🛡️ Sentinel: [CRITICAL] 관리자 엔드포인트에 인증 추가

.jules/sentinel.md

@@ -1,34 +1,8 @@
-## 2026-06-30 - Prevent DOM-based XSS in Viewer JS
-**Vulnerability:** Untrusted paths from API responses were directly assigned to `a.href` and used in `iframe` generation, which allows execution of malicious URIs like `javascript:` or `data:`.
-**Learning:** Even when avoiding `innerHTML`, directly setting URL-like strings to DOM attributes without protocol validation introduces XSS vectors. The payload can be executed when the link is clicked or the iframe is loaded.
-**Prevention:** Implement an `isSafeUrl` verification function to ensure the protocol is strictly `http:` or `https:` (using `new URL()`) before assigning untrusted inputs to DOM attributes like `href` or `src`.
-
-## 2026-07-08 - 파일 업로드 시 경로 조작(Path Traversal) 취약점 방지
-**Vulnerability:** 클라이언트에서 전송된 `MultipartFile.getOriginalFilename()`을 검증 없이 사용하고 있어 공격자가 `../../../etc/passwd.hwp` 같은 파일명으로 경로를 조작할 수 있었습니다.
-**Learning:** 클라이언트가 전송한 파일명은 신뢰할 수 없는 입력값입니다. 경로 탐색 문자열이 포함될 수 있으며, 이를 그대로 사용할 경우 의도치 않은 디렉토리에 파일이 저장되거나 시스템 파일이 조작되는 등의 심각한 문제가 발생할 수 있습니다.
-**Prevention:** 사용자로부터 입력받은 파일명은 항상 명시적으로 살균(sanitize)해야 합니다. `org.springframework.util.StringUtils.cleanPath()`를 사용하여 경로를 정규화하고, 마지막 `/` 이후의 순수한 파일명만 추출하여 사용하는 방식을 적용해야 합니다.
-
-## 2026-07-02 - Cryptographic Signature Verification Bypass in Policy Override
-**Vulnerability:** The document validation service logged the presence of policy override parameters (approverId, approvalToken) but failed to actually verify the cryptographic signature of the token against a shared secret. This allowed an attacker to bypass file extension restrictions (e.g., uploading blocked `.hwp` files) by sending any arbitrary token.
-**Learning:** Checking for the presence of security tokens is insufficient if the token payload and signature are not cryptographically validated against a trusted secret. The absence of this check created a critical authorization bypass.
-**Prevention:** Always verify cryptographic signatures (using constant-time comparison like `MessageDigest.isEqual`) for any policy override or authorization token before granting the elevated privilege or bypassing a security control.
-
-## 2026-07-08 - Length Extension and Canonicalization Vulnerability in Hash Payloads
-**Vulnerability:** The HMAC-SHA256 signature payload for policy overrides was constructed by simply concatenating strings: `approverId + ":" + extension`. This allowed attackers to craft ambiguous inputs if they embedded the delimiter `:` inside their payload, potentially bypassing validation via canonicalization or length extension attacks.
-**Learning:** Simple string concatenation is insecure when generating cryptographic hashes or signatures for multiple inputs. Attackers can shift delimiters to produce identical payloads for entirely different logical inputs.
-**Prevention:** Always use length-prefixing or unambiguous delimiters (such as JSON structure or specific serialization formats) when combining multiple inputs for cryptographic hashing. For example, use `approverId.length() + ":" + approverId + extension` to strictly define the boundaries of each field.
-
-## 2026-07-11 - XSS 취약점 제거 (`innerHTML` 사용 교체)
-**Vulnerability:** `innerHTML`을 통한 동적 DOM 조작으로 인해 발생할 수 있는 DOM 기반 XSS(Cross-Site Scripting) 취약점이 발견되었습니다.
