Secure attachments

docs/native-attachments-design.md

@@ -0,0 +1,231 @@
+# Design: Native LLM Attachments over the Private (OHTTP) Path
+
+## Status
+
+Proposal. Spans three repos: `chat-app` (browser), `chat-api` (relay), `tee-gateway`
+(enclave). The bulk of the change lands in `tee-gateway`.
+
+## Motivation
+
+Today attachments are handled by **server-side parsing in `chat-api`**:
+
+- `chat-api/src/core/attachments.py` downloads each attachment and runs PyMuPDF /
+  python-docx to extract **plain text**, then injects that text into the prompt.
+- Images are classified by content-type and passed through as URLs.
+
+This is the wrong layer to solve the problem:
+
+1. **It throws away everything the models do natively.** Modern Claude / GPT /
+   Gemini ingest PDFs and images directly — layout, tables, figures, charts,
+   handwriting, embedded images. Flattening a PDF to `page.get_text()` loses all
+   of that and feeds the model a worse input than it could handle itself.
+2. **It only works on the non-private path.** The parsing in `attachments.py` is
+   invoked exclusively from the regular `POST /api/v1/chat` handler. On the
+   **OHTTP path**, `chat-api` is a dumb relay — it forwards opaque ciphertext to
+   the enclave and never sees the body — so attachments are simply not processed.
+   Worse, in the enclave `llm_backend.convert_messages` flattens multimodal
+   content parts to text only (`"".join(part.get("text", "") ...)`), so any
+   `image_url` part is **silently dropped** before it reaches the provider.
+
+Net result: **attachments and privacy are currently mutually exclusive.**
+Attachments only work on the route where `chat-api` reads the plaintext, and the
+private route drops them.
+
+## Goal
+
+Send attachments to the model **natively**, on the **private (OHTTP) path**:
+
+- No server-side text extraction. The file bytes reach the model as a native
+  image/document content part.
+- `chat-api` and Cloudflare never see attachment plaintext (same trust boundary
+  as the message text already enjoys on OHTTP).
+- The enclave converts the inner request's multimodal content into each
+  provider's native format via LangChain.
+
+## Trust boundary (what this does and does not hide)
+
+- **Hidden from:** the browser→relay transport, `chat-api`, the OHTTP relay,
+  Cloudflare/R2. They see only HPKE ciphertext.
+- **Visible to:** the enclave (it decrypts — that's the trust anchor) and the
+  **upstream LLM provider** (OpenAI/Anthropic/Google/xAI/ByteDance), which
+  receives the attachment as part of the completion request. This is identical
+  to how message *text* is already handled: whatever you send the model, the
+  model provider sees. Fully provider-blind attachments would require the model
+  to run inside the TEE and are out of scope here.
+
+## Transport: how the attachment reaches the enclave
+
+### Phase 1 — inline base64 (recommended starting point)
+
+The browser embeds the file directly in the message content as a standard
+OpenAI-style content part, inside the HPKE-encrypted OHTTP payload:
+
+```jsonc
+{
+  "model": "claude-sonnet-4-6",
+  "messages": [
+    {
+      "role": "user",
+      "content": [
+        { "type": "text", "text": "Summarize this contract." },
+        { "type": "image_url",
+          "image_url": { "url": "..." } },
+        { "type": "file",
+          "file": { "filename": "contract.pdf",
+                    "file_data": "data:application/pdf;base64,JVBERi0..." } }
+      ]
+    }
+  ]
+}
+```
+
+- Pros: nothing outside the enclave/provider ever sees the bytes; no R2 round
+  trip; no presigned-URL machinery; no SSRF surface.
+- Cons: base64 inflates ~33%; bounded by request/OHTTP size limits; no
+  persistence (re-sent each turn). Fine for the common case (a few MB of PDF or
+  an image). Enforce a hard per-request attachment-bytes cap in the enclave.
+
+### Phase 2 — encrypted blob in R2 (only if large files / persistence needed)
+
+Browser client-side-encrypts the file (AES-GCM), uploads **ciphertext** to R2
+(Cloudflare sees only ciphertext), and includes inside the OHTTP payload an R2
+reference plus the AES key **wrapped to the TEE attestation/HPKE public key**.
+The enclave fetches the ciphertext and decrypts internally. Defer until Phase 1
+limits become a real constraint.
+
+> Note: do **not** go back to plaintext-in-R2 + presigned URLs. That reintroduces
+> the public-bearer-token leak and the SSRF surface in `attachments.py`.
+
+## Enclave changes (`tee-gateway`) — the core of the work
+
+### 1. `convert_messages` must preserve multimodal content
+
+`llm_backend.py:248-255` currently does:
+
+```python
+elif role == "user":
+    if isinstance(content, list):
+        content = "".join(
+            part.get("text", "") if isinstance(part, dict) else str(part)
+            for part in content
+        )
+    langchain_messages.append(HumanMessage(content=content))
+```
+
+Replace the flattening with a converter that maps the inbound OpenAI-style
+content parts to **LangChain v1 standard content blocks** (`langchain_core.
+messages.content` — `ImageContentBlock`, `FileContentBlock`). Building the
+*standard* blocks (rather than raw OpenAI `image_url`/`file` dicts) is important:
+each provider package translates them into its own native API, so one code path
+covers Anthropic, OpenAI, Gemini, and xAI uniformly.
+
+- `text` → `{"type": "text", "text": ...}`
+- image (base64 data URI or https) →
+  `{"type": "image", "base64": ..., "mime_type": "image/png"}` (or `"url": ...`)
