diff --git a/docs/architecture/helper-causal-receipts-v0.1.md b/docs/architecture/helper-causal-receipts-v0.1.md
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+# Helper Causal Receipts v0.1
+
+Status: Draft
+Scope: SourceOS Shell, BearBrowser, TurtleTerm, Office/PDF runtime, preview/rendering helpers
+Primary goal: preserve user-legible causal intent across helper-process boundaries.
+
+## Problem
+
+- Modern desktop actions are not single-process events.
+- A visible action such as previewing a file, opening a native file picker, rendering a thumbnail, taking a screenshot, cleaning browser cache, or indexing metadata can spawn a hidden helper-process cascade.
+- The macOS unified-log sample that motivated this spec shows repeated helper lifecycle patterns: demand spawn, `xpcproxy` materialization, source attachment, running/init transitions, sandbox-denied lookups, clean exits, supervisor kills, and teardown races.
+- The useful primitive is not the raw process log. The useful primitive is a root-intent-bound receipt.
+- SourceOS must not repeat the opaque pattern where users see helper churn but cannot answer: why did this run, what requested it, what data did it touch, what was denied, and did network/clipboard/account/analytics access occur?
+
+## Design Principles
+
+- Every helper process carries a `root_intent_id`.
+- Every helper spawn has a declared purpose.
+- Every sensitive capability request is recorded as a policy decision.
+- Every denied capability records whether data was accessed. For a sandbox denial, the default is `data_accessed=false` unless an allow event proves otherwise.
+- Every helper exit records completion, duration, and receipt completeness.
+- Every teardown race is normalized before user presentation.
+- Expected denials are evidence of containment, not automatic alerts.
+- Unexpected denials are policy-regression candidates.
+- Local preview helpers deny network, DNS, pasteboard, account lookup, analytics, camera, microphone, location, credential stores, and arbitrary file reads by default.
+- Web thumbnailing is treated as hostile-content rendering, not as static image generation.
+- Native file picker helpers must not inherit browser session authority.
+- Terminal preview helpers must not inherit shell secrets.
+
+## Event Types
+
+| Event Type | Purpose | Required Fields |
+|---|---|---|
+| `root_intent.created` | Start a causal graph for a visible or scheduled action | `event_id`, `root_intent_id`, `timestamp`, `surface`, `actor`, `declared_purpose`, `data_scope`, `default_policy`, `receipt_required` |
+| `helper.spawn` | Record subprocess/helper launch | `event_id`, `parent_event_id`, `root_intent_id`, `parent_process`, `child_process`, `trigger`, `spawn_reason`, `policy_profile` |
+| `capability.request` | Record sensitive service/capability lookup | `event_id`, `root_intent_id`, `requestor`, `capability`, `requested_service`, `decision`, `classification`, `policy_rule`, `data_accessed` |
+| `helper.exit` | Record termination and cleanup | `event_id`, `root_intent_id`, `process`, `exit_status`, `duration_ms`, `children_cleaned`, `unexpected_denials`, `network_used`, `receipt_complete` |
+| `teardown.normalized` | Normalize noisy cleanup/race messages | `raw_message`, `normalized_class`, `severity`, `meaning`, `receipt_complete`, `policy_impact` |
+| `policy.decision` | Record policy evaluation | `policy_profile`, `rule_id`, `capability`, `decision`, `reason`, `override_actor`, `override_expiry` |
+| `data.touch` | Record data class touched | `object_type`, `object_hash`, `path_policy`, `access_mode`, `retention`, `derived_artifact` |
+
+## Policy Profiles
+
+### `preview.local_only.v1`
+
+- Applies to local PDF, image, office, and generic file previews.
+- Allows selected file snapshot reads, thumbnail cache writes, CPU rendering, mediated GPU rendering, allowlisted system font reads, and IPC to the preview broker.
+- Denies network, DNS, pasteboard, analytics, account lookup, contacts, calendar, camera, microphone, location, arbitrary file reads, and unrestricted child processes.
+
+### `preview.web_thumbnail.local_only.v1`
+
+- Applies to HTML thumbnails, web archive previews, local browser export previews, and URL snapshot rendering.
+- Risk model: hostile-content rendering.
+- Allows parsing and rendering the selected local snapshot plus mediated GPU rendering and local thumbnail output.
+- Denies network, DNS, cookies, credentials, local/session storage, extension APIs, service workers, remote fonts, pasteboard, account lookup, analytics, camera, microphone, and location.
+- Non-negotiable invariant: web thumbnail helpers never inherit browser session authority.
+
+### `cache_cleanup.local_only.v1`
+
+- Applies to browser/app cache cleanup and local cache size accounting.
+- Allows cache metadata read, cache entry delete, cache size compute, and local policy report.
+- Denies network, DNS, analytics, account lookup, remote sync, and browser session reads.
+- Special rule: if a network-shaped helper is spawned, its receipt must state whether network authority was actually granted or whether only local cache metadata was inspected.
+
+### `file_picker.native_ui.v1`
+
+- Applies to native open/save panels and file picker preview surfaces.
+- Allows selected file grants, UI rendering, and preview-broker IPC.
+- Denies account lookup, cloud sync triggers, pasteboard access, analytics, browser extension invocation, cookie reads, and browser session reads.
+- Special rule: native file picker helpers must not inherit browser session authority.
+
+### `terminal.preview.local_only.v1`
+
+- Applies to TurtleTerm file previews, hyperlink previews, archive listings, and command-output renderers.
+- Allows selected file/path preview, local rendering, and local temporary artifacts.
+- Denies shell environment reads, shell history reads, SSH key reads, token reads, network fetches, clipboard reads, account lookup, and analytics.
+- Special rule: terminal preview helpers must never inherit shell secrets.
+
+## Denial Classification
+
+| Classification | Meaning | Default Severity |
+|---|---|---|
+| `expected_denial` | Policy intentionally blocked a commonly probed service | notice |
+| `unexpected_denial` | Helper requested capability outside declared profile | warning |
+| `compatibility_probe` | Framework probed optional service and did not require it | notice |
+| `policy_regression` | New build began requesting undeclared capability | error in CI |
+| `malicious_probe_candidate` | Request unrelated to purpose and targeting sensitive data | critical |
+| `missing_service` | Target service absent or not running | notice |
+| `teardown_race` | Request/reply path raced with helper shutdown | trace/notice |
+
+## Teardown Normalization
+
+| Raw Pattern | Normalized Class | Meaning |
+|---|---|---|
+| `no client port found` | `client_endpoint_missing_after_teardown` | Client disappeared before service reply completed |
+| `invalid client reply port -1` | `invalid_reply_endpoint_after_teardown` | Reply endpoint invalid during cleanup |
+| `job not found` / `ENOSERVICE` | `service_removed_before_reply` | Service exited before late lookup/reply completed |
+| `Operation already in progress` | `duplicate_activation_coalesced` | Duplicate demand while helper already running |
+| supervisor `SIGKILL` | `supervisor_worker_lifecycle_kill` | Supervisor ended bounded worker |
+
+## User Inspector Requirements
+
+- Provide a local “Why did this run?” view.
+- Group by `root_intent_id`, not raw PID.
