HIGH (privacy). The /net SignRequest (sighash + alpha + pczt_hex) is posted PLAINTEXT to the relay; the PCZT decodes to recipient address + amount. RE-SCOPED (found while implementing): NOT a simple sealTo reuse. The blind helper does NOT have the devices' X25519 encPubs (register_vault sends only the group key; encPubs are ephemeral DKG hello data the helper never sees). So sealing requires a HANDSHAKE: the seated devices must publish their encPubs into the signing room (or at registration), the helper collects them, then seals the request (reorder: devices announce -> helper seals+publishes). The sealTo/open machinery exists in konclave-wasm; the key DISTRIBUTION does not. Honest CLAIMS caveat added meanwhile. Ref: temp/relay-security-audit.md, ADR-0007 I3.
HIGH (privacy). The /net SignRequest (sighash + alpha + pczt_hex) is posted PLAINTEXT to the relay; the PCZT decodes to recipient address + amount. RE-SCOPED (found while implementing): NOT a simple sealTo reuse. The blind helper does NOT have the devices' X25519 encPubs (register_vault sends only the group key; encPubs are ephemeral DKG hello data the helper never sees). So sealing requires a HANDSHAKE: the seated devices must publish their encPubs into the signing room (or at registration), the helper collects them, then seals the request (reorder: devices announce -> helper seals+publishes). The sealTo/open machinery exists in konclave-wasm; the key DISTRIBUTION does not. Honest CLAIMS caveat added meanwhile. Ref: temp/relay-security-audit.md, ADR-0007 I3.