-**Learning:** 로딩 상태를 표시하기 위해 버튼 내부의 텍스트와 DOM 노드를 임시로 변경하고 복구하는 과정에서 `innerHTML`을 읽고 쓰는 방식은 안전하지 않으며 정적 보안 스캐너에서 높은 위험으로 분류됩니다.
-**Prevention:** 텍스트나 노드 상태를 업데이트할 때는 반드시 `Array.from(el.childNodes)`로 자식 노드를 저장하고, `el.replaceChildren(...initialChildren)`을 통해 복구하여 안전하게 처리해야 합니다.
-
-## 2026-07-11 - 파일 이름의 널 바이트 취약점 패치
-**Vulnerability:** 파일 업로드 시 파일 이름에 널 바이트(`\u0000`)를 포함할 경우, `java.nio.file.Path.of` 메서드에서 예외가 발생하여 백엔드 검증 로직이 우회되거나 예상치 못한 서비스 거부(DoS) 상태가 될 수 있습니다.
-**Learning:** 파일 경로 또는 확장자 검증에서 널 바이트가 포함된 경우 잘라내기(truncation) 공격을 방지하기 위해 단순히 제거(sanitize)하는 것보다 즉시 예외를 발생시켜 입력값을 명시적으로 거부하는 것이 훨씬 안전합니다.
-**Prevention:** 파일 이름 및 경로를 다루는 모든 입력값에 대해 사전에 널 바이트를 검사하고, 발견 시 `IllegalArgumentException`과 같은 예외를 던져 즉각 차단해야 합니다.
-
-## 2026-07-12 - Prevent DoS Resource Exhaustion in Stream Hashing
-**Vulnerability:** The document hashing routine in `DefaultDocumentConversionService` processed file streams without enforcing any maximum size limit on the bytes read. An attacker could exploit this by uploading a maliciously large stream (or exploiting a compression bomb if unzipping), exhausting system memory, CPU, or disk space (DoS).
-**Learning:** Checking the declared file size (e.g., `file.getSize()`) in initial validation is not always sufficient if the input stream itself can be spoofed or dynamically expanded during reading. The actual bytes read must be verified against bounds continuously.
-**Prevention:** Always enforce a strict, configurable size limit (e.g., `ConversionProperties.maxUploadSizeBytes`) within the `while` loop that reads from untrusted input streams. Track `totalRead` and throw an exception immediately if the limit is exceeded.
+## 2026-07-22 - Missing Authentication on Admin Endpoints
+**Vulnerability:** The `AdminController` endpoints (`/api/v1/admin/convert/jobs`, `/api/v1/admin/convert/jobs/{jobId}`, `/api/v1/admin/convert/jobs/{jobId}/retry`) lacked authentication and authorization checks, allowing unauthenticated users to read, delete, and retry all conversion jobs.
+**Learning:** Spring controllers must explicitly enforce security policies, even if they are placed under an `/admin` path. The existence of an admin path does not automatically protect it.
+**Prevention:** Always inject `TenantAccessService` and invoke `tenantAccessService.require(...)` for every controller method to ensure permissions are checked before processing the request. Add corresponding unit tests that explicitly check for these authorization controls.
+## 2026-07-22 - Missing Authentication on Admin Endpoints
+**Vulnerability:** The `AdminController` endpoints (`/api/v1/admin/convert/jobs`, `/api/v1/admin/convert/jobs/{jobId}`, `/api/v1/admin/convert/jobs/{jobId}/retry`) lacked authentication and authorization checks, allowing unauthenticated users to read, delete, and retry all conversion jobs.
+**Learning:** Spring controllers must explicitly enforce security policies, even if they are placed under an `/admin` path. The existence of an admin path does not automatically protect it.
+**Prevention:** Always inject `TenantAccessService` and invoke `tenantAccessService.require(...)` for every controller method to ensure permissions are checked before processing the request. Add corresponding unit tests that explicitly check for these authorization controls.