+- Show visible action, parent surface, helper chain, allowed capabilities, denied capabilities, data touched, network/DNS outcome, exit status, incomplete receipts, and policy regressions.
+- Expected denials should be visible on expansion, but not noisy by default.
+- Policy regressions and incomplete receipts should be surfaced immediately.
+
+## Acceptance Tests
+
+| Test | Given | Assert |
+|---|---|---|
+| Root intent propagation | Any helper spawn | `root_intent_id`, `parent_event_id`, `spawn_reason`, and `policy_profile` exist |
+| Local preview no-network | Local PDF/image preview | network, DNS, analytics, and account lookup denied |
+| Web thumbnail isolation | HTML/web thumbnail render | cookies, storage, extensions, network, and pasteboard denied |
+| Cache cleanup transparency | Cache cleanup spawns network-shaped helper | receipt explains reason and egress decision |
+| Native file picker isolation | Browser invokes native file panel | no browser session or extension authority inherited |
+| Terminal preview isolation | TurtleTerm preview | shell secrets and environment denied |
+| Receipt completeness | Completed action | all helper spawns have exit or active-state events |
+| Denial classification | Denied capability request | denial classified and `data_accessed` recorded |
+| Policy regression CI | New undeclared capability | CI fails unless policy is updated |
+| Inspector rendering | Completed DAG | user-readable summary exists |
+
+## Repo Integration
+
+| Repo | Role |
+|---|---|
+| `SourceOS-Linux/sourceos-shell` | Runtime receipt store, helper wrapper, parser/correlator, local inspector |
+| `SourceOS-Linux/BearBrowser` | Browser file picker, cache cleanup, preview and thumbnail helper enforcement |
+| `SourceOS-Linux/TurtleTerm` | Terminal preview and command helper secret isolation |
+| `SocioProphet/ontogenesis` | Ontology classes, properties, SHACL constraints |
+| `SocioProphet/prophet-platform` | Evidence-envelope mapping, evidence-console view, CI trust gates |
+
+## Non-Goals
+
+- Do not alert for every expected denial.
+- Do not ban short-lived helpers.
+- Do not ban multiprocess rendering.
+- Do not assume every denial is malicious.
+- Do require causality, classification, policy, and receipts.
+
+## Security Invariants
+
+- Preview helpers are local-only by default.
+- Web thumbnails do not inherit browser session state.
+- Cache cleanup does not receive network authority by default.
+- Native file picker helpers do not inherit browser extension authority.
+- Terminal preview helpers do not inherit shell secrets.
+- Every sensitive capability decision is recorded.
+- Every helper exit is recorded.
+- Incomplete receipts degrade trust state.
diff --git a/policies/helper-receipts/apple_service_family_taxonomy.v0.1.yaml b/policies/helper-receipts/apple_service_family_taxonomy.v0.1.yaml
new file mode 100644
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+++ b/policies/helper-receipts/apple_service_family_taxonomy.v0.1.yaml
@@ -0,0 +1,167 @@
+version: 0.1
+purpose: >
+  Conservative mapping from Apple/macOS service-family strings to SourceOS helper receipt phases and policy profiles.
+  This supports imported-log analysis without claiming private subsystem intent.
+default_phase: unknown_or_general_launchd_churn
+default_policy_profile: unknown
+families:
+  - match: com.apple.mdworker
+    phase: spotlight_metadata_indexing
+    policy_profile: indexer.metadata_local.v1
+    role: metadata_index_worker
+  - match: mdworker_shared
+    phase: spotlight_metadata_indexing
+    policy_profile: indexer.metadata_local.v1
+    role: metadata_index_worker
+  - match: CacheDelete
+    phase: cache_cleanup
+    policy_profile: cache_cleanup.local_only.v1
+    role: cache_cleanup
+  - match: CacheExtension
+    phase: cache_cleanup
+    policy_profile: cache_cleanup.local_only.v1
+    role: cache_cleanup
+  - match: WebKit
+    phase: web_thumbnail_or_webkit_helper
+    policy_profile: preview.web_thumbnail.local_only.v1
+    role: web_runtime_helper
+  - match: WebThumbnail
+    phase: web_thumbnail_or_webkit_helper
+    policy_profile: preview.web_thumbnail.local_only.v1
+    role: web_thumbnail_helper
+  - match: QuickLook
+    phase: quicklook_preview_rendering
+    policy_profile: preview.local_only.v1
+    role: preview_ui_or_thumbnail
+  - match: CGPDFService
+    phase: quicklook_preview_rendering
+    policy_profile: preview.local_only.v1
+    role: pdf_rendering_helper
+  - match: ImageIOXPCService
+    phase: quicklook_preview_rendering
+    policy_profile: preview.local_only.v1
+    role: image_decode_helper
+  - match: ThumbnailExtension
+    phase: quicklook_preview_rendering
+    policy_profile: preview.local_only.v1
+    role: thumbnail_helper
+  - match: screencapture
+    phase: screenshot_capture
+    policy_profile: screenshot.capture_receipt.v1
+    role: screenshot_capture_ui
+  - match: openAndSavePanelService
+    phase: native_file_picker
+    policy_profile: file_picker.native_ui.v1
+    role: native_file_picker
+  - match: AXVisualSupportAgent
+    phase: accessibility_ui_support
+    policy_profile: accessibility.ui_support.v1
+    role: accessibility_visual_support
+  - match: com.apple.accessibility
+    phase: accessibility_ui_support
+    policy_profile: accessibility.ui_support.v1
+    role: accessibility_service
+  - match: com.apple.filesystems.netfs
+    phase: filesystem_netfs_plugin
+    policy_profile: filesystem.netfs_plugin.v1
+    role: network_filesystem_plugin
+  - match: PlugInLibraryService
+    phase: filesystem_netfs_plugin
+    policy_profile: filesystem.netfs_plugin.v1
+    role: plugin_library_service
+  - match: iconservices
+    phase: iconservices_rendering
+    policy_profile: iconservices.rendering_local.v1
+    role: icon_rendering_service
+  - match: AudioComponentRegistrar
+    phase: audio_component_discovery
+    policy_profile: audio.component_scan_local.v1
+    role: audio_component_registry
+  - match: CarbonComponentScanner
+    phase: audio_component_discovery
+    policy_profile: audio.component_scan_local.v1
+    role: audio_component_scanner
+  - match: trustd
+    phase: trust_and_certificate_services
+    policy_profile: trust.security_local.v1
+    role: certificate_trust_service
+  - match: secinitd
+    phase: trust_and_certificate_services
+    policy_profile: trust.security_local.v1
+    role: security_initialization
+  - match: amfid
+    phase: security_integrity_sidecar
+    policy_profile: security.scan_local.v1
+    role: code_integrity
+  - match: XProtect
+    phase: security_integrity_sidecar
+    policy_profile: security.scan_local.v1
+    role: malware_protection
+  - match: sysextd
+    phase: system_extension_management
+    policy_profile: system_extension.management_local.v1
+    role: system_extension_daemon
+  - match: CloudTelemetry
+    phase: telemetry_sidecar