+- document/PDF (base64) →
+  `{"type": "file", "base64": ..., "mime_type": "application/pdf",
+    "filename": "<original name>"}`
+
+Keep a `HumanMessage` with a **list** content when parts are present; only
+collapse to a plain string when the message is text-only (preserves current
+behavior for the no-attachment case).
+
+**Verified** against the pinned versions (see "Dependency check" below): a
+`HumanMessage` carrying these standard blocks converts correctly outbound —
+Anthropic emits `{"type":"document","source":{"type":"base64","media_type":
+"application/pdf",...}}`, OpenAI emits `{"type":"file","file":{"file_data":
+"data:application/pdf;base64,...","filename":...}}`. **Carry the original
+`filename`** on file blocks — OpenAI requires one and otherwise substitutes a
+placeholder (`LC_AUTOGENERATED`).
+
+### 2. No new dependencies (PCR constraint) — confirmed
+
+Native handoff means the enclave does **not** parse PDFs/DOCX itself — it passes
+the bytes to the provider. So we should **not** add PyMuPDF/python-docx to
+`tee-gateway`.
+
+**Dependency check (done).** The currently pinned versions already support
+standard image *and* file (PDF) content blocks with base64, across every
+provider we route to — so **this change needs no dependency bump and the PCR
+measurements stay stable**:
+
+| Package | Pinned | Native file/image support |
+|---|---|---|
+| `langchain-core` | 1.2.26 | Defines `ImageContentBlock` / `FileContentBlock` (base64, url, file_id, mime_type) |
+| `langchain-anthropic` | 1.4.0 | `file` → `document` (defaults `application/pdf`); image → base64 source |
+| `langchain-openai` | 1.1.12 | `file` → `file_data` data-URI / `input_file`; image → `image_url` |
+| `langchain-google-genai` | 4.2.1 | document/image blocks supported |
+| `langchain-xai` | 1.2.2 | subclass of `BaseChatOpenAI` → inherits OpenAI handling |
+
+This was verified functionally (not just by reading types) by running the
+Anthropic and OpenAI outbound message converters over a multimodal
+`HumanMessage`. Per-model *acceptance* of PDFs still depends on the model itself
+(see capability gating below).
+
+### 3. Per-provider capability gating
+
+Not every model accepts every modality. Extend `model_registry` with capability
+flags (e.g. `supports_image`, `supports_pdf`) and reject (clear 4xx inside the
+inner request) when a request sends a modality the target model can't handle,
+rather than silently dropping it as today.
+
+### 4. Request signing / hashing
+
+`chat_controller.py` (~645-651) hashes user content via `str(msg.content)`. With
+multimodal content that would hash megabytes of base64 and is not canonical.
+Define a stable hashing rule, e.g. hash each attachment as
+`sha256(mime_type || raw_bytes)` and include those digests (not the base64) in
+the canonical request JSON that feeds `keccak256(requestHash ...)`. This keeps
+signatures meaningful and bounded while still committing to the exact attachment
+content.
+
+### 5. Limits & validation
+
+- Hard cap on total attachment bytes per request (post-decode).
+- Allowlist of accepted mime types per modality.
+- Reject `image_url` values that are remote `https` URLs on the private path if
+  we want to guarantee the enclave makes no outbound fetch for user content
+  (Phase 1 = base64 only). Decide explicitly.
+
+## `chat-api` changes
+
+- OHTTP path: **no change needed** to the relay itself — attachments ride inside
+  the encrypted payload it already forwards opaquely.
+- Regular `POST /api/v1/chat` path: stop calling `load_documents` /
+  `is_image_url` and stop injecting extracted text. Either (a) build native
+  content parts here too, or (b) deprecate attachment support on the non-private
+  path and route all attachments through OHTTP. Recommend (b) for a single code
+  path.
+- The presigned-URL / `attachments: string[]` machinery and `attachments.py`
+  become dead code for inference and can be removed once Phase 1 ships (R2 may
+  still be used for chat-history storage — that is a separate concern and should
+  be client-side-encrypted if kept).
+
+## `chat-app` changes
+
+- Replace "upload to R2 → store presigned URL → send URL in `attachments`" with:
+  read the file in the browser, base64-encode, and add a native `image_url` /
+  `file` content part to the outgoing (to-be-encrypted) message.
+- Enforce client-side size/type limits matching the enclave caps; surface a clear
+  error when a file exceeds them.
+- Drop the presigned-upload/download hooks from the send path.
+
+## Rollout
+
+1. Enclave: `convert_messages` multimodal support + capability flags + hashing +
+   limits (behind the existing OHTTP path). Ship and verify PCRs.
+2. `chat-app`: send native base64 content parts on the OHTTP path.
+3. Remove server-side parsing from `chat-api`; retire `attachments.py` and the
+   presigned-URL attachment flow.
+4. (Optional, later) Phase 2 encrypted-R2-blob for large files.
+
+## Open questions
+
+- ~~Pinned `langchain-*` versions: do they already support `file` (PDF) content
+  blocks?~~ **Resolved:** yes, all five providers — no dep bump / PCR change
+  needed (see Dependency check above).
+- Hard size cap value for inline attachments, and the OHTTP request size ceiling.
+- Keep or drop attachment support entirely on the non-private path?
+- Source of truth for per-model `supports_image` / `supports_pdf` flags — note
+  `langchain-*` ships `ModelProfile` data (e.g. `langchain_xai/data/_profiles`)
+  that may already encode some of this.

