Satelle controls visible desktops and handles Host authentication, provider credential references, prompts, and durable execution state. Treat suspected security issues as private until a fix and disclosure plan are ready.

Satelle publishes pre-release versions. Security fixes target the latest published release and the default branch. Include the exact commit or satelle --version output in a report so the affected code can be identified.

Email contact@micr.dev with the subject Satelle security report. Do not open a public issue for a suspected vulnerability.

Include only the information needed to reproduce and assess the problem:

• The affected Satelle commit or version and Controller/Host platforms.
• The transport in use: local, direct HTTPS/WSS, or SSH tunnel.
• The security boundary that was crossed or could be crossed.
• Minimal reproduction steps and the observed result.
• Whether credentials, desktop content, prompts, or durable state were exposed.
• Any temporary mitigation already applied.

Do not send live bearer tokens, provider secrets, private keys, raw credential store values, or full configuration files. Replace them with clearly marked placeholders. If a minimal encrypted artifact is necessary, first request a safe transfer method in the report.

Normal Satelle logs are designed to exclude raw provider secrets, prompts, transcripts, and desktop content. They can still contain sensitive operational metadata such as Host aliases, Session identifiers, usernames, filesystem paths, network names, error details, and timing information.

Before sharing diagnostic output:

1. Reproduce with the narrowest command and scope that demonstrates the issue.
2. Remove bearer tokens, authorization headers, Secret Source values, private keys, certificates that identify a private deployment, and provider secrets.
3. Redact Host aliases, usernames, addresses, tailnet names, Session identifiers, local paths, prompts, transcripts, and desktop content unless essential.
4. State what was redacted and whether the output came from a Controller or Host.
5. Send the result only through the private reporting channel.

--verbose, --json, and event output are not diagnostic-export consent. Support bundle export is not implemented in this release; do not substitute an unreviewed archive of Satelle state directories.

Reports are especially useful when they involve:

• Authentication or authorization bypass across API Principal scopes.
• Host identity, TLS, CA bundle, bearer-token, or SSH tunnel confusion.
• Unsafe file ownership, permissions, replacement, or secret persistence.
• Project configuration gaining user-level trust or mutation authority.
• YOLO or approval behavior exceeding its documented Turn boundary.
• Session isolation, idempotency, lease ownership, or durable-state corruption.
• Prompt, provider credential, transcript, screenshot, or desktop-content leaks.
• Path traversal, command injection, archive extraction, or update integrity.

Operational failures without a security impact can use a normal issue after all sensitive data is removed. General feature requests and public design questions do not belong in the private security channel.

The maintainer will validate the report against the current source, coordinate a fix when needed, and agree on public disclosure timing with the reporter. Please avoid public discussion until that coordination is complete.