+    policy_profile: telemetry.local_metric.v1
+    role: telemetry_service
+  - match: ecosystemanalytics
+    phase: telemetry_sidecar
+    policy_profile: telemetry.local_metric.v1
+    role: ecosystem_analytics
+  - match: ecosystemd
+    phase: ecosystem_services
+    policy_profile: ecosystem.service_local.v1
+    role: ecosystem_service
+  - match: biomesyncd
+    phase: biome_sync_services
+    policy_profile: biome.sync_local.v1
+    role: biome_sync_service
+  - match: geod
+    phase: location_services
+    policy_profile: location.service_deny_by_default.v1
+    role: location_service
+  - match: appleaccountd
+    phase: account_identity_services
+    policy_profile: account.identity_deny_by_default.v1
+    role: account_identity_service
+  - match: iCloudNotificationAgent
+    phase: cloud_notification_services
+    policy_profile: cloud_notification_deny_by_default.v1
+    role: icloud_notification_agent
+  - match: maild
+    phase: mail_services
+    policy_profile: mail.service_local.v1
+    role: mail_service
+  - match: WorkflowKit
+    phase: workflow_background_shortcuts
+    policy_profile: workflow.background_shortcut.v1
+    role: background_shortcut_runner
+  - match: BackgroundShortcutRunner
+    phase: workflow_background_shortcuts
+    policy_profile: workflow.background_shortcut.v1
+    role: background_shortcut_runner
+  - match: naturallanguaged
+    phase: natural_language_processing
+    policy_profile: nlp.local_processing.v1
+    role: natural_language_daemon
+  - match: cfprefsd
+    phase: preferences_services
+    policy_profile: preferences.local_service.v1
+    role: preferences_daemon
+  - match: prngseedd
+    phase: secure_random_seed_services
+    policy_profile: security.random_seed_local.v1
+    role: random_seed_service
+  - match: seputil
+    phase: secure_enclave_utility
+    policy_profile: security.secure_enclave_local.v1
+    role: secure_enclave_utility
+  - match: MTLCompilerService
+    phase: metal_shader_compilation
+    policy_profile: gpu.shader_compile_local.v1
+    role: metal_compiler_service
+  - match: swcd
+    phase: shared_web_credentials
+    policy_profile: web_credentials_deny_by_default.v1
+    role: shared_web_credentials_daemon
diff --git a/policies/helper-receipts/service_taxonomy.v0.1.yaml b/policies/helper-receipts/service_taxonomy.v0.1.yaml
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3a14ce9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/policies/helper-receipts/service_taxonomy.v0.1.yaml
@@ -0,0 +1,106 @@
+version: 0.1
+purpose: >
+  Map named helper/service lookups into SourceOS Helper Causal Receipt capability classes.
+  Unknown services remain mach_service.lookup until explicitly classified.
+default_capability: mach_service.lookup
+rules:
+  - match: pasteboard
+    capability: pasteboard.read
+    sensitivity: high
+    default_preview_decision: deny
+    rationale: Clipboard access is unrelated to passive preview or thumbnail generation.
+  - match: analyticsd
+    capability: analytics.emit
+    sensitivity: high
+    default_preview_decision: deny
+    rationale: Preview and cache helpers must not emit analytics by default.
+  - match: ecosystemanalyticsd
+    capability: analytics.emit
+    sensitivity: high
+    default_preview_decision: deny
+    rationale: Ecosystem analytics is telemetry-adjacent and must be separated from local security checks.
+  - match: tccd
+    capability: privacy.tcc.lookup
+    sensitivity: high
+    default_preview_decision: deny
+    rationale: Privacy/TCC lookups must be receipt-bearing.
+  - match: distributed_notifications
+    capability: notifications.distributed.lookup
+    sensitivity: medium
+    default_preview_decision: deny
+    rationale: Distributed notification lookups are optional UI/system probes in many helper contexts.
+  - match: webprivacyd
+    capability: privacy.web.lookup
+    sensitivity: high
+    default_preview_decision: deny
+    rationale: Web privacy service access is not required for local-only snapshot rendering.
+  - match: PowerManagement
+    capability: power.management.lookup
+    sensitivity: medium
+    default_preview_decision: deny
+    rationale: Passive preview helpers should not require power-management control.
+  - match: CARenderServer
+    capability: render.ca_server.lookup
+    sensitivity: medium
+    default_preview_decision: deny_or_mediated
+    rationale: Rendering helpers may need mediated graphics access, not broad compositor authority.
+  - match: windowserver
+    capability: windowserver.lookup
+    sensitivity: high
+    default_preview_decision: deny_or_mediated
+    rationale: Window-server access must be mediated and tied to visible UI intent.
+  - match: dock
+    capability: dock.lookup
+    sensitivity: low
+    default_preview_decision: deny_or_expected_denial
+    rationale: Dock/fullscreen probes are often UI compatibility probes but must remain classified.
+  - match: LaunchServices
+    capability: launchservices.lookup
+    sensitivity: medium
+    default_preview_decision: deny_or_brokered
+    rationale: LaunchServices can reveal app/file associations and should be brokered.
+  - match: coreservices
+    capability: coreservices.lookup
+    sensitivity: medium
+    default_preview_decision: deny_or_brokered
+    rationale: CoreServices lookups should be scoped to declared preview/file-picker purpose.
+  - match: FileProvider
+    capability: fileprovider.lookup
+    sensitivity: high
+    default_preview_decision: deny
+    rationale: FileProvider can imply cloud/sync surfaces; previews must not trigger sync implicitly.
+  - match: CloudTelemetry
+    capability: telemetry.cloud.lookup
+    sensitivity: high
+    default_preview_decision: deny
+    rationale: Cloud telemetry is not required for local-only helper work.
+  - match: XProtect
+    capability: security.xprotect.lookup
+    sensitivity: medium
+    default_preview_decision: allow_local_security
+    rationale: Local security checks may be allowed if receipt-bearing and separated from telemetry.
+  - match: MobileFileIntegrity
+    capability: security.code_integrity.lookup
+    sensitivity: medium
+    default_preview_decision: allow_local_security
+    rationale: Code integrity checks are acceptable when locally scoped and receipt-bearing.
+  - match: Keychain
+    capability: credentials.keychain.lookup
+    sensitivity: critical
+    default_preview_decision: deny
+    rationale: Preview helpers must not access credentials.
+  - match: securityd
+    capability: security.service.lookup
+    sensitivity: high
+    default_preview_decision: deny_or_brokered
+    rationale: Security service access requires explicit brokered purpose.
+  - match: apsd
+    capability: push_notifications.lookup
+    sensitivity: medium
+    default_preview_decision: deny
+    rationale: Push notification service is unrelated to local preview/cache cleanup.
