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28 changes: 27 additions & 1 deletion skills/incident-response/containment/SKILL.md
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ phase: [respond]
frameworks: [NIST-SP-800-61r2, MITRE-ATT&CK]
difficulty: intermediate
time_estimate: "15-30min"
version: "1.0.1"
version: "1.0.2"
author: unitoneai
license: MIT
allowed-tools: Read, Grep, Glob
Expand Down Expand Up @@ -235,6 +235,27 @@ Define conditions under which containment actions should be rolled back or modif
| Containment action was applied to wrong scope (false positive) | Remove containment controls from unaffected systems | Incident Commander |
| Eradication complete and validated | Phase out containment controls in stages with monitoring | Incident Commander + Security Team |

### Step 6b: Temporary Containment Control Ledger

Emergency containment often creates short-lived firewall blocks, DNS overrides, EDR isolation policies, IdP session revocations, WAF rules, CDN cache purges, SaaS sharing restrictions, or allowlist exceptions. Track these controls in a ledger so emergency changes do not become unowned permanent drift.

For each temporary containment control, record:

| Field | Required evidence |
|---|---|
| Control ID | Ticket, change record, SOAR action ID, or console audit event |
| Control type | Firewall, DNS, EDR, IdP, SaaS, WAF/CDN, cloud policy, or other |
| Scope | Exact accounts, hosts, groups, tenants, zones, paths, or indicators affected |
| Owner | Named responder or team accountable for validation and removal |
| Approval | Incident Commander, business owner, legal, or emergency-change authority |
| Start time | UTC timestamp when the control became effective |
| Expiry / review time | UTC timestamp or event that requires renewal, downgrade, or removal |
| Effectiveness evidence | Log, query, health check, or failed attacker action proving the control works |
| Business-impact evidence | Service health, user impact, exception requests, or accepted outage record |
| Removal plan | Exact rollback command/change path and expected validation after removal |

**Finding classification:** Missing owner or expiry for a temporary containment control is **Medium**. A temporary allowlist, bypass, or broad deny rule that remains active after the incident without renewed approval is **High**. A containment exception that restores attacker access or disables required monitoring is **Critical**.

---

## 4. Findings Classification
Expand Down Expand Up @@ -284,6 +305,11 @@ threat severity and business criticality, and expected impact on operations.]
|---|---|---|---|---|
| [Action] | [Scope] | [Duration] | [Planned/In Progress/Complete] | [Name] |

### Temporary Containment Control Ledger
| Control ID | Type | Scope | Owner | Approval | Start Time | Expiry / Review Time | Effectiveness Evidence | Removal Plan |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| [Ticket/Change/SOAR ID] | [Firewall/DNS/EDR/IdP/SaaS/WAF/CDN/Cloud] | [Exact scope] | [Name/team] | [Approver] | [UTC] | [UTC/event] | [Evidence] | [Rollback path] |

### Business Impact Assessment
| Service/System | Impact of Containment | Mitigation | Acceptable |
|---|---|---|---|
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