🔍 Proactive Security Review
Hi Untoll team — I perform independent smart contract security audits for DeFi protocols. I noticed your Uniswap V4 bonding curve hook ("the bonding curve is the pool, graduate-in-place on the same poolid, no migration") and wanted to flag security considerations for this architecture.
🚨 Finding 1: beforeSwap State Transition Atomicity (MEDIUM-HIGH)
The "graduate-in-place" design means the hook must transition from bonding curve pricing to AMM pricing within the same pool ID. This transition during beforeSwap() must be atomic:
- If the hook detects that the bonding curve is exhausted mid-swap, the remaining delta must be settled correctly
- The pool's sqrtPriceX96 must be updated atomically at the transition point
- If the transition happens between
beforeSwap and afterSwap, the hook could be in an inconsistent state
This is one of the most novel hook designs I've seen — but the atomicity requirement at the graduation boundary is critical.
🚨 Finding 2: Flash Loan Protection via V4 Hooks (MEDIUM)
Uniswap V4 hooks can access pool state during swaps. A bonding curve hook must ensure that flash loan attacks (borrow from external source → buy through bonding curve → sell at inflated price → repay) are unprofitable. Per-swap purchase limits or TWAP mechanisms should be implemented.
💼 Offer
I am an independent security researcher with experience auditing Uniswap V4 hooks and bonding curve mechanisms. I would be happy to perform a full audit for $500-$1,000.
Contact: Respond here or reach out directly.
This is a proactive review, not a bug bounty submission.
🔍 Proactive Security Review
Hi Untoll team — I perform independent smart contract security audits for DeFi protocols. I noticed your Uniswap V4 bonding curve hook ("the bonding curve is the pool, graduate-in-place on the same poolid, no migration") and wanted to flag security considerations for this architecture.
🚨 Finding 1: beforeSwap State Transition Atomicity (MEDIUM-HIGH)
The "graduate-in-place" design means the hook must transition from bonding curve pricing to AMM pricing within the same pool ID. This transition during
beforeSwap()must be atomic:beforeSwapandafterSwap, the hook could be in an inconsistent stateThis is one of the most novel hook designs I've seen — but the atomicity requirement at the graduation boundary is critical.
🚨 Finding 2: Flash Loan Protection via V4 Hooks (MEDIUM)
Uniswap V4 hooks can access pool state during swaps. A bonding curve hook must ensure that flash loan attacks (borrow from external source → buy through bonding curve → sell at inflated price → repay) are unprofitable. Per-swap purchase limits or TWAP mechanisms should be implemented.
💼 Offer
I am an independent security researcher with experience auditing Uniswap V4 hooks and bonding curve mechanisms. I would be happy to perform a full audit for $500-$1,000.
Contact: Respond here or reach out directly.
This is a proactive review, not a bug bounty submission.