+  - match: geod
+    capability: location.service.lookup
+    sensitivity: critical
+    default_preview_decision: deny
+    rationale: Location access is never needed for local preview.
diff --git a/schemas/helper-causal-receipts.schema.json b/schemas/helper-causal-receipts.schema.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f82106b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/schemas/helper-causal-receipts.schema.json
@@ -0,0 +1,94 @@
+{
+  "$schema": "https://json-schema.org/draft/2020-12/schema",
+  "$id": "https://sourceos.local/schemas/helper-causal-receipts.schema.json",
+  "title": "Helper Causal Receipts v0.1",
+  "type": "object",
+  "required": ["schema", "event_type", "event_id", "timestamp", "root_intent_id"],
+  "properties": {
+    "schema": { "const": "sourceos.helper_causal_receipt.v0.1" },
+    "event_type": {
+      "enum": [
+        "root_intent.created",
+        "helper.spawn",
+        "capability.request",
+        "helper.exit",
+        "teardown.normalized",
+        "policy.decision",
+        "data.touch"
+      ]
+    },
+    "event_id": { "type": "string", "minLength": 8 },
+    "parent_event_id": { "type": ["string", "null"] },
+    "root_intent_id": { "type": "string", "pattern": "^intent\\." },
+    "timestamp": { "type": "string" },
+    "surface": { "type": ["string", "null"] },
+    "actor": { "type": ["object", "null"], "additionalProperties": true },
+    "declared_purpose": { "type": ["string", "null"] },
+    "data_scope": { "type": ["object", "array", "null"] },
+    "default_policy": { "type": ["string", "null"] },
+    "receipt_required": { "type": ["boolean", "null"] },
+    "parent_process": { "type": ["string", "null"] },
+    "child_process": { "type": ["string", "null"] },
+    "process": { "type": ["string", "null"] },
+    "pid": { "type": ["integer", "null"] },
+    "trigger": { "type": ["string", "null"] },
+    "spawn_reason": { "type": ["string", "null"] },
+    "policy_profile": { "type": ["string", "null"] },
+    "expected_lifetime_ms": { "type": ["integer", "null"], "minimum": 0 },
+    "capability_budget": { "type": ["object", "null"] },
+    "requestor": { "type": ["string", "null"] },
+    "capability": { "type": ["string", "null"] },
+    "requested_service": { "type": ["string", "null"] },
+    "decision": { "enum": ["allow", "deny", "degrade", "missing", "unknown", null] },
+    "classification": {
+      "enum": [
+        "expected_denial",
+        "unexpected_denial",
+        "compatibility_probe",
+        "policy_regression",
+        "malicious_probe_candidate",
+        "missing_service",
+        "teardown_race",
+        "duplicate_activation_coalesced",
+        "supervisor_worker_lifecycle_kill",
+        "unknown",
+        null
+      ]
+    },
+    "policy_rule": { "type": ["string", "null"] },
+    "data_accessed": { "type": ["boolean", "null"] },
+    "exit_status": { "type": ["string", "null"] },
+    "duration_ms": { "type": ["integer", "null"], "minimum": 0 },
+    "children_cleaned": { "type": ["boolean", "null"] },
+    "unexpected_denials": { "type": ["integer", "null"], "minimum": 0 },
+    "network_used": { "type": ["boolean", "null"] },
+    "receipt_complete": { "type": ["boolean", "null"] },
+    "raw_message": { "type": ["string", "null"] },
+    "normalized_class": { "type": ["string", "null"] },
+    "severity": { "enum": ["trace", "info", "notice", "warning", "error", "critical", null] },
+    "meaning": { "type": ["string", "null"] },
+    "policy_impact": { "type": ["string", "null"] },
+    "service_key": { "type": ["string", "null"] },
+    "service_uuid": { "type": ["string", "null"] },
+    "service_family_role": { "type": ["string", "null"] },
+    "phase": { "type": ["string", "null"] },
+    "line_no": { "type": ["integer", "null"] },
+    "tags": { "type": ["array", "null"], "items": { "type": "string" } },
+    "inference_confidence": { "enum": ["high", "medium", "low", "unknown", null] }
+  },
+  "allOf": [
+    {
+      "if": { "properties": { "event_type": { "const": "helper.spawn" } } },
+      "then": { "required": ["parent_process", "child_process", "trigger", "spawn_reason", "policy_profile"] }
+    },
+    {
+      "if": { "properties": { "event_type": { "const": "capability.request" } } },
+      "then": { "required": ["requestor", "capability", "requested_service", "decision", "classification", "data_accessed"] }
+    },
+    {
+      "if": { "properties": { "event_type": { "const": "helper.exit" } } },
+      "then": { "required": ["process", "exit_status", "duration_ms", "receipt_complete"] }
+    }
+  ],
+  "additionalProperties": true
+}
diff --git a/tests/fixtures/helper-receipts/preview_local_only_fail_network_allowed.json b/tests/fixtures/helper-receipts/preview_local_only_fail_network_allowed.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b364b8d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/fixtures/helper-receipts/preview_local_only_fail_network_allowed.json
@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+{
+  "schema": "sourceos.helper_causal_receipt.v0.1",
+  "event_type": "capability.request",
+  "event_id": "evt_fixture_preview_fail",
+  "timestamp": "2026-05-06T00:00:01Z",
+  "root_intent_id": "intent.preview.file.fixture",
+  "policy_profile": "preview.local_only.v1",
+  "requestor": "sourceos-pdf-renderer",
+  "capability": "network.egress",
+  "requested_service": "network",
+  "decision": "allow",
+  "classification": "policy_regression",
+  "data_accessed": true
+}
diff --git a/tests/fixtures/helper-receipts/preview_local_only_pass.json b/tests/fixtures/helper-receipts/preview_local_only_pass.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..865cbd2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/fixtures/helper-receipts/preview_local_only_pass.json
@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+{
+  "schema": "sourceos.helper_causal_receipt.v0.1",
+  "event_type": "capability.request",
+  "event_id": "evt_fixture_preview_pass",
+  "timestamp": "2026-05-06T00:00:00Z",
+  "root_intent_id": "intent.preview.file.fixture",
+  "policy_profile": "preview.local_only.v1",
+  "requestor": "sourceos-pdf-renderer",
+  "capability": "network.egress",
+  "requested_service": "network",
+  "decision": "deny",
+  "classification": "expected_denial",
+  "data_accessed": false
+}
diff --git a/tests/fixtures/helper-receipts/web_thumbnail_pass_clipboard_denied.json b/tests/fixtures/helper-receipts/web_thumbnail_pass_clipboard_denied.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..97c0f14
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/fixtures/helper-receipts/web_thumbnail_pass_clipboard_denied.json
@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+{
+  "schema": "sourceos.helper_causal_receipt.v0.1",
+  "event_type": "capability.request",
+  "event_id": "evt_fixture_webthumb_pass",
+  "timestamp": "2026-05-06T00:00:02Z",
+  "root_intent_id": "intent.preview.web.fixture",
+  "policy_profile": "preview.web_thumbnail.local_only.v1",
+  "requestor": "sourceos-web-thumbnailer",
+  "capability": "pasteboard.read",
+  "requested_service": "pasteboard",
+  "decision": "deny",
+  "classification": "expected_denial",
+  "data_accessed": false
+}
diff --git a/tests/test_unified_log_helper_correlator.py b/tests/test_unified_log_helper_correlator.py
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..92c1893