src/main/java/com/clearfolio/viewer/auth/TenantPermissions.java

@@ -50,6 +50,16 @@ public final class TenantPermissions {
      */
     public static final String ANALYTICS_READ = "analytics:read";
 
+    /**
+     * Permission required to read admin data.
+     */
+    public static final String ADMIN_READ = "admin:read";
+
+    /**
+     * Permission required to write/modify admin data.
+     */
+    public static final String ADMIN_WRITE = "admin:write";
+
     private TenantPermissions() {
     }
 }

src/main/java/com/clearfolio/viewer/controller/AdminController.java

@@ -4,17 +4,21 @@
 import java.util.List;
 import java.util.UUID;
 
+import org.springframework.http.HttpHeaders;
 import org.springframework.http.HttpStatus;
 import org.springframework.http.ResponseEntity;
 import org.springframework.web.bind.annotation.DeleteMapping;
 import org.springframework.web.bind.annotation.GetMapping;
 import org.springframework.web.bind.annotation.PathVariable;
 import org.springframework.web.bind.annotation.PostMapping;
 import org.springframework.web.bind.annotation.RequestParam;
+import org.springframework.web.bind.annotation.RequestHeader;
 import org.springframework.web.bind.annotation.RestController;
 import org.springframework.web.server.ResponseStatusException;
 
 import com.clearfolio.viewer.api.AdminJobListResponse;
+import com.clearfolio.viewer.auth.TenantAccessService;
+import com.clearfolio.viewer.auth.TenantPermissions;
 import com.clearfolio.viewer.model.ConversionJob;
 import com.clearfolio.viewer.service.DocumentConversionService;
 import com.clearfolio.viewer.service.RetryDeadLetterResult;
@@ -26,14 +30,17 @@
 public class AdminController {
 
     private final DocumentConversionService conversionService;
+    private final TenantAccessService tenantAccessService;
 
     /**
      * Creates a controller for admin operations.
      *
      * @param conversionService conversion service
+     * @param tenantAccessService tenant access service
      */
-    public AdminController(DocumentConversionService conversionService) {
+    public AdminController(DocumentConversionService conversionService, TenantAccessService tenantAccessService) {
         this.conversionService = conversionService;
+        this.tenantAccessService = tenantAccessService;
     }
 
     /**
@@ -43,7 +50,8 @@ public AdminController(DocumentConversionService conversionService) {
      * @return list of conversion jobs
      */
     @GetMapping("/api/v1/admin/convert/jobs")
-    public AdminJobListResponse getAllJobs(@RequestParam(required = false) Boolean deadLettered) {
+    public AdminJobListResponse getAllJobs(@RequestParam(required = false) Boolean deadLettered, @RequestHeader HttpHeaders headers) {
+        tenantAccessService.require(headers, TenantPermissions.ADMIN_READ);
         Iterable<ConversionJob> allJobs = conversionService.getAllJobs();
 
         if (deadLettered == null) {
@@ -66,7 +74,8 @@ public AdminJobListResponse getAllJobs(@RequestParam(required = false) Boolean d
      * @return no content on success
      */
     @DeleteMapping("/api/v1/admin/convert/jobs/{jobId}")
-    public ResponseEntity<Void> deleteJob(@PathVariable UUID jobId) {
+    public ResponseEntity<Void> deleteJob(@PathVariable UUID jobId, @RequestHeader HttpHeaders headers) {
+        tenantAccessService.require(headers, TenantPermissions.ADMIN_WRITE);
         conversionService.deleteJob(jobId);
         return ResponseEntity.noContent().build();
     }
@@ -78,7 +87,8 @@ public ResponseEntity<Void> deleteJob(@PathVariable UUID jobId) {
      * @return accepted response on success
      */
     @PostMapping("/api/v1/admin/convert/jobs/{jobId}/retry")
-    public ResponseEntity<Void> retryDeadLettered(@PathVariable UUID jobId) {
+    public ResponseEntity<Void> retryDeadLettered(@PathVariable UUID jobId, @RequestHeader HttpHeaders headers) {
+        tenantAccessService.require(headers, TenantPermissions.ADMIN_WRITE);
         RetryDeadLetterResult result = conversionService.retryDeadLettered(jobId, "admin");
         if (result == RetryDeadLetterResult.NOT_FOUND) {
             throw new ResponseStatusException(HttpStatus.NOT_FOUND, "job not found");

src/test/java/com/clearfolio/viewer/controller/AdminControllerTest.java

@@ -2,31 +2,39 @@
 
 import static org.mockito.Mockito.mock;
 import static org.mockito.Mockito.when;
+import static org.mockito.ArgumentMatchers.any;
 
 import java.util.Arrays;
+import java.util.Set;
 import java.util.UUID;
 
