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+# Security Policy
+
+Verisphere is pre-launch, unaudited software. We take security reports
+seriously and would rather hear about a problem than not.
+
+## Reporting a vulnerability
+
+**Email: security@verisphere.co** — or, if you prefer GitHub, use the
+repository's **Report a vulnerability** button (Security tab → Advisories),
+which opens a private channel visible only to maintainers.
+
+Please include:
+
+- what the issue is and where (file/function/contract),
+- how to reproduce it — a failing test, a transaction trace, or a script is
+  ideal, but a clear written walkthrough is fine,
+- what an attacker gains, and roughly how hard it is,
+- your assessment of severity, if you have one.
+
+Please **do not** open a public issue or PR for a security problem, and please
+don't post it on social media before we've had a chance to respond.
+
+## What you can expect from us
+
+| Stage | Target |
+|---|---|
+| Acknowledgement that a human has read it | 3 business days |
+| Initial assessment (confirmed / not reproduced / need more info) | 10 business days |
+| Fix or documented mitigation for confirmed issues | as fast as the severity warrants — we'll tell you the plan |
+| Public disclosure | coordinated with you, normally after a fix ships |
+
+We will tell you honestly whether we agree with your severity rating and why.
+If we disagree, we'll explain our reasoning rather than quietly downgrading it.
+If we can't reproduce it, we'll say what we tried.
+
+## Safe harbour
+
+We will not pursue legal action against anyone who, in good faith:
+
+- tests only against **testnet deployments** or their own local fork,
+- does not access, modify, or exfiltrate other users' data or funds,
+- does not degrade the service for others (no sustained load testing, no spam
+  against the relay or public endpoints),
+- gives us a reasonable opportunity to fix the issue before disclosing it.
+
+If you're unsure whether something is in scope, ask first — that also counts
+as good faith.
+
+## Scope
+
+**In scope**
+- Protocol contracts in `VeriSphereVSP/core` (`src/`) — token, registry,
+  staking, scoring, governance, and the deployment scripts under `script/`.
+- The application backend in `VeriSphereVSP/app` — the API, relay/forwarder
+  path, content moderation, indexer, and rate limiting.
+- The frontend in `VeriSphereVSP/frontend` and the Verity browser extension.
+
+**Out of scope**
+- `src/mock/` and anything documented as rehearsal-only infrastructure.
+- Issues that require compromising a user's own device, wallet, or browser.
+- Findings from automated scanners without a demonstrated impact.
+- The economics of losing a stake: staking against a claim that later loses is
+  the protocol working as designed, not a vulnerability.
+- Third-party services (RPC providers, AMM venues, the chain itself).
+
+## Known and accepted
+
+- **The contracts are unaudited.** This is disclosed to users and is not itself
+  a finding. Reports of specific exploitable bugs in unaudited code are very
+  much welcome.
+- **Governance is currently a single key** on testnet. Findings that assume a
+  compromised governance key are understood; findings that let a non-governance
+  actor reach governance-only behaviour are in scope and serious.
+
+## Rewards
+
+We do not currently run a paid bug bounty; the project is pre-revenue and we'd
+rather promise nothing than promise what we can't pay. What we do offer:
+public credit in the advisory and this repository (or anonymity, your choice),
+and a direct line to the maintainers. If a report prevents material loss, we
+will discuss a discretionary reward case by case.
+
+## Disclosure history
+
+| ID | Date | Summary | Status |
+|---|---|---|---|
+| VSP-SEC-001 | 2026-08-19 | Mid-window accrual asymmetry in `StakeEngine`: settlement scales rewards by elapsed epochs and applies them to the lot set present at settlement, so with `snapshotPeriod > EPOCH_LENGTH` a late joiner could capture a full window's rewards (and an early leaver could dodge a full window's decay). Not reachable at the deployed 1-day period. Reported by [@ibnu76](https://github.com/ibnu76). | Fixed — `MAX_SNAPSHOT_PERIOD` capped to `EPOCH_LENGTH`; regression tests added |