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/test_unified_log_helper_correlator.py
@@ -0,0 +1,45 @@
+from tools.unified_log_helper_correlator import build_dag
+
+
+def test_build_dag_basic_lifecycle():
+    events = [
+        {
+            "event_id": "evt1",
+            "event_type": "helper.spawn",
+            "timestamp": "2026-05-05 20:00:00.000000",
+            "line_no": 1,
+            "root_intent_id": "intent.test",
+            "phase": "cache_cleanup",
+            "pid": 1,
+            "service_key": "svc",
+            "lifecycle_state": "will_spawn",
+        },
+        {
+            "event_id": "evt2",
+            "event_type": "helper.spawn",
+            "timestamp": "2026-05-05 20:00:00.100000",
+            "line_no": 2,
+            "root_intent_id": "intent.test",
+            "phase": "cache_cleanup",
+            "pid": 1,
+            "service_key": "svc",
+            "lifecycle_state": "xpcproxy_spawned",
+        },
+        {
+            "event_id": "evt3",
+            "event_type": "helper.exit",
+            "timestamp": "2026-05-05 20:00:01.000000",
+            "line_no": 3,
+            "root_intent_id": "intent.test",
+            "phase": "cache_cleanup",
+            "pid": 1,
+            "service_key": "svc",
+            "lifecycle_state": "exited",
+        },
+    ]
+
+    dag = build_dag(events)
+    assert dag["summary"]["event_count"] == 3
+    assert dag["summary"]["edge_type_counts"]["contains_phase"] == 1
+    assert dag["summary"]["edge_type_counts"]["same_pid_next_event"] >= 2
+    assert dag["summary"]["edge_type_counts"]["lifecycle_progression"] >= 2
diff --git a/tests/test_unified_log_helper_parser.py b/tests/test_unified_log_helper_parser.py
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..74c79bc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/test_unified_log_helper_parser.py
@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
+from tools.unified_log_helper_parser import parse_text
+
+
+def test_parse_mdworker_spawn():
+    text = "2026-05-05 20:40:14.174009 (user/501/com.apple.mdworker.shared.08000000-0600-0000-0000-000000000000) <Notice>: internal event: WILL_SPAWN, code = 0"
+    events = parse_text(text)
+    assert len(events) == 1
+    assert events[0]["event_type"] == "helper.spawn"
+    assert events[0]["phase"] == "spotlight_metadata_indexing"
+    assert events[0]["policy_profile"] == "indexer.metadata_local.v1"
+
+
+def test_parse_denied_pasteboard():
+    text = "2026-05-05 20:42:00.415146 (gui/501 [100023]) <Warning>: denied lookup: name = com.apple.pasteboard.1, requestor = WebThumbnailExt[53926], error = 159: Sandbox restriction"
+    events = parse_text(text)
+    assert len(events) == 1
+    assert events[0]["event_type"] == "capability.request"
+    assert events[0]["capability"] == "pasteboard.read"
+    assert events[0]["decision"] == "deny"
+    assert events[0]["data_accessed"] is False
+    assert events[0]["phase"] == "web_thumbnail_or_webkit_helper"
+
+
+def test_parse_teardown_without_context():
+    text = "2026-05-05 20:42:03.378197 <Error>: invalid client reply port -1"
+    events = parse_text(text)
+    assert len(events) == 1
+    assert events[0]["event_type"] == "teardown.normalized"
+    assert events[0]["normalized_class"] == "invalid_reply_endpoint_after_teardown"
diff --git a/tools/check_helper_receipts.py b/tools/check_helper_receipts.py
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ca23b15
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tools/check_helper_receipts.py
@@ -0,0 +1,102 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env python3
+"""Minimal CI policy gate for SourceOS Helper Causal Receipts.
+
+This intentionally checks high-value invariants first:
+- every event has a root intent
+- helper spawns declare parent/process/trigger/reason/policy
+- capability requests declare decision/classification/data_accessed
+- local-only profiles do not allow network, DNS, analytics, pasteboard, or account lookup
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from pathlib import Path
+import argparse
+import json
+import sys
+from typing import Iterable
+
+LOCAL_ONLY_PROFILES = {
+    "preview.local_only.v1",
+    "preview.web_thumbnail.local_only.v1",
+    "terminal.preview.local_only.v1",
+    "cache_cleanup.local_only.v1",
+    "file_picker.native_ui.v1",
+}
+
+DENY_IN_LOCAL_ONLY = {
+    "network.egress",
+    "dns.lookup",
+    "analytics.emit",
+    "pasteboard.read",
+    "pasteboard.write",
+    "account.lookup",
+    "credentials.keychain.lookup",
+}
+
+
+def iter_events(path: Path) -> Iterable[dict]:
+    if path.suffix == ".jsonl":
+        for line in path.read_text(errors="replace").splitlines():
+            if line.strip():
+                yield json.loads(line)
+    else:
+        data = json.loads(path.read_text(errors="replace"))
+        if isinstance(data, list):
+            yield from data
+        else:
+            yield data
+
+
+def check_event(ev: dict) -> list[str]:
+    errors: list[str] = []
+
+    if not str(ev.get("root_intent_id", "")).startswith("intent."):
+        errors.append("root_intent_id must start with 'intent.'.")
+
+    event_type = ev.get("event_type")
+
+    if event_type == "helper.spawn":
+        for field in ["parent_process", "child_process", "trigger", "spawn_reason", "policy_profile"]:
+            if field not in ev or ev.get(field) in (None, ""):
+                errors.append(f"helper.spawn missing {field}")
+
+    if event_type == "capability.request":
+        for field in ["requestor", "capability", "requested_service", "decision", "classification", "data_accessed"]:
+            if field not in ev:
+                errors.append(f"capability.request missing {field}")
+
+        if ev.get("policy_profile") in LOCAL_ONLY_PROFILES:
+            if ev.get("capability") in DENY_IN_LOCAL_ONLY and ev.get("decision") == "allow":
+                errors.append(
+                    f"local-only policy {ev.get('policy_profile')} allowed forbidden capability {ev.get('capability')}"
+                )
+
+    if event_type == "helper.exit":
+        for field in ["process", "exit_status", "duration_ms", "receipt_complete"]:
+            if field not in ev:
+                errors.append(f"helper.exit missing {field}")
+
+    return errors
+
+
+def main() -> int:
+    parser = argparse.ArgumentParser()
+    parser.add_argument("paths", nargs="+", type=Path)
+    args = parser.parse_args()
+
+    failures: list[dict] = []
+    checked = 0
+
+    for path in args.paths:
+        for index, event in enumerate(iter_events(path)):
+            checked += 1
+            for error in check_event(event):
+                failures.append({"path": str(path), "index": index, "error": error})
+
+    print(json.dumps({"checked": checked, "errors": failures}, indent=2, sort_keys=True))
+    return 1 if failures else 0
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    raise SystemExit(main())
diff --git a/tools/unified_log_helper_correlator.py b/tools/unified_log_helper_correlator.py
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..86d7482
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tools/unified_log_helper_correlator.py
@@ -0,0 +1,201 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env python3
+"""Helper Causal Receipt DAG correlator.