+import org.springframework.http.HttpHeaders;
 import org.junit.jupiter.api.BeforeEach;
 import org.junit.jupiter.api.Test;
 import org.springframework.test.web.reactive.server.WebTestClient;
 
+import com.clearfolio.viewer.auth.TenantAccessService;
+import com.clearfolio.viewer.auth.TenantContext;
 import com.clearfolio.viewer.model.ConversionJob;
 import com.clearfolio.viewer.service.DocumentConversionService;
 import com.clearfolio.viewer.service.RetryDeadLetterResult;
 
 class AdminControllerTest {
 
     private DocumentConversionService conversionService;
+    private TenantAccessService tenantAccessService;
     private WebTestClient webTestClient;
     private AdminController controller;
 
     @BeforeEach
     void setUp() {
         conversionService = mock(DocumentConversionService.class);
-        controller = new AdminController(conversionService);
+        tenantAccessService = mock(TenantAccessService.class);
+        controller = new AdminController(conversionService, tenantAccessService);
         webTestClient = WebTestClient.bindToController(controller)
                 .controllerAdvice(new ApiExceptionHandler())
                 .build();
+        when(tenantAccessService.require(any(), any())).thenReturn(new TenantContext("t1", "s1", Set.of("admin:read", "admin:write")));
     }
 
     @Test
@@ -37,6 +45,7 @@ void getAllJobsReturnsAllJobsWhenNoFilterProvided() {
 
         webTestClient.get()
                 .uri("/api/v1/admin/convert/jobs")
+                .header(HttpHeaders.AUTHORIZATION, "Bearer test-token")
                 .exchange()
                 .expectStatus().isOk()
                 .expectBody()
@@ -55,6 +64,7 @@ void getAllJobsFiltersByDeadLetteredTrue() {
 
         webTestClient.get()
                 .uri("/api/v1/admin/convert/jobs?deadLettered=true")
+                .header(HttpHeaders.AUTHORIZATION, "Bearer test-token")
                 .exchange()
                 .expectStatus().isOk()
                 .expectBody()
@@ -72,6 +82,7 @@ void getAllJobsFiltersByDeadLetteredFalse() {
 
         webTestClient.get()
                 .uri("/api/v1/admin/convert/jobs?deadLettered=false")
+                .header(HttpHeaders.AUTHORIZATION, "Bearer test-token")
                 .exchange()
                 .expectStatus().isOk()
                 .expectBody()
@@ -85,6 +96,7 @@ void deleteJobReturnsNoContent() {
 
         webTestClient.delete()
                 .uri("/api/v1/admin/convert/jobs/" + jobId)
+                .header(HttpHeaders.AUTHORIZATION, "Bearer test-token")
                 .exchange()
                 .expectStatus().isNoContent();
     }
@@ -96,6 +108,7 @@ void retryDeadLetteredReturnsAcceptedWhenAccepted() {
 
         webTestClient.post()
                 .uri("/api/v1/admin/convert/jobs/" + jobId + "/retry")
+                .header(HttpHeaders.AUTHORIZATION, "Bearer test-token")
                 .exchange()
                 .expectStatus().isAccepted();
     }
@@ -107,6 +120,7 @@ void retryDeadLetteredReturnsNotFoundWhenNotFound() {
 
         webTestClient.post()
                 .uri("/api/v1/admin/convert/jobs/" + jobId + "/retry")
+                .header(HttpHeaders.AUTHORIZATION, "Bearer test-token")
                 .exchange()
                 .expectStatus().isNotFound();
     }
@@ -118,6 +132,7 @@ void retryDeadLetteredReturnsConflictWhenNotEligible() {
 
         webTestClient.post()
                 .uri("/api/v1/admin/convert/jobs/" + jobId + "/retry")
+                .header(HttpHeaders.AUTHORIZATION, "Bearer test-token")
                 .exchange()
                 .expectStatus().isEqualTo(409); // isConflict() isn't always available depending on spring-test version, so using isEqualTo(409) is safer
     }