fix: the hdmi receive driver copies edid (extended d... in...#7
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orbisai0security wants to merge 1 commit into
Open
fix: the hdmi receive driver copies edid (extended d... in...#7orbisai0security wants to merge 1 commit into
orbisai0security wants to merge 1 commit into
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Automated security fix generated by Orbis Security AI
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Summary
Fix critical severity security issue in
hdmi/xilinx-hdmirx.c.Vulnerability
V-001hdmi/xilinx-hdmirx.c:369Description: The HDMI receive driver copies EDID (Extended Display Identification Data) from a connected device into an internal kernel buffer using memcpy. The number of bytes copied is computed as '128 * edid->blocks', where edid->blocks is taken directly from the externally-supplied EDID structure without any validation against the actual allocated size of xhdmi->edid_user. A malicious HDMI device or a crafted ioctl call can set edid->blocks to a large value (e.g., 255), causing the driver to copy up to 32,640 bytes into a buffer that may only hold 512 bytes (4 standard EDID blocks), overflowing the kernel heap and corrupting adjacent memory structures.
Changes
hdmi/xilinx-hdmirx.cVerification
Automated security fix by OrbisAI Security