+
+Reads JSONL emitted by `tools/unified_log_helper_parser.py` and builds a conservative
+DAG. The graph is intentionally observational:
+
+- phase containment edges group events by inferred subsystem family
+- same-PID edges preserve chronological process-local continuity
+- same-service edges preserve service-key continuity
+- lifecycle edges connect spawn/init/exit progressions
+- nearby capability edges connect service lookups to recent same-PID helper lifecycle events
+
+The correlator does not claim private OS intent; it reconstructs visible evidence
+for user-facing explanation and policy review.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from pathlib import Path
+import argparse
+from collections import Counter, defaultdict
+from datetime import datetime
+import json
+from typing import Any
+
+
+def ts_float(timestamp: str) -> float:
+    for fmt in ("%Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%S.%f", "%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%SZ"):
+        try:
+            return datetime.strptime(timestamp, fmt).timestamp()
+        except ValueError:
+            continue
+    return 0.0
+
+
+def load_events(path: Path) -> list[dict[str, Any]]:
+    events: list[dict[str, Any]] = []
+    for line in path.read_text(errors="replace").splitlines():
+        if line.strip():
+            events.append(json.loads(line))
+    return events
+
+
+def build_dag(events: list[dict[str, Any]]) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    events = sorted(events, key=lambda ev: (ts_float(ev.get("timestamp", "")), ev.get("line_no", 0)))
+
+    nodes: dict[str, dict[str, Any]] = {}
+    edges: list[dict[str, Any]] = []
+
+    root_id = "root:intent.imported_log.analysis.synthetic"
+    nodes[root_id] = {
+        "id": root_id,
+        "type": "root_intent",
+        "label": "Imported unified-log helper receipt analysis",
+    }
+
+    for event in events:
+        phase = event.get("phase", "unknown_or_general_launchd_churn")
+        phase_id = f"phase:{phase}"
+        if phase_id not in nodes:
+            nodes[phase_id] = {
+                "id": phase_id,
+                "type": "phase",
+                "label": phase.replace("_", " "),
+                "phase": phase,
+            }
+            edges.append({"source": root_id, "target": phase_id, "type": "contains_phase"})
+
+        event_id = event["event_id"]
+        nodes[event_id] = {
+            "id": event_id,
+            "type": event.get("event_type"),
+            "timestamp": event.get("timestamp"),
+            "line_no": event.get("line_no"),
+            "label": event.get("lifecycle_state") or event.get("capability") or event.get("normalized_class") or event.get("event_type"),
+            "pid": event.get("pid"),
+            "service_key": event.get("service_key"),
+            "service_uuid": event.get("service_uuid"),
+            "phase": phase,
+            "policy_profile": event.get("policy_profile"),
+            "service_family_role": event.get("service_family_role"),
+            "capability": event.get("capability"),
+            "requested_service": event.get("requested_service"),
+            "decision": event.get("decision"),
+            "classification": event.get("classification"),
+            "lifecycle_state": event.get("lifecycle_state"),
+            "exit_status": event.get("exit_status"),
+            "duration_ms": event.get("duration_ms"),
+            "severity": event.get("severity"),
+            "inference_confidence": event.get("inference_confidence"),
+        }
+        edges.append({"source": phase_id, "target": event_id, "type": "contains_event"})
+
+    by_pid: dict[int, list[dict[str, Any]]] = defaultdict(list)
+    by_service: dict[str, list[dict[str, Any]]] = defaultdict(list)
+
+    for event in events:
+        if event.get("pid") is not None:
+            by_pid[int(event["pid"])].append(event)
+        if event.get("service_key"):
+            by_service[str(event["service_key"])].append(event)
+
+    for pid, pid_events in by_pid.items():
+        pid_events = sorted(pid_events, key=lambda ev: (ts_float(ev.get("timestamp", "")), ev.get("line_no", 0)))
+        for previous, current in zip(pid_events, pid_events[1:]):
+            edges.append({
+                "source": previous["event_id"],
+                "target": current["event_id"],
+                "type": "same_pid_next_event",
+                "pid": pid,
+            })
+
+    lifecycle_order = {
+        "will_spawn": 1,
+        "xpcproxy_spawned": 2,
+        "source_attach": 3,
+        "running_or_init": 4,
+        "exited": 5,
+    }
+
+    for service_key, service_events in by_service.items():
+        service_events = sorted(service_events, key=lambda ev: (ts_float(ev.get("timestamp", "")), ev.get("line_no", 0)))
+
+        for previous, current in zip(service_events, service_events[1:]):
+            edges.append({
+                "source": previous["event_id"],
+                "target": current["event_id"],
+                "type": "same_service_next_event",
+                "service_key": service_key,
+            })
+
+        lifecycle_events = [event for event in service_events if event.get("lifecycle_state")]
+        for previous, current in zip(lifecycle_events, lifecycle_events[1:]):
+            previous_order = lifecycle_order.get(previous.get("lifecycle_state"), 99)
+            current_order = lifecycle_order.get(current.get("lifecycle_state"), 99)
+            edge_type = "lifecycle_progression" if current_order >= previous_order else "lifecycle_loop_or_reactivation"
+            edges.append({
+                "source": previous["event_id"],
+                "target": current["event_id"],
+                "type": edge_type,
+                "service_key": service_key,
+            })
+
+    prior_lifecycle_by_pid: dict[int, list[dict[str, Any]]] = defaultdict(list)
+    for event in events:
+        if event.get("event_type") in {"helper.spawn", "helper.exit"} and event.get("pid") is not None:
+            prior_lifecycle_by_pid[int(event["pid"])].append(event)
+
+    for event in events:
+        if event.get("event_type") != "capability.request" or event.get("pid") is None:
+            continue
+        candidates: list[tuple[float, dict[str, Any]]] = []
+        for candidate in prior_lifecycle_by_pid.get(int(event["pid"]), []):
+            delta = ts_float(event.get("timestamp", "")) - ts_float(candidate.get("timestamp", ""))
+            if 0 <= delta <= 10:
+                candidates.append((delta, candidate))
+        if candidates:
+            _, nearest = sorted(candidates, key=lambda item: item[0])[0]
+            edges.append({
+                "source": nearest["event_id"],
+                "target": event["event_id"],
+                "type": "nearby_pid_capability_request",
+                "pid": event.get("pid"),
+            })
+
+    summary = {
+        "event_count": len(events),
+        "node_count": len(nodes),
+        "edge_count": len(edges),
+        "event_type_counts": dict(Counter(event.get("event_type") for event in events)),
+        "phase_counts": dict(Counter(event.get("phase", "unknown_or_general_launchd_churn") for event in events)),
+        "policy_profile_counts": dict(Counter(event.get("policy_profile", "unknown") for event in events)),
+        "service_family_role_counts": dict(Counter(event.get("service_family_role", "unknown") for event in events)),
+        "capability_counts": dict(Counter(event.get("capability") for event in events if event.get("capability"))),
+        "lifecycle_state_counts": dict(Counter(event.get("lifecycle_state") for event in events if event.get("lifecycle_state"))),
+        "edge_type_counts": dict(Counter(edge["type"] for edge in edges)),
+    }
+
+    return {
+        "schema": "sourceos.helper_causal_receipt_dag.v0.1",
+        "root_intent_id": "intent.imported_log.analysis.synthetic",
+        "summary": summary,
+        "nodes": list(nodes.values()),
+        "edges": edges,
+    }
+
+
+def main() -> int:
+    parser = argparse.ArgumentParser()
+    parser.add_argument("jsonl", type=Path)
+    parser.add_argument("--out", type=Path, required=True)
+    args = parser.parse_args()
+
+    dag = build_dag(load_events(args.jsonl))
+    args.out.write_text(json.dumps(dag, indent=2, sort_keys=True))
+    print(json.dumps(dag["summary"], indent=2, sort_keys=True))
+    return 0
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    raise SystemExit(main())
diff --git a/tools/unified_log_helper_parser.py b/tools/unified_log_helper_parser.py
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e9b0fee
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tools/unified_log_helper_parser.py
@@ -0,0 +1,211 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env python3
+"""Unified-log-style helper receipt parser.
