diff --git a/test/test_datasets_utils.py b/test/test_datasets_utils.py
index 461688405d7..c936e70f57f 100644
--- a/test/test_datasets_utils.py
+++ b/test/test_datasets_utils.py
@@ -1,5 +1,6 @@
 import contextlib
 import gzip
+import io
 import os
 import pathlib
 import re
@@ -235,6 +236,28 @@ def create_archive(root, extension, mode, content="this is the content"):
         with open(file) as fh:
             assert fh.read() == content
 
+    @pytest.mark.parametrize("member_name", ["../escaped.txt", "../../escaped.txt"])
+    def test_extract_tar_rejects_path_traversal(self, member_name, tmpdir):
+        # Regression test for a path-traversal vulnerability (issue #9517): a tar
+        # member with a "../" component must not be extracted outside to_path.
+        tmpdir = pathlib.Path(tmpdir)
+        to_path = tmpdir / "extract_here"
+        to_path.mkdir()
+        escaped_target = (to_path / member_name).resolve()
+        assert to_path.resolve() not in escaped_target.parents  # target is really outside
+
+        archive = tmpdir / "malicious.tar"
+        payload = b"path traversal payload"
+        with tarfile.open(archive, mode="w") as tar:
+            info = tarfile.TarInfo(member_name)
+            info.size = len(payload)
+            tar.addfile(info, io.BytesIO(payload))
+
+        with pytest.raises((tarfile.TarError, RuntimeError)):
+            utils.extract_archive(str(archive), str(to_path))
+
+        assert not escaped_target.exists()
+
     def test_verify_str_arg(self):
         assert "a" == utils.verify_str_arg("a", "arg", ("a",))
         pytest.raises(ValueError, utils.verify_str_arg, 0, ("a",), "arg")
diff --git a/torchvision/datasets/utils.py b/torchvision/datasets/utils.py
index 0b6670800d2..448ba82acf2 100644
--- a/torchvision/datasets/utils.py
+++ b/torchvision/datasets/utils.py
@@ -206,11 +206,35 @@ def download_file_from_google_drive(
         raise RuntimeError("File not found or corrupted.")
 
 
+def _reject_escaping_tar_members(tar: tarfile.TarFile, to_path: Union[str, pathlib.Path]) -> None:
+    """Path-traversal guard for Python versions without the PEP 706 ``data`` filter.
+
+    Rejects any member whose resolved path, or link target, would fall outside
+    ``to_path`` before extraction writes anything.
+    """
+    base = os.path.realpath(to_path)
+    for member in tar.getmembers():
+        target = os.path.realpath(os.path.join(base, member.name))
+        if os.path.commonpath([base, target]) != base:
+            raise RuntimeError(f"Refusing to extract tar member '{member.name}' outside of '{to_path}'.")
+        if member.issym() or member.islnk():
+            link_target = os.path.realpath(os.path.join(os.path.dirname(target), member.linkname))
+            if os.path.commonpath([base, link_target]) != base:
+                raise RuntimeError(f"Refusing to extract tar member '{member.name}' linking outside of '{to_path}'.")
+
+
 def _extract_tar(
     from_path: Union[str, pathlib.Path], to_path: Union[str, pathlib.Path], compression: Optional[str]
 ) -> None:
     with tarfile.open(from_path, f"r:{compression[1:]}" if compression else "r") as tar:
-        tar.extractall(to_path)
+        # PEP 706 ``data`` filter rejects path traversal, absolute paths, and links
+        # escaping ``to_path``. It is the default in Python 3.14 and available since
+        # 3.12 (backported to 3.10.12+/3.11.4+); fall back to a manual guard otherwise.
+        if hasattr(tarfile, "data_filter"):
+            tar.extractall(to_path, filter="data")
+        else:
+            _reject_escaping_tar_members(tar, to_path)
+            tar.extractall(to_path)
 
 
 _ZIP_COMPRESSION_MAP: dict[str, int] = {