23 planned work items are implemented. The remaining economy collection proof is blocked on the unmerged netting surface; its scalar conservation predicates and Kani groundwork are present, but no collection-level claim is made. Hosted CI streaks remain advisory evidence and are not represented as local proof results. See the current-state snapshot and the executed roadmap for exact scope and limitations.
- Example index: examples/README.md
- One-page surface map: examples/EXAMPLE_SURFACE_MATRIX.md
- Docker smoke path: examples/docker/README.md
Contributions are welcome. Read CONTRIBUTING.md for the workflow and
CODE_OF_CONDUCT.md for community expectations. Before opening a pull
request, run the verification gate (make gate for the minimal check, or make ci for the
full PR-tier lane CI enforces):
make gatecargo build --workspace && \
cargo test --workspace && \
cargo clippy --workspace -- -D warnings && \
cargo fmt --all -- --check