+
+Converts macOS unified-log style text into conservative Helper Causal Receipt
+candidate events. This tool is intentionally observational: it reconstructs
+visible lifecycle/capability patterns from text and does not claim private OS
+subsystem ground truth.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from pathlib import Path
+import argparse
+import json
+import re
+import uuid
+from typing import Optional
+
+LINE_RE = re.compile(
+    r"^(?P<ts>\d{4}-\d{2}-\d{2} \d{2}:\d{2}:\d{2}\.\d+)\s+"
+    r"(?:\((?P<context>[^)]*)\)\s+)?"
+    r"<(?P<severity>[^>]+)>:\s+"
+    r"(?P<msg>.*)$"
+)
+PID_RE = re.compile(r"(?:pid/|\[)(?P<pid>\d+)")
+SERVICE_NAME_RE = re.compile(r"name = (?P<name>[^,\s]+)")
+REQUESTOR_RE = re.compile(r"requestor = (?P<requestor>[^,\s]+)")
+XPCPROXY_RE = re.compile(r"xpcproxy spawned with pid (?P<pid>\d+)")
+EXIT_DURATION_RE = re.compile(r"ran for (?P<ms>\d+)ms")
+UUIDISH_RE = re.compile(r"([A-F0-9]{8}-[A-F0-9]{4}-[A-F0-9]{4}-[A-F0-9]{4}-[A-F0-9]{12})", re.I)
+
+SERVICE_FAMILY_RULES = [
+    ("mdworker", "spotlight_metadata_indexing", "indexer.metadata_local.v1", "metadata_index_worker"),
+    ("CacheDelete", "cache_cleanup", "cache_cleanup.local_only.v1", "cache_cleanup"),
+    ("CacheExtension", "cache_cleanup", "cache_cleanup.local_only.v1", "cache_cleanup"),
+    ("WebKit", "web_thumbnail_or_webkit_helper", "preview.web_thumbnail.local_only.v1", "web_runtime_helper"),
+    ("WebThumbnail", "web_thumbnail_or_webkit_helper", "preview.web_thumbnail.local_only.v1", "web_thumbnail_helper"),
+    ("QuickLook", "quicklook_preview_rendering", "preview.local_only.v1", "preview_ui_or_thumbnail"),
+    ("CGPDFService", "quicklook_preview_rendering", "preview.local_only.v1", "pdf_rendering_helper"),
+    ("ImageIOXPCService", "quicklook_preview_rendering", "preview.local_only.v1", "image_decode_helper"),
+    ("ThumbnailExtension", "quicklook_preview_rendering", "preview.local_only.v1", "thumbnail_helper"),
+    ("screencapture", "screenshot_capture", "screenshot.capture_receipt.v1", "screenshot_capture_ui"),
+    ("openAndSavePanelService", "native_file_picker", "file_picker.native_ui.v1", "native_file_picker"),
+    ("AXVisualSupportAgent", "accessibility_ui_support", "accessibility.ui_support.v1", "accessibility_visual_support"),
+    ("com.apple.accessibility", "accessibility_ui_support", "accessibility.ui_support.v1", "accessibility_service"),
+    ("com.apple.filesystems.netfs", "filesystem_netfs_plugin", "filesystem.netfs_plugin.v1", "network_filesystem_plugin"),
+    ("PlugInLibraryService", "filesystem_netfs_plugin", "filesystem.netfs_plugin.v1", "plugin_library_service"),
+    ("iconservices", "iconservices_rendering", "iconservices.rendering_local.v1", "icon_rendering_service"),
+    ("AudioComponentRegistrar", "audio_component_discovery", "audio.component_scan_local.v1", "audio_component_registry"),
+    ("CarbonComponentScanner", "audio_component_discovery", "audio.component_scan_local.v1", "audio_component_scanner"),
+    ("trustd", "trust_and_certificate_services", "trust.security_local.v1", "certificate_trust_service"),
+    ("secinitd", "trust_and_certificate_services", "trust.security_local.v1", "security_initialization"),
+    ("amfid", "security_integrity_sidecar", "security.scan_local.v1", "code_integrity"),
+    ("XProtect", "security_integrity_sidecar", "security.scan_local.v1", "malware_protection"),
+    ("CloudTelemetry", "telemetry_sidecar", "telemetry.local_metric.v1", "telemetry_service"),
+    ("ecosystemanalytics", "telemetry_sidecar", "telemetry.local_metric.v1", "ecosystem_analytics"),
+    ("geod", "location_services", "location.service_deny_by_default.v1", "location_service"),
+    ("appleaccountd", "account_identity_services", "account.identity_deny_by_default.v1", "account_identity_service"),
+    ("iCloudNotificationAgent", "cloud_notification_services", "cloud_notification_deny_by_default.v1", "icloud_notification_agent"),
+    ("WorkflowKit", "workflow_background_shortcuts", "workflow.background_shortcut.v1", "background_shortcut_runner"),
+    ("MTLCompilerService", "metal_shader_compilation", "gpu.shader_compile_local.v1", "metal_compiler_service"),
+    ("swcd", "shared_web_credentials", "web_credentials_deny_by_default.v1", "shared_web_credentials_daemon"),
+]
+
+CAPABILITY_RULES = [
+    ("pasteboard", "pasteboard.read", "high"),
+    ("analyticsd", "analytics.emit", "high"),
+    ("ecosystemanalyticsd", "analytics.emit", "high"),
+    ("tccd", "privacy.tcc.lookup", "high"),
+    ("distributed_notifications", "notifications.distributed.lookup", "medium"),
+    ("webprivacyd", "privacy.web.lookup", "high"),
+    ("PowerManagement", "power.management.lookup", "medium"),
+    ("CARenderServer", "render.ca_server.lookup", "medium"),
+    ("windowserver", "windowserver.lookup", "high"),
+    ("dock", "dock.lookup", "low"),
+    ("LaunchServices", "launchservices.lookup", "medium"),
+    ("coreservices", "coreservices.lookup", "medium"),
+    ("FileProvider", "fileprovider.lookup", "high"),
+    ("CloudTelemetry", "telemetry.cloud.lookup", "high"),
+    ("XProtect", "security.xprotect.lookup", "medium"),
+    ("MobileFileIntegrity", "security.code_integrity.lookup", "medium"),
+    ("Keychain", "credentials.keychain.lookup", "critical"),
+    ("securityd", "security.service.lookup", "high"),
+    ("apsd", "push_notifications.lookup", "medium"),
+    ("geod", "location.service.lookup", "critical"),
+]
+
+
+def new_event_id() -> str:
+    return "evt_" + uuid.uuid4().hex
+
+
+def service_key(context: str) -> str:
+    return re.sub(r"\s+\[\d+\]$", "", context or "global")
+
+
+def family_for(text: str) -> tuple[str, str, str]:
+    low = text.lower()
+    for needle, phase, policy, role in SERVICE_FAMILY_RULES:
+        if needle.lower() in low:
+            return phase, policy, role
+    return "unknown_or_general_launchd_churn", "unknown", "unknown"
+
+
+def capability_for(service_name: str) -> tuple[str, str]:
+    low = service_name.lower()
+    for needle, cap, sensitivity in CAPABILITY_RULES:
+        if needle.lower() in low:
+            return cap, sensitivity
+    return "mach_service.lookup", "unknown"
+
+
+def base_event(ts: str, context: str, msg: str, severity: str, line_no: int) -> dict:
+    pid_match = PID_RE.search(context or "") or PID_RE.search(msg)
