Skip to content

Security: agentry-sh/agentry

SECURITY.md

Security policy

Reporting a vulnerability

Please do not open a public issue for a suspected vulnerability or exposed credential. Email security [at] agentry.sh with:

  • the affected component or endpoint;
  • reproduction steps and expected impact;
  • whether the issue is already being exploited or a secret is exposed; and
  • a safe way to contact you.

You should receive an acknowledgement within three business days. We will coordinate validation, remediation, and disclosure with you. Please avoid accessing customer data, causing service disruption, or retaining data beyond what is necessary to demonstrate the issue.

Supported versions

Agentry is early-stage software. Security fixes target the current main branch and the hosted service; older commits and unpublished builds do not receive separate support.

Security boundary

Agentry is a control plane over a customer's existing PostHog Cloud project. PostHog remains the customer-owned authoritative store for analytics, exceptions, issue grouping and lifecycle, affected-user impact, recordings, feature flags, surveys, experiments, retention, and source-map symbolication.

Applications send analytics and exceptions directly through official PostHog SDKs. Trusted customer CI sends source maps directly through the official PostHog CLI. Agentry does not issue browser or server telemetry keys, expose an event-ingest endpoint, proxy source maps, host PostHog, or retain a raw event stream.

The hosted control plane connects to one existing PostHog Cloud project through minimum-scope, read-only OAuth. It performs bounded reads of analytics, Error Tracking, recording metadata, feature flags, surveys and response statistics, and experiments. While the connection is active, its access and refresh token material is encrypted at rest. It is never returned to the CLI, coding agent, repository, application, CI job, or automation runner. Detach and reauthorization-required transitions purge the stored token material; detach never deletes or mutates the customer's PostHog project.

PostHog is also the only interactive sign-in surface. The CLI discovers or asks for the Cloud region, presents one PostHog authorization URL, and polls with an opaque token stored outside the repository. Successful polling returns an agentry_sk_ owner key and a one-time authorization ID; it never returns the PostHog access or refresh token. The CLI deletes that authorization ID after it is claimed into the selected Agentry project. There is no separate Agentry account or second credential path.

Agentry may retain bounded, redacted evidence snapshots and query receipts, a thin issue-control projection, source-backed plans and approvals, deploy evidence, automation state, and immutable receipts. It does not retain replay snapshots/video, unbounded survey free text, source-map artifacts, or a shadow analytics warehouse. Recording reads expose metadata and a PostHog player link only. Provider content is untrusted evidence and never grants tool or execution authority.

Credential model

Credentials are purpose-specific and non-interchangeable:

  • the PostHog OAuth grant is held only by the hosted control plane and permits bounded reads from the connected PostHog project;
  • customer PostHog SDK and CLI credentials stay in customer-owned application and CI environments and are not Agentry credentials;
  • AGENTRY_PRIVATE_API_KEY is interactive owner/member authority stored outside the repository and minted after successful PostHog sign-in;
  • AGENTRY_CI_API_KEY records Agentry deploy evidence and provider-observed PR proof only; and
  • each AGENTRY_RUNNER_API_KEY is bound to exactly one enabled automation.

A runner credential cannot access the OAuth token or act as an owner. Draft PR is the maximum autonomous effect: Agentry authority does not include merge, direct push, deployment, rollback, silent workflow changes, or PostHog writes.

See docs/credential-boundaries.md and the telemetry threat model for the full model.

Never include real credentials, OAuth codes or tokens, customer evidence, invite tokens, onboarding proof markers, source snapshots, or production response bodies in a public report.

There aren't any published security advisories