tee_gateway/controllers/chat_controller.py

@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
+import hashlib
 import json
 import time
 import uuid
@@ -29,6 +30,9 @@
     get_chat_model_cached,
     convert_messages,
     extract_usage,
+    validate_attachments,
+    AttachmentValidationError,
+    _convert_content_part,
 )
 from tee_gateway.pricing import compute_session_cost
 
@@ -47,6 +51,13 @@ def create_chat_completion(body):
         connexion.request.get_json()
     )
 
+    # Reject attachments the target model can't handle, and enforce the size cap,
+    # before doing any provider work.
+    try:
+        validate_attachments(chat_request.messages, chat_request.model)
+    except AttachmentValidationError as e:
+        return {"error": "Invalid attachment", "message": str(e)}, e.status
+
     if chat_request.stream:
         return _create_streaming_response(chat_request)
     else:
@@ -636,6 +647,40 @@ def generate():
 # ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 
 
+def _canonical_user_content(content) -> Any:
+    """Canonicalize user-message content for request hashing.
+
+    Plain-string content is returned unchanged. For multimodal content (a list of
+    parts), inline attachment bytes are replaced with a ``sha256`` digest so the
+    signed request commits to the exact attachment content without bloating the
+    hashed payload with megabytes of base64. URL / file_id references are kept
+    verbatim.
+    """
+    if isinstance(content, str):
+        return content
+    if not isinstance(content, list):
+        return str(content)
+
+    canonical = []
+    for part in content:
+        block = _convert_content_part(part)
+        if block is None:
+            continue
+        if block["type"] == "text":
+            canonical.append({"type": "text", "text": block.get("text", "")})
+            continue
+        entry = {"type": block["type"]}
+        if "base64" in block:
+            entry["sha256"] = hashlib.sha256(
+                block["base64"].encode("utf-8")
+            ).hexdigest()
+        for key in ("mime_type", "filename", "url", "file_id"):
+            if block.get(key):
+                entry[key] = block[key]
+        canonical.append(entry)
+    return canonical
+
+
 def _chat_request_to_dict(chat_request: CreateChatCompletionRequest) -> dict:
     """Serialize a CreateChatCompletionRequest to a canonical dict for hashing."""
     messages = []
@@ -646,9 +691,7 @@ def _chat_request_to_dict(chat_request: CreateChatCompletionRequest) -> dict:
             messages.append(
                 {
                     "role": "user",
-                    "content": msg.content
-                    if isinstance(msg.content, str)
-                    else str(msg.content),
+                    "content": _canonical_user_content(msg.content),
                 }
             )
         elif isinstance(msg, ChatCompletionRequestAssistantMessage):