+    pid = int(pid_match.group("pid")) if pid_match else None
+    uuid_match = UUIDISH_RE.search((context or "") + " " + msg)
+    phase, policy_profile, role = family_for((context or "") + " " + msg)
+    return {
+        "schema": "sourceos.helper_causal_receipt.v0.1",
+        "event_id": new_event_id(),
+        "timestamp": ts,
+        "root_intent_id": "intent.imported_log.analysis.synthetic",
+        "raw_message": msg,
+        "pid": pid,
+        "line_no": line_no,
+        "service_key": service_key(context or "global"),
+        "service_uuid": uuid_match.group(1) if uuid_match else None,
+        "phase": phase,
+        "policy_profile": policy_profile,
+        "service_family_role": role,
+        "source_severity": severity,
+    }
+
+
+def classify(parsed: dict, line_no: int) -> Optional[dict]:
+    context = parsed.get("context") or "global"
+    msg = parsed["msg"]
+    base = base_event(parsed["ts"], context, msg, parsed["severity"], line_no)
+    child = base["service_key"].split("/")[-1].split(" [")[0]
+
+    if "internal event: WILL_SPAWN" in msg:
+        return {**base, "event_type": "helper.spawn", "lifecycle_state": "will_spawn", "parent_event_id": None, "parent_process": context, "child_process": child, "trigger": "ipc_or_launchd", "spawn_reason": "Demand-spawned helper candidate observed in unified log", "classification": "unknown", "inference_confidence": "medium", "severity": "trace"}
+
+    xpc = XPCPROXY_RE.search(msg)
+    if xpc:
+        return {**base, "event_type": "helper.spawn", "lifecycle_state": "xpcproxy_spawned", "parent_event_id": None, "parent_process": context, "child_process": child, "pid": int(xpc.group("pid")), "trigger": "xpcproxy", "spawn_reason": "xpcproxy materialized helper process", "classification": "unknown", "inference_confidence": "high", "severity": "trace"}
+
+    if "SOURCE_ATTACH" in msg:
+        return {**base, "event_type": "helper.spawn", "lifecycle_state": "source_attach", "parent_event_id": None, "parent_process": context, "child_process": child, "trigger": "source_attach", "spawn_reason": "IPC/event source attached to helper", "classification": "unknown", "inference_confidence": "medium", "severity": "trace"}
+
+    if "service state: running" in msg or "internal event: INIT" in msg or "job state = running" in msg:
+        return {**base, "event_type": "helper.spawn", "lifecycle_state": "running_or_init", "parent_event_id": None, "parent_process": context, "child_process": child, "trigger": "init", "spawn_reason": "Helper entered running/initialized state", "classification": "unknown", "inference_confidence": "medium", "severity": "trace"}
+
+    if "denied lookup" in msg or "failed lookup" in msg:
+        service_match = SERVICE_NAME_RE.search(msg)
+        requestor_match = REQUESTOR_RE.search(msg)
+        service = service_match.group("name") if service_match else "unknown"
+        capability, sensitivity = capability_for(service)
+        denied = "denied lookup" in msg
+        return {**base, "event_type": "capability.request", "requestor": requestor_match.group("requestor") if requestor_match else context, "capability": capability, "capability_sensitivity": sensitivity, "requested_service": service, "decision": "deny" if denied else "missing", "classification": "expected_denial" if denied else "missing_service", "policy_rule": f"{base['policy_profile']}.default_deny" if denied else None, "data_accessed": False, "inference_confidence": "high" if denied else "medium", "severity": "notice"}
+
+    teardown_rules = [
+        ("Operation already in progress", "duplicate_activation_coalesced", "Duplicate activation request while helper already active"),
+        ("no client port found", "client_endpoint_missing_after_teardown", "Client disappeared before service reply completed"),
+        ("invalid client reply port", "invalid_reply_endpoint_after_teardown", "Reply endpoint invalid during cleanup"),
+        ("job not found", "service_removed_before_reply", "Service exited before late lookup/reply completed"),
+        ("ENOSERVICE", "service_removed_before_reply", "Service exited before late lookup/reply completed"),
+    ]
+    for needle, normalized_class, meaning in teardown_rules:
+        if needle in msg:
+            classification = "teardown_race" if "reply" in normalized_class or "teardown" in normalized_class else "duplicate_activation_coalesced"
+            return {**base, "event_type": "teardown.normalized", "normalized_class": normalized_class, "meaning": meaning, "receipt_complete": True, "policy_impact": "none", "classification": classification, "inference_confidence": "medium", "severity": "notice"}
+
+    if "exited due to" in msg:
+        duration_match = EXIT_DURATION_RE.search(msg)
+        status = "clean" if "exit(0)" in msg else "supervisor_kill" if "SIGKILL" in msg else "unknown_exit"
+        classification = "supervisor_worker_lifecycle_kill" if "SIGKILL" in msg and ("mds[" in msg or "launchd" in msg) else "unknown"
+        return {**base, "event_type": "helper.exit", "lifecycle_state": "exited", "process": context, "exit_status": status, "duration_ms": int(duration_match.group("ms")) if duration_match else 0, "children_cleaned": None, "unexpected_denials": None, "network_used": None, "receipt_complete": True, "classification": classification, "inference_confidence": "high" if duration_match else "medium", "severity": "trace" if status == "clean" else "notice"}
+
+    return None
+
+
+def parse_text(text: str) -> list[dict]:
+    events = []
+    for line_no, line in enumerate(text.splitlines(), 1):
+        match = LINE_RE.match(line)
+        if not match:
+            continue
+        event = classify(match.groupdict(), line_no)
+        if event:
+            events.append(event)
+    return events
+
+
+def main() -> int:
+    parser = argparse.ArgumentParser()
+    parser.add_argument("input", type=Path)
+    parser.add_argument("--jsonl", type=Path, required=True)
+    args = parser.parse_args()
+
+    events = parse_text(args.input.read_text(errors="replace"))
+    with args.jsonl.open("w") as handle:
+        for event in events:
+            handle.write(json.dumps(event, sort_keys=True) + "\n")
+
+    print(json.dumps({"events": len(events)}, indent=2, sort_keys=True))
+    return 0
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    raise SystemExit(main())