From 5b861ef7b42c05cdba26415a1d88199b7e8fe761 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Raul Salvat Date: Sat, 7 Mar 2026 20:08:15 +0000 Subject: [PATCH] docs: add OSOH MVP build slice 03 --- docs/tasks/OSOH_MVP_BUILD_SLICE_03.md | 55 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 55 insertions(+) create mode 100644 docs/tasks/OSOH_MVP_BUILD_SLICE_03.md diff --git a/docs/tasks/OSOH_MVP_BUILD_SLICE_03.md b/docs/tasks/OSOH_MVP_BUILD_SLICE_03.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..7c01e4b --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/tasks/OSOH_MVP_BUILD_SLICE_03.md @@ -0,0 +1,55 @@ +# OSOH MVP Build Slice 03 + +## Slice Goal +Extend the MVP foundation by defining the first usable ingest contract and minimal rejection behavior for monitored-surface telemetry while preserving fail-closed governance and constitutional boundary enforcement. + +## Slice Scope +This slice covers: +- minimal ingest payload contract +- bearer-token authentication path +- valid event acceptance baseline +- invalid event rejection baseline +- ingestion-only scope enforcement + +## Required Build Order + +### 1. Minimal ingest contract +- define minimum accepted payload shape +- require site-bound event submission +- require event type field +- require timestamp field +- require payload body presence + +### 2. Authentication baseline +- require bearer token on ingest requests +- resolve token to monitored surface +- reject missing token +- reject unknown token +- reject revoked token + +### 3. Acceptance baseline +- accept valid in-scope payloads +- return success response for accepted events +- normalize accepted event structure +- attach accepted event to monitored surface identity + +### 4. Rejection baseline +- reject malformed payloads +- reject out-of-scope submissions +- reject inactive or unauthorized token state +- return explicit failure response for rejected events + +### 5. Scope enforcement +- preserve ingestion-only credential behavior +- prevent credential use outside ingest path +- prevent trust promotion through ingest success + +## Slice Completion Condition +Slice 03 is complete when Sentinel can send a minimally valid authenticated ingest event that is accepted and normalized, while malformed, invalid, or unauthorized requests are fail-closed and rejected without any promotion into OSOH core trust. + +## Non-Negotiables +- Sentinel remains `external_monitored_surface` +- Sentinel does not become OSOH core +- Sentinel does not enter first-party session trust +- Sentinel does not enter broad first-party CORS trust +- ingest credentials remain unique, per-site, and ingestion-only