From 8fdbd01e0f7dac13afa801bb4e54587f5b3da122 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "google-labs-jules[bot]" <161369871+google-labs-jules[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> Date: Tue, 21 Jul 2026 21:03:36 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 1/2] =?UTF-8?q?=F0=9F=9B=A1=EF=B8=8F=20Sentinel:=20[CRITIC?= =?UTF-8?q?AL]=20Fix=20timing=20attack=20vulnerability=20in=20token=20vali?= =?UTF-8?q?dation?= MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Replaced length checks and raw buffer comparisons with SHA-256 hashed constant-time string comparisons. --- .jules/sentinel.md | 4 ++++ src/cli/commands/serve.ts | 9 +++------ 2 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) create mode 100644 .jules/sentinel.md diff --git a/.jules/sentinel.md b/.jules/sentinel.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..ce93117d --- /dev/null +++ b/.jules/sentinel.md @@ -0,0 +1,4 @@ +## 2026-07-21 - Timing Attack in Bearer Token Validation +**Vulnerability:** Bearer tokens were compared by first checking their buffer lengths (`tokenBuffer.length === authTokenBuffer.length`) before calling `crypto.timingSafeEqual`. This creates a short-circuit fast path that leaks the secret's length via timing differences. +**Learning:** Developers attempted to use constant-time comparison but negated its benefits by adding a length check, which is a common but dangerous anti-pattern. +**Prevention:** Always hash both secrets to a fixed length (e.g., using `crypto.createHash('sha256')`) before comparison to ensure true constant-time evaluation, avoiding the need for length checks entirely. diff --git a/src/cli/commands/serve.ts b/src/cli/commands/serve.ts index 2c37293e..e20ec168 100644 --- a/src/cli/commands/serve.ts +++ b/src/cli/commands/serve.ts @@ -346,13 +346,10 @@ export async function handleServeCommand(_options: unknown, command: Command) { let isAuthenticated = false; if (scheme?.toLowerCase() === 'bearer' && token) { - const tokenBuffer = Buffer.from(token); + const tokenHash = crypto.createHash('sha256').update(token).digest(); for (const authToken of authTokens) { - const authTokenBuffer = Buffer.from(authToken); - if ( - tokenBuffer.length === authTokenBuffer.length && - crypto.timingSafeEqual(tokenBuffer, authTokenBuffer) - ) { + const authTokenHash = crypto.createHash('sha256').update(authToken).digest(); + if (crypto.timingSafeEqual(tokenHash, authTokenHash)) { isAuthenticated = true; break; } From 00ea2323d139faf494af5bdf591b30694bcbde6b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "google-labs-jules[bot]" <161369871+google-labs-jules[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> Date: Tue, 21 Jul 2026 21:07:22 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 2/2] =?UTF-8?q?=F0=9F=9B=A1=EF=B8=8F=20Sentinel:=20[CRITIC?= =?UTF-8?q?AL]=20Fix=20timing=20attack=20vulnerability=20in=20token=20vali?= =?UTF-8?q?dation?= MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Replaced length checks and raw buffer comparisons with SHA-256 hashed constant-time string comparisons. Formatted code via `bun run format`. --- tests/integration/prompt_templates.test.ts | 4 +++- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/tests/integration/prompt_templates.test.ts b/tests/integration/prompt_templates.test.ts index 21905259..f1360d78 100644 --- a/tests/integration/prompt_templates.test.ts +++ b/tests/integration/prompt_templates.test.ts @@ -36,7 +36,9 @@ describe('Prompt templates', () => { expect(planSystem).toContain('You are SalmonLoop.'); expect(patchSystem).toContain('You are PATCH, a phase-native diff compiler.'); - expect(autopilotSystem).toContain('You are a senior software engineer running in "autopilot" mode.'); + expect(autopilotSystem).toContain( + 'You are a senior software engineer running in "autopilot" mode.', + ); expect(answerSystem).toContain('You are a coding assistant in "answer" mode.'); expect(researchSystem).toContain('You are a research assistant.'); });