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ZhiXiao-Lin merged 1 commit into from
Jun 24, 2026
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docs: README current (SecurityAction, exit, 8-node soak) #4

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21 changes: 13 additions & 8 deletions README.md
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Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -2,7 +2,7 @@

Kernel-level **eBPF observability — and optional intervention — for AI agents.** It turns
syscalls and network events into agent-semantic telemetry (which agent ran which tool, made
which LLM call, touched which files, reached which endpoint) with **zero changes to the agent
which LLM call, touched which files, reached which endpoint, escalated privileges) with **zero changes to the agent
and no per-language instrumentation** — and the same kernel vantage point can **intervene**:
deny an agent's egress, file access, or process execution from an external policy.

Expand All @@ -19,12 +19,12 @@ can never break observability.
```
AI agent + its tool subprocesses unmodified · any language
│
│ execve · connect · TLS ClientHello · DNS · openat · read/recv · SSL_*
│ execve · do_exit · connect · TLS ClientHello · DNS · openat · setuid/ptrace/bind · SSL_*
══════════╪═══════════════════════════════════════════════ KERNEL (eBPF + fanotify)
▼
OBSERVE (passive, always-on) INTERVENE (opt-in, external policy)
exec connect sni dns enforce → cgroup/connect4: deny egress
llm-metrics file* ssl-content* fileguard → fanotify: deny open + exec
exec exit connect sni dns enforce → cgroup/connect4: deny egress
security llm-metrics file* ssl* fileguard → fanotify: deny open + exec
│
│ ring buffers
══════════╪═══════════════════════════════════════════════ USERSPACE
Expand Down Expand Up @@ -198,16 +198,21 @@ Rust + [Aya](https://aya-rs.dev). Validated on Linux 6.8.

## Tested

Soak-tested under sustained load — observe on a production host, intervene in an isolated VM:
Soak-tested under sustained load — observe on real hosts (including a **24-min large-scale soak
across an 8-node Kubernetes cluster**, observe-only DaemonSet: flat RSS, zero drops, zero
restarts, non-disruptive), intervene in an isolated VM:

| path | cases (all leak-free + correct under load) |
|---|---|
| **observe** | steady 20 min · edge-input · **a real a3s-code agent** · throughput 110k ev/60s · memory-bound (256 Mi) · restart ×8 · idle + heartbeat · SIGTERM · concurrent collectors · backpressure · connection-churn |
| **observe** | steady 20 min · edge-input · **a real a3s-code agent** · throughput 110k ev/60s · memory-bound (256 Mi) · restart ×8 · idle + heartbeat · SIGTERM · concurrent collectors · backpressure · connection-churn · **8-node cluster** |
| **intervene** | egress · file/exec · SSL-content guards — and all three running alongside the collector |

Two robustness bugs surfaced and were fixed this way: NDJSON stdout pollution (v0.9.1) and an
Every new signal is validated live (correct payload, verifier loads clean) and reviewed by an
adversarial multi-agent pass before release — which has **twice** caught a per-thread event
duplication (multithreaded `do_exit` / `setuid`) that single-threaded tests missed. Soak also
surfaced two robustness bugs, since fixed: NDJSON stdout pollution (v0.9.1) and an
output-backpressure event-loop stall (v0.9.2). Lib line coverage **79.6%** (`cargo llvm-cov`) —
the untrusted SNI / DNS / cgroup parsers and the full 14-provider classifier are unit-tested.
the untrusted SNI / DNS / cgroup parsers and the full 15-provider classifier are unit-tested.

## Security

Expand Down
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