🔒 [security fix] Fix Redis eval vulnerability#1225
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🔒 Release Safety Check Results✅ Safety Checks Passed {"code":"NOT_FOUND","message":"Requested function was not found"} |
🔍 Classification Check Results
✅ No violations detected. Safe to merge! |
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🎯 What: Replace raw Redis EVAL with parameter validation and secure command definition (using SHA under the hood via defineCommand).
⚠️ Risk: Arbitrary Redis command injection or unexpected server errors if malformed parameters (like NaN, infinite, or negative bounds) were passed to the Lua script, potentially leading to denial of service or data corruption in rate limit states.
🛡️ Solution: Added strict bounds checking (Number.isFinite, non-negative assertions) on incoming parameters and switched from direct this.redis.eval to defining and executing a secure Redis command via this.redis.defineCommand, which validates the script, registers it, and safely proxies parameter bindings to prevent format injection.
PR created automatically by Jules for task 1985635102874006381 started by @Hardonian