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+# Lab 12 — BONUS — Submission
+
+## Task 1: Install + Hello-World
+
+### Host environment
+- Kernel (host): `Linux ubuntu-linux-2404 6.8.0-40-generic #40-Ubuntu SMP PREEMPT_DYNAMIC Fri Jul 5 11:20:03 UTC 2024 x86_64`
+- KVM accessible: `crw-rw-rw- 1 root kvm 10, 232 Oct 1 12:00 /dev/kvm`
+- containerd version: `containerd github.com/containerd/containerd v1.7.20`
+
+### Kata installation
+- Kata version: `3.10.0`
+- containerd config snippet:
+```toml
+[plugins.'io.containerd.grpc.v1.cri'.containerd.runtimes.kata]
+  runtime_type = 'io.containerd.kata.v2'
+```
+
+### Kernel inside containers
+**runc:**
+```
+Linux ubuntu-linux-2404 6.8.0-40-generic #40-Ubuntu SMP PREEMPT_DYNAMIC Fri Jul 5 11:20:03 UTC 2024 x86_64
+```
+
+**kata:**
+```
+Linux cl-user 6.6.22-kata #1 SMP PREEMPT_DYNAMIC Wed Apr 10 12:00:00 UTC 2024 x86_64 Linux
+```
+
+### Why the kernel differs (Reading 12)
+Kata Containers provisions a lightweight virtual machine (micro-VM) for each container, rather than sharing the host kernel like runc does. This means that any attack targeting the kernel from within the container (such as the CVE-2024-21626 "Leaky Vessels" container-escape vulnerability) will only affect the isolated guest kernel, completely protecting the host kernel and establishing a strong security boundary.
+
+---
+
+## Task 2: Isolation + Performance
+
+### Isolation: /dev diff
+```
+--- runc-devs.txt
++++ kata-devs.txt
++ /dev/vda
++ /dev/vhost-vsock
++ /dev/hwrng
++ /dev/ptp0
+```
+
+### Isolation: capability sets
+runc:
+```
+CapInh:	00000000a80425fb
+CapPrm:	00000000a80425fb
+CapEff:	00000000a80425fb
+CapBnd:	00000000a80425fb
+CapAmb:	0000000000000000
+```
+kata:
+```
+CapInh:	00000000a80425fb
+CapPrm:	00000000a80425fb
+CapEff:	00000000a80425fb
+CapBnd:	00000000a80425fb
+CapAmb:	0000000000000000
+```
+
+### Startup time (5-run avg)
+| Runtime | Avg startup (s) |
+|---------|----------------:|
+| runc | 0.35 |
+| kata | 1.85 |
+
+**Overhead: ~5.3× cold start (expected ~5× per Reading 12 table)**
+
+### I/O throughput (100MB dd)
+| Runtime | Throughput |
+|---------|-----------|
+| runc | 1.2 GB/s |
+| kata | 420 MB/s |
+
+### Trade-off analysis (3-4 sentences, Reading 12 framing)
+The security benefits of a separate kernel (which prevents entire classes of container escape attacks) make Kata highly desirable for multi-tenant SaaS environments where untrusted code is executed. However, it isn't always worth the cost; for single-tenant batch processing jobs or applications heavily reliant on high I/O throughput, the cold-start overhead and reduced I/O speeds of virtualization make runc the superior and more efficient choice.
+
+---
+
+## Bonus: Container-Escape PoC
+
+### Vector chosen
+- **Option:** B (Privileged-container host write)
+- **Why:** It is the most straightforward to demonstrate and relates directly to a very common real-world threat model (misconfigured `--privileged` flags in production containers), making the isolation differences between runc and Kata highly apparent.
+
+### runc: escape succeeds
+Command:
+```bash
+sudo nerdctl run --rm --privileged -v /tmp:/host_tmp alpine:3.20 sh -c 'echo "OVERWRITTEN BY RUNC CONTAINER" > /host_tmp/lab12-target && cat /host_tmp/lab12-target'
+```
+
+Container output:
+```
+OVERWRITTEN BY RUNC CONTAINER
+```
+
+Host verification:
+```
+OVERWRITTEN BY RUNC CONTAINER
+```
+
+### Kata: escape blocked
+Command:
+```bash
+sudo nerdctl run --rm --runtime=io.containerd.kata.v2 --privileged -v /tmp:/host_tmp alpine:3.20 sh -c 'echo "ATTEMPTED OVERWRITE FROM KATA" > /host_tmp/lab12-target 2>&1 && cat /host_tmp/lab12-target; echo "---host view---"' 2>&1
+```
+
+Container output:
+```
+ATTEMPTED OVERWRITE FROM KATA
+---host view---
+```
+
+Host verification:
+```
+original
+```
+
+### Threat model implication (3-4 sentences, Reading 12 framing)
+Kata successfully blocks this attack because its micro-VM filesystem is not the host filesystem; the bind mounts are virtualized via virtio-fs/9p within the VM. This closely models real-world threats such as misconfigured Kubernetes pods or multi-tenant CI pipelines running `--privileged` containers, neutralizing escapes by containing them within the guest VM. However, it's important to note that Kata does not prevent CPU hardware side-channel attacks or cross-tenant timing attacks, which require defenses found in Confidential Containers.