From 069db334312afa521d3349381070c30e41ecc9ac Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Shaidyk <Shaidyk@users.noreply.github.com>
Date: Mon, 29 Jun 2026 11:28:15 +0300
Subject: [PATCH] fix: resolve #1 - Rewrite Coolify Core in Rust for
 Performance & Safety

---
 docker/coolify-realtime/terminal-utils.js     | 50 +++++++++++++++----
 .../coolify-realtime/terminal-utils.test.js   | 36 +++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 77 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)

diff --git a/docker/coolify-realtime/terminal-utils.js b/docker/coolify-realtime/terminal-utils.js
index 7456b282c2..2afad8a738 100644
--- a/docker/coolify-realtime/terminal-utils.js
+++ b/docker/coolify-realtime/terminal-utils.js
@@ -97,21 +97,53 @@ export function normalizeHostForAuthorization(host) {
     return normalizedHost.toLowerCase();
 }
 
+// ssh(1) single-letter options that consume the following argument as their value.
+// The value of such an option (e.g. `-o ProxyJump=user@jump`, `-i key@path`) must never
+// be mistaken for the connection destination when authorizing a target host.
+const SSH_VALUE_OPTION_FLAGS = new Set([
+    '-B', '-b', '-c', '-D', '-E', '-e', '-F', '-I', '-i', '-J', '-L', '-l',
+    '-m', '-O', '-o', '-p', '-Q', '-R', '-S', '-W', '-w',
+]);
+
 export function extractTargetHost(sshArgs) {
-    const userAtHost = sshArgs.find(arg => {
-        if (arg.includes('storage/app/ssh/keys/')) {
-            return false;
+    if (!Array.isArray(sshArgs)) {
+        throw new TypeError('extractTargetHost expects an array of ssh arguments');
+    }
+
+    // The real ssh destination is the first positional `user@host` argument: not an
+    // option flag, not the value consumed by a preceding value-taking flag, and not an
+    // option assignment (`key=value`) or identity-file path. Scanning for the first
+    // `user@host` token anywhere is unsafe — a crafted command can smuggle an authorized
+    // host into an option value (`-o ProxyJump=user@authorized`) while connecting elsewhere.
+    let skipNextValue = false;
+
+    for (const arg of sshArgs) {
+        if (skipNextValue) {
+            skipNextValue = false;
+            continue;
         }
 
-        return /^[^@]+@[^@]+$/.test(arg);
-    });
+        if (typeof arg !== 'string' || arg.length === 0) {
+            continue;
+        }
 
-    if (!userAtHost) {
-        return null;
+        if (arg.startsWith('-')) {
+            if (SSH_VALUE_OPTION_FLAGS.has(arg)) {
+                skipNextValue = true;
+            }
+            continue;
+        }
+
+        if (arg.includes('=') || arg.includes('storage/app/ssh/keys/')) {
+            continue;
+        }
+
+        if (/^[^@]+@[^@]+$/.test(arg)) {
+            return normalizeHostForAuthorization(arg.slice(arg.indexOf('@') + 1));
+        }
     }
 
-    const atIndex = userAtHost.indexOf('@');
-    return normalizeHostForAuthorization(userAtHost.slice(atIndex + 1));
+    return null;
 }
 
 export function isAuthorizedTargetHost(targetHost, authorizedHosts = []) {
diff --git a/docker/coolify-realtime/terminal-utils.test.js b/docker/coolify-realtime/terminal-utils.test.js
index 3da4441557..c2ca527c54 100644
--- a/docker/coolify-realtime/terminal-utils.test.js
+++ b/docker/coolify-realtime/terminal-utils.test.js
@@ -45,3 +45,39 @@ test('normalizeHostForAuthorization unwraps bracketed IPv6 hosts', () => {
 test('isAuthorizedTargetHost rejects hosts that are not in the allowlist', () => {
     assert.equal(isAuthorizedTargetHost("'10.0.0.9'", ['10.0.0.5']), false);
 });
+
+test('extractTargetHost ignores an authorized host smuggled into a ProxyJump option value', () => {
+    const sshArgs = extractSshArgs(
+        "timeout 3600 ssh -o ProxyJump='root@10.0.0.5' -o StrictHostKeyChecking=no 'root'@'192.168.0.99' 'bash -se' << \\\\$abc\necho hi\nabc"
+    );
+
+    // The real connection target is the positional host, not the option value.
+    assert.equal(extractTargetHost(sshArgs), '192.168.0.99');
+    // Authorizing the smuggled ProxyJump host would bypass the allowlist.
+    assert.equal(isAuthorizedTargetHost(extractTargetHost(sshArgs), ['10.0.0.5']), false);
+});
+
+test('extractTargetHost ignores ProxyJump passed via the -J value flag', () => {
+    const sshArgs = extractSshArgs(
+        "timeout 3600 ssh -J 'root@10.0.0.5' -o StrictHostKeyChecking=no 'root'@'192.168.0.99' 'bash -se' << \\\\$abc\necho hi\nabc"
+    );
+
+    assert.equal(extractTargetHost(sshArgs), '192.168.0.99');
+});
+
+test('extractTargetHost still resolves the destination after a port and identity file', () => {
+    const sshArgs = extractSshArgs(
+        "timeout 3600 ssh -p '22' -i storage/app/ssh/keys/id@host -o StrictHostKeyChecking=no 'root'@'10.0.0.5' 'bash -se' << \\\\$abc\necho hi\nabc"
+    );
+
+    assert.equal(extractTargetHost(sshArgs), '10.0.0.5');
+});
+
+test('extractTargetHost returns null when no positional host is present', () => {
+    assert.equal(extractTargetHost(['-o', 'StrictHostKeyChecking=no']), null);
+    assert.equal(extractTargetHost([]), null);
+});
+
+test('extractTargetHost throws a TypeError on non-array input', () => {
+    assert.throws(() => extractTargetHost('root@10.0.0.5'), TypeError);
+});